§1.9Μετὰ τοίνυν ταῦτα δεῖ διορίσασθαι τὰ γένη τῶν κατηγοριῶν, ἐν οἷς ὑπάρχουσιν αἱ ῥηθεῖσαι τέτταρες.
After these things, then, we must define the genera of the categories in which the four mentioned belong.
Ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα τὸν ἀριθμὸν δέκα, τί ἐστι, ποσόν, ποιόν, πρός τι, ποῦ, ποτέ, κεῖσθαι, ἔχειν, ποιεῖν, πάσχειν.
And these are ten in number: what-it-is, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, affection.
Ἀεὶ γὰρ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τὸ γένος καὶ τὸ ἴδιον καὶ ὁ ὁρισμὸς ἐν μιᾷ τούτων τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἔσται· πᾶσαι γὰρ ὁ ὁρισμὸς ἐν μιᾷ τούτων τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἔσται· πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ διὰ τούτων προτάσεις ἢ τί ἐστιν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ ποσὸν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰ κατηγοριῶν σημαίνουσιν.
For the accident, the genus, the property, and the definition will always be in one of these categories; for every definition will be in one of these categories; for all the propositions through these signify either what-it-is, or quality, or quantity, or some other of the categories.
Δῆλον δ᾿ ἐξ αὐτῶν ὅτι ὁ τὸ τί ἐστι σημαίνων ὁτὲ μὲν οὐσίαν σημαίνει, ὁτὲ δὲ ποιόν, ὁτὲ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰ κατηγοριῶν.
And it is clear from these themselves that the one signifying what-it-is sometimes signifies substance, sometimes quality, and sometimes some other of the categories.
Ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἐκκειμένου ἀνθρώπου φῇ τὸ ἐκκείμενον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ἢ ζῷον, τί ἐστι λέγει καὶ οὐσίαν σημαίνει· ὅταν δὲ χρώματος λευκοῦ ἐκκειμένου φῇ τὸ ἐκκείμενον λευκὸν εἶναι ἢ χρῶμα, τί ἐστι λέγει καὶ ποιὸν σημαίνει.
For when, a man being set forth, one says that the set-forth thing is a man or an animal, he says what-it-is and signifies substance; but when, a white color being set forth, he says that the set-forth thing is white or color, he says what-it-is and signifies quality.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐὰν πηχυαίου μεγέθους ἐκκειμένου φῇ τὸ ἐκκείμενον πηχυαῖον εἶναι μέγεθος, τί ἐστιν ἐρεῖ καὶ ποσὸν σημαίνει.
And likewise also if, a cubit size being set forth, he says that the set-forth thing is a cubit size, he will say what-it-is and signify quantity.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἕκαστον γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων, ἐάν τε αὐτὸ περὶ αὑτοῦ λέγηται ἐάν τε τὸ γένος περὶ τούτου, τί ἐστι σημαίνει.
And likewise also in the case of the others; for each of such things, whether it is said of itself or its genus is said of it, signifies what-it-is.
Ὅταν δὲ περὶ ἑτέρου, οὐ τί ἐστι σημαίνει, ἀλλὰ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἤ τινα τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν.
But when it is said of another, it does not signify what-it-is, but quantity or quality or some other of the categories.
Ὥστε περὶ ὧν μὲν οἱ λόγοι καὶ ἐξ ὧν, ταῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτά ἐστι· πῶς δὲ ληψόμεθα καὶ δι᾿ ὧν εὐπορήσομεν, μετὰ ταῦτα λεκτέον.
So that the things about which arguments are, and from which they are, are these and so many; but how we shall take them and through what we shall be well supplied, must be said after these.
§1.10Πρῶτον τοίνυν διωρίσθω, τί ἐστι πρότασις διαλεκτικὴ καὶ τί πρόβλημα διαλεκτικόν.
First, then, let it be defined what a dialectical proposition is and what a dialectical problem is.
Οὐ γὰρ πᾶσαν πρότασιν οὐδὲ πᾶν πρόβλημα διαλεκτικὸν θετέον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν προτείνειε νοῦν ἔχων τὸ μηδενὶ δοκοῦν, οὐδὲ προβάλοι τὸ πᾶσι φανερὸν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις· τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει ἀπορίαν, τὰ δ᾿ οὐδεὶς ἂν θείη.
For we must not set down every proposition nor every problem as dialectical; for no one in his right mind would propose what seems true to no one, nor would he set as a problem what is manifest to all or to most; for the latter have no difficulty, while the former no one would posit.
