§1.6Μὴ λανθανέτω δ᾿ ἡμᾶς ὅτι τὰ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον καὶ τὸ γένος καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς πάντα καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ὁρισμοὺς ἁρμόσει λέγεσθαι.
And let it not escape our notice that all the things that are said relative to property, genus, and accident will also be appropriate to be said relative to definitions.
Δείξαντες γὰρ ὅτι οὐ μόνῳ ὑπάρχει τῷ ὑπὸ τὸν ὁρισμόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἰδίου, ἢ ὅτι οὐ γένος τὸ ἀποδοθὲν ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ, ἢ ὅτι οὐχ ὑπάρχει τι τῶν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ῥηθέντων, ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος ἂν ῥηθείη, ἀνῃρηκότες ἐσόμεθα τὸν ὁρισμόν·
For having shown that it does not belong to the defined thing alone, just as in the case of property, or that what is rendered in the definition is not a genus, or that some of the things mentioned in the phrase does not belong, which would also be said in the case of accident, ¦p.264 we shall have demolished the definition; so that according to the argument rendered earlier, all the things enumerated would be in a certain way definitional.
ὥστε κατὰ τὸν ἔμπροσθεν ἀποδοθέντα λόγον ἅπαντ᾿ ἂν εἴη τρόπον τινὰ ὁρικὰ τὰ κατηριθμημένα. Ἀλλ᾿ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο μίαν ἐπὶ πάντων καθόλου μέθοδον ζητητέον· οὔτε γὰρ ῥᾴδιον εὑρεῖν τοῦτ᾿ ἐστίν, εἴ θ᾿ εὑρεθείη, παντελῶς ἀσαφὴς καὶ δύσχρηστος ἂν εἴη πρὸς τὴν προκειμένην πραγματείαν.
But we must not on this account seek one universal method for all; for it is neither easy to find this, and if it should be found, it would be completely obscure and difficult to use for the proposed treatise.
Ἰδίας δὲ καθ᾿ ἕκαστον τῶν διορισθέντων γενῶν ἀποδοθείσης μεθόδου ῥᾷον ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστον οἰκείων ἡ διέξοδος τοῦ προκειμένου γένοιτ᾿ ἄν.
But if a specific method is rendered for each of the defined genera, the passage through the proposed matter would more easily occur from what is peculiar to each.
Ὥστε τύπῳ μέν, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, διαιρετέον, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν τὰ μάλισθ᾿ ἑκάστοις οἰκεῖα προσαπτέον, ὁρικά τε καὶ γενικὰ προσαγορεύοντας αὐτά.
So that we must divide in outline, as was said before, and we must attach of the remaining things those that are most peculiar to each, addressing them as definitional and generic.
Σχεδὸν δὲ προσῆπται τὰ ῥηθέντα πρὸς ἑκάστοις.
And indeed, the things mentioned have been almost attached to each.
§1.7Πρῶτον δὲ πάντων περὶ ταὐτοῦ διοριστέον, ποσαχῶς λέγεται.
First of all, we must define concerning 'the same', in how many senses it is said.
Δόξειε δ᾿ ἂν τὸ ταὐτὸν ὡς τύπῳ λαβεῖν τριχῇ διαιρεῖσθαι.
And 'the same' would seem, to take it in outline, to be divided in three ways.
Ἀριθμῷ γὰρ ἢ εἴδει ἢ γένει τὸ ταὐτὸν εἰώθαμεν προσαγορεύειν, ἀριθμῷ μὲν ὧν ὀνόματα πλείω τὸ δὲ πρᾶγμα ἕν, οἷον λώπιον καὶ ἱμάτιον, εἴδει δὲ ὅσα πλείω ὄντα ἀδιάφορα κατὰ τὸ εἶδός ἐστι, καθάπερ ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἵππος ἵππῳ· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα τῷ εἴδει λέγεται ταὐτά, ὅσα ὑπὸ ταὐτὸ εἶδος.
For we are accustomed to address 'the same' either in number, or in species, or in genus: in number, of those things whose names are more but the thing is one, for example, cloak and cloak; in species, as many things as, being more, are indistinguishable according to species, just as man with man and horse with horse; for such things are said to be the same in species as many as are under the same species.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ γένει ταὐτά, ὅσα ὑπὸ ταὐτὸ γένος ἐστίν, οἷον ἵππος ἀνθρώπῳ.
And likewise also in genus, as many things as are under the same genus, for example, horse with man.
Δόξειε δ᾿ ἂν τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς κρήνης ὕδωρ ταὐτὸν λεγόμενον ἔχειν τινὰ διαφορὰν παρὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους τρόπους· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτόν γε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τετάχθω τοῖς καθ᾿ ἓν εἶδος ὁπωσοῦν λεγομένοις.
And water called 'the same' from the same spring would seem to have a certain difference besides the modes mentioned; nevertheless, let such a thing also be arranged in the same class as those things that are in any way whatever said to be according to one species.
Ἅπαντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα συγγενῆ καὶ παραπλήσια ἀλλήλοις ἔοικεν εἶναι.
For all such things seem to be cognate and close to one another.
Πᾶν μὲν γὰρ ὕδωρ παντὶ ταὐτὸν τῷ εἴδει λέγεται διὰ τὸ ἔχειν τινὰ ὁμοιότητα, τὸ δ᾿ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς κρήνης ὕδωρ οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ διαφέρει ἀλλ᾿ ἢ τῷ σφοδροτέραν εἶναι τὴν ὁμοιότητα· διὸ οὐ χωρίζομεν αὐτὸ τῶν καθ᾿ ἓν εἶδος ὁπωσοῦν λεγομένων.
