§3.2#1Ἔτι ὅταν δύο τινὰ ᾖ σφόδρα ἀλλήλοις παραπλήσια καὶ μὴ δυνώμεθα ὑπεροχὴν μηδεμίαν συνιδεῖν τοῦ ἑτέρου πρὸς τὸ ἕτερον, ὁρᾶν ἀπὸ τῶν παρεπομένων· ᾧ γὰρ ἕπεται μεῖζον ἀγαθόν, τοῦθ᾿ αἱρετώτερον.
Moreover, when any two things are very similar to each other and we cannot discern any superiority of one over the other, we must look to their consequences; for that which is followed by a greater good is more desirable.
Ἂν δ᾿ ᾖ τὰ ἑπόμενα κακά, ᾧ τὸ ἔλαττον ἀκολουθεῖ κακόν, τοῦθ᾿ αἱρετώτερον.
But if the consequences are evils, that which is followed by a lesser evil is more desirable.
Ὄντων γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων αἱρετῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει δυσχερές τι παρέπεσθαι.
For even when both are desirable, nothing prevents some difficulty from accompanying them.
Διχῶς δ᾿ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἕπεσθαι ἡ σκέψις· καὶ γὰρ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἕπεται, οἷον τῷ μανθάνοντι τὸ μὲν ἀγνοεῖν πρότερον, τὸ δ᾿ ἐπίστασθαι ὕστερον.
The consideration of consequences is twofold; for a consequence may be either prior or posterior, as for instance, for one who is learning, ignorance is prior, but knowledge is posterior.
Βέλτιον δ᾿ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὸ ὕστερον ἑπόμενον.
And as a rule, the posterior consequence is better.
Λαμβάνειν οὖν τῶν ἑπομένων ὁπότερον ἂν ᾖ χρήσιμον.
One should, therefore, take whichever of the consequences is useful.
Ἔτι τὰ πλείω ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἐλαττόνων, ἢ ἁπλῶς, ἢ ὅταν τὰ ἕτερα ἐν τοῖς ἑτέροις ὑπάρχῃ, τὰ ἐλάττῳ ἐν τοῖς πλείοσιν.
Moreover, a greater number of goods is more desirable than a smaller number, either absolutely, or when the one is present in the other, that is, the smaller number in the greater.
Ἔνστασις, εἴ που θάτερον θατέρου χάριν· οὐδὲν γὰρ αἱρετώτερα τὰ ἄμφω τοῦ ἑνός, οἷον τὸ ὑγιάζεσθαι καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια τῆς ὑγιείας, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ὑγιάζεσθαι τῆς ὑγιείας ἕνεκεν αἱρούμεθα.
An objection arises if perchance one is for the sake of the other; for both together are not at all more desirable than the one alone, for example, getting well and health than health, since we choose getting well for the sake of health.
Καὶ μὴ ἀγαθὰ δὲ ἀγαθῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει εἶναι αἱρετώτερα, οἷον εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ ἄλλο τι ὃ μή ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀνδρίας.
And nothing prevents things that are not goods from being more desirable than goods, for example, happiness and something else which is not a good than justice and courage.
Καὶ ταὐτὰ μεθ᾿ ἡδονῆς μᾶλλον ἢ ἄνευ ἡδονῆς.
Also, the same things with pleasure are more desirable than without pleasure.
Καὶ ταὐτὰ μετ᾿ ἀλυπίας μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ λύπης.
And the same things with freedom from pain than with pain.
Καὶ ἕκαστον ἐν ᾧ καιρῷ μεῖζον δύναται, ἐν τούτῳ καὶ αἱρετώτερον, οἷον τὸ ἀλύπως ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῇ νεότητι· μεῖζον γὰρ ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ δύναται.
And each thing, in the season in which it has greater power, is in this season also more desirable, for example, freedom from pain in old age rather than in youth; for it has greater power in old age.
Κατὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ αἱρετώτερον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ τοὺς νέους αἱρεῖται ἡγεμόνας διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀξιοῦν φρονίμους εἶναι.
According to this, prudence also is more desirable in old age; for no one chooses the young as leaders because they are not expected to be prudent.
Ἡ δ᾿ ἀνδρία ἀνάπαλιν· ἐν τῇ νεότητι γὰρ ἀναγκαιοτέρα ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρίαν ἐνέργεια.
But courage is the reverse; for in youth the activity according to courage is more necessary.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη· μᾶλλον γὰρ οἱ νέοι τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐνοχλοῦνται.
Similarly also with temperance; for the young are more troubled by desires than their elders.
Καὶ ὃ ἐν παντὶ καιρῷ ἢ ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις χρησιμώτερον, οἷον δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη ἀνδρίας· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀεὶ ἡ δὲ ποτὲ χρησίμη.
And that which is more useful at all times or on most occasions, for example, justice and temperance than courage; for the former are always useful, but the latter only sometimes.
Καὶ ὃ πάντων ἐχόντων μηδὲν θατέρου δεόμεθα, ἢ ὃ ἐχόντων προσδεόμεθα τοῦ λοιποῦ, καθάπερ ἐπὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀνδρίας· δικαίων μὲν γὰρ πάντων ὄντων οὐδὲν χρήσιμος ἡ ἀνδρία, ἀνδρείων δὲ πάντων ὄντων χρήσιμος ἡ δικαιοσύνη.
And that which, when all possess it, we have no need of the other, is more desirable than that which, when we possess it, we still need what remains, just as in the case of justice and courage; for if all were just, courage would be of no use, but if all were courageous, justice would still be useful.
Ἔτι ἐκ τῶν φθορῶν καὶ τῶν ἀποβολῶν καὶ τῶν γενέσεων καὶ τῶν λήψεων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων· ὧν γὰρ αἱ φθοραὶ φευκτότεραι, αὐτὰ αἱρετώτερα.
Moreover, from destructions, losses, generations, acquisitions, and contraries; for those things whose destructions are more to be avoided are themselves more desirable.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀποβολῶν καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων· οὗ γὰρ ἡ ἀποβολὴ ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον φευκτότερον, αὐτὸ αἱρετώτερον.
Similarly also in the case of losses and contraries; for that of which the loss or the contrary is more to be avoided is itself more desirable.
Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν γενέσεων καὶ τῶν λήψεων ἀνάπαλιν· ὧν γὰρ αἱ λήψεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις αἱρετώτεραι, καὶ αὐτὰ αἱρετώτερα.
But in the case of generations and acquisitions, the reverse holds; for those things whose acquisitions and generations are more desirable are themselves also more desirable.