§2.11Ἐκ μὲν οὖν τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον καὶ τοῦ ὁμοίως τοσαυταχῶς ἐνδέχεται ἐπιχειρεῖν·
It is, then, in so many ways that one can attack from the 'more' and 'less' and the 'similarly'.
ἔτι δ᾿ ἐκ τῆς προσθέσεως.
Furthermore, from addition.
ἐὰν ἕτερον πρὸς ἕτερον προστεθὲν ποιῇ ἀγαθὸν ἢ λευκόν, μὴ ὂν πρότερον λευκὸν ἢ ἀγαθόν, τὸ προστεθὲν ἔσται λευκὸν ἢ ἀγαθόν, οἷόν περ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ποιεῖ.
If one thing, when added to another, makes it good or white, whereas it was not white or good before, that which is added will be white or good, of such a kind as it also makes the whole.
Ἔτι εἰ πρὸς τὸ ὑπάρχον προστεθέν τι μᾶλλον ποιεῖ τοιοῦτον οἷον ὑπῆρχε, καὶ αὐτὸ ἔσται τοιοῦτον.
Furthermore, if something added to what already belongs makes it more such as it already was, it too will be such.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
And similarly also in other cases.
Χρήσιμος δὲ οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ὁ τόπος, ἀλλ᾿ ἐν οἷς τὴν τοῦ μᾶλλον ὑπεροχὴν συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι.
This topic, however, is not useful in all cases, but only in those in which the excess of the 'more' happens to occur.
Οὗτος δὲ ὁ τόπος οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει πρὸς τὸ ἀνασκευάζειν.
And this topic does not convert for constructive refutation.
Εἰ γὰρ μὴ ποιεῖ τὸ προστιθέμενον ἀγαθόν, οὐδέπω δῆλον εἰ αὐτὸ μὴ ἀγαθόν· τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν κακῷ προστιθέμενον οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀγαθὸν τὸ ὅλον ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ λευκὸν μέλανι.
For if that which is added does not make a thing good, it is not yet clear whether it is itself not good; for a good thing added to an evil thing does not necessarily make the whole good, nor does white added to black make it white.
Πάλιν εἴ τι μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον λέγεται, καὶ ἁπλῶς ὑπάρχει· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὂν ἀγαθὸν ἢ λευκὸν οὐδὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ἧττον ἀγαθὸν ἢ λευκὸν ῥηθήσεται·
Again, if something is said to be 'more' or 'less', it also belongs absolutely; for what is not good or white will not be said to be more or less good or white either.
τὸ γὰρ κακὸν οὐδενὸς μᾶλλον ἢ ἧττον ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον κακὸν ἢ ἧττον ῥηθήσεται.
For an evil thing will not be said to be more or less good than anything, but rather more or less evil.
Οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει δ᾿ οὐδ᾿ οὗτος ὁ τόπος πρὸς τὸ ἀνασκευάσαι· Πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν οὐ λεγομένων μᾶλλον ἁπλῶς ὑπάρχει· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ οὐ λέγεται μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος.
But neither does this topic convert for refutation; for many things that are not said to be 'more' belong absolutely; for 'man' is not said to be 'more' or 'less', but not on that account is he not a man.
Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον σκεπτέον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κατά τι καὶ ποτὲ καὶ ποῦ· εἰ γὰρ κατά τι ἐνδέχεται, καὶ ἁπλῶς ἐνδέχεται.
In the same way one must examine also in the case of 'in some respect', 'sometime', and 'somewhere'; for if it is possible in some respect, it is also possible absolutely.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ποτὲ ἢ ποῦ· τὸ γὰρ ἁπλῶς ἀδύνατον οὔτε κατά τι οὔτε ποῦ οὔτε ποτὲ ἐνδέχεται.
And similarly also with 'sometime' or 'somewhere'; for what is absolutely impossible is possible neither in some respect nor somewhere nor sometime.
Ἔνστασις ὅτι κατά τι μέν εἰσι φύσει σπουδαῖοι, οἷον ἐλευθέριοι ἢ σωφρονικοί, ἁπλῶς δὲ οὐκ εἰσὶ φύσει σπουδαῖοι· οὐδεὶς γὰρ φύσει φρόνιμος.
An objection is that they are in some respect naturally virtuous, for example, liberal or temperate, but absolutely they are not naturally virtuous; for no one is naturally wise.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ποτὲ ἐνδέχεται τῶν φθαρτῶν τι μὴ φθαρῆναι, ἁπλῶς δ᾿ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ φθαρῆναι.
And similarly also 'sometime' it is possible for some perishable thing not to perish, but absolutely it is not possible for it not to perish.
Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ποῦ μὲν συμφέρει τοιαύτῃ διαίτῃ χρῆσθαι, οἷον ἐν τοῖς νοσώδεσι τόποις, ἁπλῶς δ᾿ οὐ συμφέρει.
In the same way also 'somewhere' it is beneficial to use such a diet, for example in sickly places, but absolutely it is not beneficial.
Ἔτι δὲ ποῦ μὲν ἕνα μόνον δυνατὸν εἶναι, ἁπλῶς δὲ οὐ δυνατὸν ἕνα μόνον εἶναι.
Furthermore, 'somewhere' it is possible for there to be only one, but absolutely it is not possible for there to be only one.
Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ποῦ μὲν καλὸν τὸν πατέρα θύειν, οἷον ἐν Τριβαλλοῖς, ἁπλῶς δ᾿ οὐ καλόν.
In the same way also 'somewhere' it is noble to sacrifice one's father, for example among the Triballi, but absolutely it is not noble.
Ἢ τοῦτο μὲν οὐ ποῦ σημαίνει ἀλλὰ τισίν·
Or does this not signify 'somewhere' but 'for some people'?
οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει ὅπου ἂν ὦσιν· πανταχοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἔσται καλὸν οὖσι Τριβαλλοῖς.
For it makes no difference where they are; for it will be noble for them everywhere, since they are Triballi.
Πάλιν ποτὲ μὲν συμφέρει φαρμακεύεσθαι, οἷον ὅταν νοσῇ, ἁπλῶς δ᾿ οὔ.
Again, 'sometime' it is beneficial to take medicine, for example when one is sick, but absolutely it is not.
Ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ποτὲ σημαίνει, ἀλλὰ τῷ διακειμένῳ πως·
Or does this not signify 'sometime' either, but 'to one who is in a certain state'?
οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει ὁποτεοῦν, ἐὰν οὕτω μόνον διακείμενος ᾖ.
For it makes no difference when it is, if only he is in such a state.
Τὸ δ᾿ ἁπλῶς ἐστὶν ὃ μηδενὸς προστεθέντος ἐρεῖς ὅτι καλόν ἐστιν ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον.
On the other hand, 'absolutely' is that of which, with nothing added, you will say that it is noble or the contrary.
Οἷον τὸ τὸν πατέρα θύειν οὐκ ἐρεῖς καλὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τισὶ καλὸν εἶναι· οὐκ ἄρα ἁπλῶς καλόν.
For example, you will not say that to sacrifice one's father is noble, but that it is noble for some people; therefore it is not absolutely noble.
Ἀλλὰ τὸ τοὺς θεοὺς τιμᾶν ἐρεῖς καλὸν οὐδὲν προστιθείς· ἁπλῶς γὰρ καλόν ἐστιν.
But you will say that to honor the gods is noble, adding nothing; for it is absolutely noble.
Ὥστε ὃ ἂν μηδενὸς προστιθεμένου δοκῇ εἶναι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἁπλῶς ῥηθήσεται.
So that whatever, with nothing added, seems to be noble or base or any other such thing, will be said absolutely.