§3.1#1## Γ.
Πότερον δ᾿ αἱρετώτερον ἢ βέλτιον δυεῖν ἢ πλειόνων, ἐκ τῶνδε σκεπτέον.
Γ. Whether of two or more things one is more desirable or better must be examined from the following considerations.
Πρῶτον δὲ διωρίσθω ὅτι τὴν σκέψιν ποιούμεθα οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῶν πολὺ διεστώτων καὶ μεγάλην πρὸς ἄλληλα διαφορὰν ἐχόντων (οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀπορεῖ πότερον ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἢ ὁ πλοῦτος αἱρετώτερον) ἀλλ᾿ ὑπὲρ τῶν σύνεγγυς, καὶ περὶ ὧν ἀμφισβητοῦμεν ποτέρῳ δεῖ προσθέσθαι μᾶλλον, διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν ὁρᾶν τοῦ ἑτέρου πρὸς τὸ ἕτερον ὑπεροχήν.
First, let it be defined that we are making this inquiry not about things that are widely different and have a great difference from one another (for no one is in doubt whether happiness or wealth is more desirable), but about things that are close, and about which we dispute as to which of the two we ought to favor more, because we see no superiority of the one over the other.
Δῆλον οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὅτι δειχθείσης ὑπεροχῆς ἢ μιᾶς ἢ πλειόνων συγκαταθήσεται ἡ διάνοια ὅτι τοῦτ᾿ ἐστὶν αἱρετώτερον, ὁπότερον τυγχάνει αὐτῶν ὑπερέχον.
It is clear, then, in such cases that if one or more superiorities are shown, the mind will agree that whichever of them happens to be superior is more desirable.
Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τὸ πολυχρονιώτερον ἢ βεβαιότερον αἱρετώτερον τοῦ ἧττον τοιούτου.
First, then, that which is more long-lasting or secure is more desirable than that which is less so.
Καὶ ὃ μᾶλλον ἂν ἕλοιτο ὁ φρόνιμος ἢ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνήρ, ἢ ὁ νόμος ὁ ὀρθός, ἢ οἱ σπουδαῖοι περὶ ἕκαστα αἱρούμενοι ᾗ τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν, ἢ οἱ ἐν ἑκάστῳ γένει ἐπιστήμονες, ἢ ὅσα οἱ πλείους ἢ πάντες, οἷον ἐν ἰατρικῇ ἢ τεκτονικῇ ἃ οἱ πλείους τῶν ἰατρῶν ἢ πάντες, ἢ ὅσα ὅλως οἱ πλείους ἢ πάντες ἢ πάντα, οἶον τἀγαθόν· πάντα γὰρ τἀγαθοῦ ἐφίεται.
And that which the wise or good man would rather choose, or correct law, or excellent men in each sphere when choosing as such, or the experts in each class, or what most or all would choose (for example, in medicine or carpentry what most or all doctors would choose), or what generally most or all things or everything would choose, such as the good; for everything aims at the good.
Δεῖ δ᾿ ἄγειν πρὸς ὅ τι ἂν ᾖ χρήσιμον τὸ ῥηθησόμενον.
And one must guide what is said towards whatever may be useful.
Ἔστι δ᾿ ἁπλῶς μὲν βέλτιον καὶ αἱρετώτερον τὸ κατὰ τὴν βελτίω ἐπιστήμην, τινὶ δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν.
Absolutely, indeed, that which is according to the better science is better and more desirable, but for a particular person that which is according to his own.
Ἔπειτα δὲ τὸ ὅπερ τόδε τι τοῦ μὴ ἐν γένει, οἷον ἡ δικαιοσύνη τοῦ δικαίου· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν γένει τῷ ἀγαθῷ, τὸ δ᾿ οὔ, καὶ τὸ μὲν ὅπερ ἀγαθόν, τὸ δ᾿ οὔ· οὐδὲν γὰρ λέγεται ὅπερ τὸ γένος, ὃ μὴ τυγχάνει ἐν τῷ γένει ὄν, οἷον ὁ λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπερ χρῶμα.
Next, that which is 'precisely a certain this' is more desirable than what is not in the genus, for example justice than the just man; for the one is in the genus 'good', but the other is not, and the one is precisely good, but the other is not; for nothing is said to be precisely the genus which does not happen to be in the genus, for example a white man is not precisely color.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
And similarly also in other cases.
Καὶ τὸ δι᾿ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν τοῦ δι᾿ ἕτερον αἱρετοῦ αἱρετώτερον, οἷον τὸ ὑγιαίνειν τοῦ γυμνάζεσθαι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δι᾿ αὑτὸ αἱρετόν, τὸ δὲ δι᾿ ἕτερον.
And that which is desirable for its own sake is more desirable than that which is desirable for the sake of something else, for example health than exercise; for the one is desirable for its own sake, but the other for the sake of something else.
Καὶ τὸ καθ᾿ αὑτὸ τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον τὸ τοὺς φίλους δικαίους εἶναι τοῦ τοὺς ἐχθρούς.
And that which is so in itself is more desirable than what is so accidentally, for example that one's friends should be just than that one's enemies should be so.
Τὸ μὲν γὰρ καθ᾿ αὑτὸ αἱρετόν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· τὸ γὰρ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς δικαίους εἶναι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἱρούμεθα, ὅπως μηδὲν ἡμᾶς βλάπτωσιν.
For the former is desirable in itself, but the latter accidentally; for that our enemies should be just we choose accidentally, so that they may do us no harm.
Ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ταὐτὸ τῷ πρὸ τούτου, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τοὺς φίλους δικαίους εἶναι δι᾿ αὑτὸ αἱρούμεθα, καὶ εἰ μηδὲν ἡμῖν μέλλει ἔσεσθαι, κἂν ἐν Ἰνδοῖς ὦσιν· τὸ δὲ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς δι᾿ ἕτερον, ὅπως μηθὲν ἡμᾶς βλάπτωσιν.
This is the same as the one before it, but differs in its manner; for that our friends should be just we choose for its own sake, even if nothing is going to accrue to us and even if they are in India; but that our enemies should be just we choose for the sake of something else, so that they may do us no harm.