§3.1#2Καὶ τὸ αἴτιον ἀγαθοῦ καθ᾿ αὑτὸ τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰτίου, καθάπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς τύχης· ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθ᾿ αὑτὴν ἡ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰτία τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.
And that which is in itself the cause of good is more desirable than that which is accidentally so, just as virtue is than fortune; for the former is in itself, the latter accidentally, the cause of goods, and if there is any other such thing.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου· τὸ γὰρ καθ᾿ αὑτὸ κακοῦ αἴτιον φευκτότερον τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον ἡ κακία καὶ ἡ τύχη· τὸ μὲν γὰρ καθ᾿ αὑτὸ κακόν, ἡ δὲ τύχη κατὰ συμβεβηκός.
Similarly also in the case of the contrary: for that which is in itself the cause of evil is more to be avoided than that which is so accidentally, for example, vice and fortune; for the former is an evil in itself, but fortune is so accidentally.
Καὶ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν τοῦ τινὶ αἱρετώτερον, οἷον τὸ ὑγιάζεσθαι τοῦ τέμνεσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ τινὶ τῷ δεομένῳ τομῆς.
And that which is absolutely good is more desirable than that which is so for some particular person, for example, being healthy than undergoing surgery; for the former is absolutely good, but the latter is so only for a particular person, namely the one who needs surgery.
Καὶ τὸ φύσει τοῦ μὴ φύσει, οἷον ἡ δικαιοσύνη τοῦ δικαίου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ φύσει, τὸ δ᾿ ἐπίκτητον.
And that which is by nature than that which is not by nature, for example, justice than the just man; for the former is by nature, but the latter is acquired.
Καὶ τὸ τῷ βελτίονι καὶ τιμιωτέρῳ ὑπάρχον αἱρετῶτερον, οἷον θεῷ ἢ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ψυχῇ ἢ σώματι.
And that which belongs to the better and more honorable is more desirable, for example, to God rather than to man, and to the soul rather than to the body.
Καὶ τὸ τοῦ βελτίονος ἴδιον βέλτιον ἢ τὸ τοῦ χείρονος, οἷον τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἢ τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ ἐν ἀμφοτέροις οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἀλλήλων, τοῖς δ᾿ ἰδίοις τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου ὑπερέχει.
And that which is peculiar to the better is better than that which is peculiar to the worse, for example, what is peculiar to God than what is peculiar to man; for in respect of what is common to both they do not differ from one another, but in their peculiar properties the one excels the other.
Καὶ τὸ ἐν βελτίοσιν ἢ προτέροις ἢ τιμιωτέροις βέλτιον, οἷον ὑγίεια ἰσχύος καὶ κάλλους.
And that which is in better or prior or more honorable things is better, for example, health than strength and beauty.
Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ὑγροῖς καὶ ξηροῖς καὶ θερμοῖς καὶ ψυχροῖς, ἁπλῶς δ᾿ εἰπεῖν ἐξ ὧν πρώτων συνέστηκε τὸ ζῷον, τὰ δ᾿ ἐν τοῖς ὑστέροις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἰσχὺς ἐν τοῖς νεύροις καὶ ὀστοῖς, τὸ δὲ κάλλος τῶν μελῶν τις συμμετρία δοκεῖ εἶναι.
For the former is in the moist, dry, hot, and cold—absolutely speaking, in the primary constituents of the living being—while the latter are in the secondary; for strength is in the sinews and bones, while beauty is thought to be a certain symmetry of the limbs.
Καὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος αἱρετώτερον δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ δυοῖν τὸ ἔγγιον τοῦ τέλους.
And the end seems to be more desirable than what is towards the end, and of two things, that which is nearer to the end.
Καὶ ὅλως τὸ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ βίου τέλος αἱρετώτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ πρὸς ἄλλο τι, οἷον τὸ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν συντεῖνον ἢ τὸ πρὸς φρόνησιν.
And generally, that which is directed towards the end of life is more desirable than that which is directed towards something else, for example, that which contributes to happiness rather than that which contributes to prudence.
Καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν τοῦ ἀδυνάτου.
And the possible than the impossible.
Ἔτι δύο ποιητικῶν, οὗ τὸ τέλος βέλτιον.
Moreover, of two productive causes, that of which the end is better is more desirable.
Ποιητικοῦ δὲ καὶ τέλους ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογον, ὅταν πλείονι ὑπερέχῃ τὸ τέλος τοῦ τέλους ἢ ἐκεῖνο τοῦ οἰκείου ποιητικοῦ, οἷον εἰ ἡ εὐδαιμονία πλείονι ὑπερέχει ὑγιείας ἢ ὑγίεια ὑγιεινοῦ, τὸ ποιητικὸν εὐδαιμονίας βέλτιον ὑγιείας.
And between a productive cause and an end, the comparison is made from analogy, when the end exceeds the other end by more than the latter exceeds its own productive cause; for example, if happiness exceeds health by more than health exceeds what is healthy, the productive cause of happiness is better than health.
Ὅσῳ γὰρ ἡ εὐδαιμονία ὑγιείας ὑπερέχει, τοσούτῳ καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν τὸ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ ὑπερέχει.
For by as much as happiness exceeds health, by so much also the productive cause of happiness exceeds the healthy.
Ἡ δὲ ὑγίεια τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ ἐλάττονι ὑπερεῖχεν, ὥστε πλείονι ὑπερέχει τὸ ποιητικὸν εὐδαιμονίας τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ ἢ ἡ ὑγίεια τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ.
But health exceeded the healthy by less, so that the productive cause of happiness exceeds the healthy by more than health exceeds the healthy.
Δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι αἱρετώτερον τὸ ποιητικὸν εὐδαιμονίας τῆς ὑγιείας· τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ πλείονι ὑπερέχει.
It is clear, then, that the productive cause of happiness is more desirable than health; for it exceeds the same thing by more.
Ἔτι τὸ κάλλιον καθ᾿ αὑτὸ καὶ τιμιώτερον καὶ ἐπαινετώτερον, οἷον φιλία πλούτου καὶ δικαιοσύνη ἰσχύος.
Moreover, that which is in itself more beautiful, more honorable, and more praiseworthy is more desirable, for example, friendship than wealth, and justice than strength.
Τὰ μὲν γὰρ καθ᾿ αὑτὰ τῶν τιμίων καὶ ἐπαινετῶν, τὰ δ᾿ οὐ καθ᾿ αὑτὰ ἀλλὰ δι᾿ ἕτερον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ τιμᾷ τὸν πλοῦτον δι᾿ ἑαυτὸν ἀλλὰ δι᾿ ἕτερον, τὴν δὲ φιλίαν καθ᾿ αὑτό, καὶ εἰ μηδὲν μέλλει ἡμῖν ἕτερον ἀπ᾿ αὐτῆς ἔσεσθαι.
For the former are in themselves honorable and praiseworthy, while the latter are not so in themselves but for the sake of something else; for no one honors wealth for its own sake but for the sake of something else, but friendship for its own sake, even if nothing else is going to accrue to us from it.