§2.10Πάλιν ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοίων, εἰ ὁμοίως ἔχει, οἷον εἰ ἐπιστήμη μία πλειόνων, καὶ δόξα, καὶ εἰ τὸ ὄψιν ἔχειν ὁρᾶν, καὶ τὸ ἀκοὴν ἔχειν ἀκούειν.
Again, from things that are similar, one must examine whether they are in a similar state; for example, if there is one science of many things, so is there also opinion, and if having sight is seeing, having hearing is also hearing.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν δοκούντων.
And similarly also in other cases, both in the case of things that actually are so and of things that are thought to be so.
Χρήσιμος δ᾿ ὁ τόπος πρὸς ἄμφω· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπί τινος τῶν ὁμοίων οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ὁμοίων, εἰ δὲ ἐπί τινος μή, οὐδ᾿ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
This topic is useful for both; for if it is so in the case of some one of the similar things, it is so also in the case of the other similar things, and if it is not so in the case of some one, neither is it in the case of the others.
Σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἰ ἐφ᾿ ἑνὸς καὶ εἰ ἐπὶ πολλῶν ὁμοίως ἔχει· ἐνιαχοῦ γὰρ διαφωνεῖ.
One must examine also whether it is similarly in the case of one and in the case of many; for sometimes there is a discrepancy.
Οἷον εἰ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι διανοεῖσθαι, καὶ τὸ πολλὰ ἐπίστασθαι πολλὰ διανοεῖσθαι.
For example, if to know is to think, then also to know many things is to think many things.
Τοῦτο δ᾿ οὐκ ἀληθές· ἐπίστασθαι μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται πολλά, διανοεῖσθαι δ᾿ οὔ.
But this is not true; for it is possible to know many things, but not to think many things.
Εἰ οὖν τοῦτο μή, οὐδ᾿ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἐφ᾿ ἑνός, ὅτι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι διανοεῖσθαί ἐστιν.
If, then, the latter is not true, neither is the former in the case of one, namely, that to know is to think.
Ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον.
Furthermore, from the more and less.
Εἰσὶ δὲ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον τόποι τέσσαρες, εἷς μὲν εἰ ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ μᾶλλον τῷ μᾶλλον, οἷον εἰ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἡ μᾶλλον ἡδονὴ μᾶλλον ἀγαθόν, καὶ εἰ τὸ ἀδικεῖν κακόν, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖν μᾶλλον κακόν.
And there are four topics of the more and less: one, whether the 'more' follows the 'more'; for example, if pleasure is a good, then also the greater pleasure is a greater good, and if to do injustice is an evil, to do greater injustice is a greater evil.
Χρήσιμος δ᾿ οὖν πρὸς ἄμφω ὁ τόπος· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖ τῇ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἐπιδόσει ἡ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος ἐπίδοσις, καθάπερ εἴρηται, δῆλον ὅτι συμβέβηκεν, εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖ, οὐ συμβέβηκεν.
At all events, this topic is useful for both; for if the increase of the accident follows the increase of the subject, as has been said, it is clear that it is an accident, but if it does not follow, it is not an accident.
Τοῦτο δ᾿ ἐπαγωγῇ ληπτέον.
And this must be secured by induction.
Ἄλλος· ἑνὸς περὶ δύο λεγομένου, εἰ ᾧ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς ὑπάρχειν μὴ ὑπάρχει, οὐδ᾿ ᾧ ἧττον, καὶ εἰ ᾧ ἧττον εἰκὸς ὑπάρχείν ὑπάρχει, καὶ ᾧ μᾶλλον.
Another: when one thing is predicated of two, if it does not belong to that to which it is more likely to belong, neither does it belong to that to which it is less likely; and if it belongs to that to which it is less likely to belong, it belongs also to that to which it is more likely.
Πάλιν δυοῖν περὶ ἑνὸς λεγομένων εἰ τὸ μᾶλλον ὑπάρχειν δοκοῦν μὴ ὑπάρχει, οὐδὲ τὸ ἧττον, ἢ εἰ τὸ ἧττον δοκοῦν ὑπάρχειν ὑπάρχει, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον.
Again, when two things are predicated of one, if that which seems more likely to belong does not belong, neither does that which is less likely; or if that which seems less likely to belong does belong, so does that which is more likely.
Ἔτι δυοῖν περὶ δύο λεγομένων εἰ τὸ θατέρῳ μᾶλλον ὑπάρχειν δοκοῦν μὴ ὑπάρχει, οὐδὲ τὸ λοιπὸν τῷ λοιπῷ, ἢ εἰ τὸ ἧττον δοκοῦν τῷ ἑτέρῳ ὑπάρχειν ὑπάρχει, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν τῷ λοιπῷ.
Furthermore, when two things are predicated of two, if that which seems more likely to belong to the one does not belong to it, neither does the remaining one belong to the remaining one; or if that which seems less likely to belong to the one does belong to it, the remaining one belongs also to the remaining one.
Ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίως ὑπάρχειν ἢ δοκεῖν ὑπάρχειν τριχῶς, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῶν ὕστερον ῥηθέντων τριῶν τόπων ἐλέγετο.
Furthermore, from their belonging or seeming to belong in a similar degree, in three ways, just as was said in the case of 'more' for the last three topics mentioned.
Εἴτε γὰρ ἕν τι δυσὶν ὁμοίως ὑπάρχει ἢ δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν, εἰ τῷ ἑτέρῳ μὴ ὑπάρχει, οὐδὲ τῷ ἑτέρῳ, εἰ δὲ θατέρῳ ὑπάρχει, καὶ τῷ λοιπῷ· εἴτε δύο τῷ αὐτῷ ὁμοίως, εἰ τὸ ἕτερον μὴ ὑπάρχει, οὐδὲ τὸ λοιπόν, εἰ δὲ θάτερον, καὶ τὸ λοιπόν.
For whether some one thing belongs or seems to belong to two in a similar degree: if it does not belong to the one, neither does it belong to the other, and if it belongs to the one, it belongs also to the remaining one; or whether two things belong to the same thing in a similar degree: if the one does not belong, neither does the remaining one, and if the one belongs, the remaining one does also.
Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ εἰ δύο δυσὶν ὁμοίως ὑπάρχει· εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ μὴ ὑπάρχει, οὐδὲ τὸ λοιπὸν τῷ λοιπῷ, εἰ δὲ ὑπάρχει τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν τῷ λοιπῷ.
In the same way also if two things belong to two in a similar degree: for if the one does not belong to the one, neither does the remaining one belong to the remaining one, and if the one belongs to the one, the remaining one belongs also to the remaining one.