Ἔστι δὲ πρότασις διαλεκτικὴ ἐρώτησις ἔνδοξος ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς, καὶ τούτοις ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις, μὴ παράδοξος· θείη γὰρ ἄν τις τὸ δοκοῦν τοῖς σοφοῖς, ἐὰν μὴ ἐναντίον ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν δόξαις ᾖ.
And a dialectical proposition is an accepted question either to all, or to most, or to the wise—and among these, either to all, or to most, or to the most well-known—being not paradoxical; for one would posit what seems true to the wise, provided it is not contrary to the opinions of the many.
Εἰσὶ δὲ προτάσεις διαλεκτικαὶ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἐνδόξοις ὅμοια, καὶ τἀναντία κατ᾿ ἀντίφασιν τοῖς δοκοῦσιν ἐνδόξοις εἶναι προτεινόμενα, καὶ ὅσαι δόξαι κατὰ τέχνας εἰσὶ τὰς εὑρημένας.
And dialectical propositions are also those that are similar to accepted opinions, and those proposed as contrary by contradiction to what seem to be accepted opinions, and as many opinions as are according to the discovered arts.
Εἰ γὰρ ἔνδοξον τὸ τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπιστήμην καὶ τὸ αἴσθησιν τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων, ἔνδοξον ἂν φανείη καὶ εἰ μίαν ἀριθμῷ γραμματικὴν εἶναι, καὶ αὐλητικὴν μίαν, εἰ δὲ πλείους γραμματικάς, καὶ αὐλητικὰς πλείους· πάντα γὰρ ὅμοια καὶ συγγενῆ ταῦτ᾿ ἔοικεν εἶναι.
For if it is an accepted opinion that the science of contraries is the same, and that the perception of contraries is the same, it would also appear to be an accepted opinion that if grammar is one in number, flute-playing is also one, and if there are several grammars, there are also several flute-playings; for all these seem to be similar and cognate.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἐνδόξοις ἐναντία κατ᾿ ἀντίφασιν προτεινόμενα ἔνδοξα φανεῖται· εἰ γὰρ ἔνδοξον ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, καὶ ὅτι οὐ δεῖ κακῶς ποιεῖν ἔνδοξον.
And likewise also, things proposed as contrary by contradiction to accepted opinions will appear accepted; for if it is accepted that one ought to do good to friends, it is also accepted that one ought not to do harm.
Ἔστι δ᾿ ἐναντίον μὲν ὅτι δεῖ κακῶς ποιεῖν τοὺς φίλους, κατ᾿ ἀντίφασιν δὲ ὅτι οὐ δεῖ κακῶς ποιεῖν.
Now the contrary is that one ought to do harm to friends, while the contradiction is that one ought not to do harm.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ δεῖ τοὺς φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν, τοὺς ἐχθροὺς οὐ δεῖ.
And likewise also, if one ought to do good to friends, one ought not to [do good] to enemies.
Ἔστι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο κατ᾿ ἀντίφασιν τῶν ἐναντίων· τὸ γὰρ ἐναντίον ἐστὶν ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς εὖ ποιεῖν.
And this too is by contradiction of contraries; for the contrary is that one ought to do good to enemies.
Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
And in the same way also in the case of the others.
Ἔνδοξον δ᾿ ἐν παραβολῇ φανεῖται καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον περὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου, οἷον εἰ τοὺς φίλους δεῖ εὖ ποιεῖν, καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς δεῖ κακῶς.
And in comparison, the contrary about the contrary will also appear accepted, for example, if one ought to do good to friends, one ought also to do harm to enemies.
Φανείη δ᾿ ἂν καὶ ἐναντίον τὸ τοὺς φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν τῷ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κακῶς· πότερον δὲ καὶ κατ᾿ ἀλήθειαν οὕτως ἔχει ἢ οὔ, ἐν τοῖς ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐναντίων λεγομένοις ῥηθήσεται.
And doing good to friends would also appear contrary to doing harm to enemies; but whether this is so in truth as well or not, will be said in the things spoken concerning contraries.
Δῆλον δ᾿ ὅτι καὶ ὅσαι δόξαι κατὰ τέχνας εἰσί, διαλεκτικαὶ προτάσεις εἰσί· θείη γὰρ ἄν τις τὰ δοκοῦντα τοῖς ὑπὲρ τούτων ἐπεσκεμμένοις, οἷον περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐν ἰατρικῇ ὡς ὁ ἰατρός, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ ὡς ὁ γεωμέτρης· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
And it is clear that as many opinions as are according to the arts are also dialectical propositions; for one would posit the things that seem true to those who have investigated concerning them, for example, in medicine as the physician [does], and in geometry as the geometer [does]; and likewise also in the case of the others.