For all water is said to be the same in species as all other water because of having a certain likeness, and water from the same spring differs in nothing else than in the likeness being more intense; therefore we do not separate it from those things that are in any way whatever said to be according to one species.
Μάλιστα δ᾿ ὁμολογουμένως τὸ ἓν ἀριθμῷ ταὐτὸν παρὰ πᾶσι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι.
And most of all, by common agreement, ¦p.265 that which is one in number seems to be called 'the same' among all people.
Εἴωθε δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἀποδίδοσθαι πλεοναχῶς, κυριώτατα μὲν καὶ πρώτως ὅταν ὀνόματι ἢ ὅρῳ τὸ ταὐτὸν ἀποδοθῇ, καθάπερ ἱμάτιον λωπίῳ καὶ ζῷον πεζὸν δίπουν ἀνθρώπῳ, δεύτερον δ᾿ ὅταν τῷ ἰδίῳ, καθάπερ τὸ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὸν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τὸ τῇ φύσει ἄνω φερόμενον πυρί, τρίτον δ᾿ ὅταν ἀπὸ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος, οἷον τὸ καθήμενον ἢ τὸ μουσικὸν Σωκράτει.
And this also is accustomed to be rendered in several ways, most properly and primarily when the same is rendered by a name or a definition, just as cloak to cloak, and two-footed pedestrian animal to man, secondly when by property, just as the capable of receiving knowledge to man, and that which is carried upwards by nature to fire, thirdly when from accident, for example, the sitting or the musical to Socrates.
Πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα τὸ ἓν ἀριθμῷ βούλεται σημαίνειν.
For all these wish to signify that which is one in number.
Ὅτι δ᾿ ἀληθὲς τὸ νῦν ῥηθέν ἐστιν, ἐκ τῶν μεταβαλλόντων τὰς προσηγορίας μάλιστ᾿ ἄν τις καταμάθοι.
And that what has just been said is true, one would learn best from those who change names.
Πολλάκις γὰρ ἐπιτάσσοντες ὀνόματι καλέσαι τινὰ τῶν καθημένων μεταβάλλομεν, ὅταν τύχῃ μὴ συνιεὶς ᾧ τὴν πρόσταξιν ποιούμεθα, ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος αὐτοῦ μᾶλλον συνήσοντος, καὶ κελεύομεν τὸν καθήμενον ἢ διαλεγόμενον καλέσαι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, δῆλον ὡς ταὐτὸν ὑπολαμβάνοντες κατά τε τοὔνομα καὶ κατὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς σημαίνειν.
For often, when ordering to call by name someone of those who are sitting, we change, when it happens that the one to whom we make the command does not understand, as if he would rather understand from his accident, and we order to call the sitting or discussing person to us, clearly assuming that it signifies the same thing both according to the name and according to the accident.
§1.8Τὸ μὲν οὖν ταὐτόν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, τριχῇ διῃρήσθω.
Let 'the same', then, as has been said, be divided in three ways.
ὅτι δ᾿ ἐκ τῶν πρότερον εἰρημένων οἱ λόγοι καὶ διὰ τούτων καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα, μία μὲν πίστις ἡ διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς· εἰ γάρ τις ἐπισκοποίη ἑκάστην τῶν προτάσεων καὶ τῶν προβλημάτων, φαίνοιτ᾿ ἂν ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅρου ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰδίου ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος γεγενημένη.
And that the arguments are from the things mentioned before, and through these, and directed towards these, one proof is that through induction; for if one should examine each of the premises and the problems, it would appear to have arisen either from definition, or from property, or from genus, or from accident.
Ἄλλη δὲ πίστις ἡ διὰ συλλογισμοῦ.
And another proof is that through syllogism.
Ἀνάγκη γὰρ πᾶν τὸ περί τινος κατηγορούμενον ἤτοι ἀντικατηγορεῖσθαι τοῦ πράγματος ἢ μή.
For it is necessary that everything predicated of something is either counter-predicated of the thing or not.
Καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀντικατηγορεῖται, ὅρος ἢ ἴδιον ἂν εἴη· εἰ μὲν γὰρ σημαίνει τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ὅρος, εἰ δὲ μὴ σημαίνει, ἴδιον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ἴδιον, τὸ ἀντικατηγορούμενον μέν, μὴ σημαῖνον δὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι.
And if indeed it is counter-predicated, it would be a definition or a property; for if on the one hand it signifies the essence, it is a definition, but if it does not signify it, a property; for this was a property: that which is counter-predicated indeed, but does not signify the essence.
Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀντικατηγορεῖται τοῦ πράγματος, ἤτοι τῶν ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου λεγομένων ἐστὶν ἢ οὔ.
But if it is not counter-predicated of the thing, it is either of the things said in the definition of the subject or not.
Καὶ εἰ μὲν τῶν ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ λεγομένων, γένος ἢ διαφορὰ ἂν εἴη, ἐπειδὴ ὁ ὁρισμὸς ἐκ γένους καὶ διαφορῶν φορῶν ἐστίν· εἰ δὲ μὴ τῶν ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ λεγομένων ἐστί, δῆλον ὅτι συμβεβηκὸς ἂν εἴη· τὸ γὰρ συμβεβηκὸς ἐλέγετο ὃ μήτε ὅρος μήτε γένος μήτε ἴδιόν ἐστιν, ὑπάρχει δὲ τῷ πράγματι.
And if indeed it is of the things said in the definition, it would be a genus or a difference, since the definition is from genus and differences; ¦p.266 but if it is not of the things said in the definition, it is clear that it would be an accident; for the accident was said to be that which is neither definition, nor genus, nor property, but belongs to the thing.