§1.11Πρόβλημα δ᾿ ἐστὶ διαλεκτικὸν θεώρημα τὸ συντεῖνον ἢ πρὸς αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγὴν ἢ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν καὶ γνῶσιν, ἢ αὐτὸ ἢ ὡς συνεργὸν πρός τι ἕτερον τῶν τοιούτων· περὶ οὗ ἢ οὐδετέρως δοξάζουσιν ἢ ἐναντίως οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς ἢ οἱ σοφοὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἢ ἑκατέροι αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς.
A dialectical problem is an object of inquiry that contributes either to choice and avoidance, or to truth and knowledge, either by itself or as a cooperative aid to some other such thing, concerning which either people have no opinion either way, or the many have opinions contrary to the wise, or the wise to the many, or each of these to themselves.
Ἔνια μὲν γὰρ τῶν προβλημάτων χρήσιμον εἰδέναι πρὸς τὸ ἑλέσθαι ἢ φυγεῖν, οἷον πότερον ἡ ἡδονὴ αἱρετὸν ἢ οὔ, ἔνια δὲ πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι μόνον, οἷον πότερον ὁ κόσμος ἀΐδιος ἢ οὔ, ἔνια δὲ αὐτὰ μὲν καθ᾿ αὑτὰ πρὸς οὐδέτερον τούτων, συνεργὰ δέ ἐστι πρός τινα τῶν τοιούτων· πολλὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ μὲν καθ᾿ αὑτὰ οὐ βουλόμεθα γνωρίζειν, ἑτέρων δ᾿ ἕνεκα, ὅπως διὰ τούτων ἄλλο τι γνωρίσωμεν.
For some of the problems it is useful to know for the purpose of choosing or avoiding (for example, whether pleasure is a thing to be chosen or not), some for the purpose of knowing only (for example, whether the world is eternal or not), and some by themselves are useful for neither of these, but are cooperative aids for some of such things; for there are many things which we do not wish to know for themselves, but for the sake of other things, so that through these we may know something else.
Ἔστι δὲ προβλήματα καὶ ὧν ἐναντίοι εἰσὶ συλλογισμοί (ἀπορίαν γὰρ ἔχει πότερον οὕτως ἔχει ἢ οὐχ οὕτως διὰ τὸ περὶ ἀμφοτέρων εἶναι λόγους πιθανούς) καὶ περὶ ὧν λόγον μὴ ἔχομεν ὄντων μεγάλων, χαλεπὸν οἰόμενοι εἶναι τὸ διὰ τί ἀποδοῦναι, οἷον πότερον ὁ κόσμος ἀΐδιος ἢ οὔ· καὶ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ζητήσειεν ἄν τις.
Problems are also those things about which there are contrary reasonings (for it causes difficulty whether it is so or not so, because of there being plausible arguments concerning both), and those about which we have no argument, though they are great, since we think it is difficult to render the reason why, for example, whether the world is eternal or not; for one would investigate even such things.
Τὰ μὲν οὖν προβλήματα καὶ αἱ προτάσεις, καθάπερ εἴρηται, διωρίσθω·
Let problems and propositions, then, be defined as has been said.
θέσις δέ ἐστιν ὑπόληψις παράδοξος τῶν γνωρίμων τινὸς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν, οἷον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν, καθάπερ ἔφη Ἀντισθένης, ἢ ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται καθ᾿ Ἡράκλειτον, ἢ ὅτι ἓν τὸ ὄν, καθάπερ Μέλισσός φησιν· τὸ γὰρ τοῦ τυχόντος ἐναντία ταῖς δόξαις ἀποφηναμένου φροντίζειν εὔηθες.
A thesis is a paradoxical belief of someone of those well-known in philosophy, for example, that it is not possible to contradict, as Antisthenes said, or that all things are in motion according to Heraclitus, or that what is is one, as Melissus says; for to pay attention to any chance person declaring things contrary to common opinions is foolish.
Ἣ περὶ ὧν λόγον ἔχομεν ἐναντίον ταῖς δόξαις, οἷον ὅτι οὐ πᾶν τὸ ὂν ἤτοι γενόμενόν ἐστιν ἢ ἀΐδιον, καθάπερ οἱ σοφισταί φασιν· μουσικὸν γὰρ ὄντα γραμματικὸν εἶναι οὔτε γενόμενον οὔτε ἀΐδιον ὄντα.
Or [a thesis is] about things concerning which we have an argument contrary to common opinions, for example, that not everything that is is either generated or eternal, as the sophists say; for that one who is musical is grammatical is neither generated nor eternal.
Τοῦτο γάρ, εἰ καί τινι μὴ δοκεῖ, δόξειεν ἂν διὰ τὸ λόγον ἔχειν.
For this, even if it does not seem so to someone, would seem so because of its having an argument.
Ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ ἡ θέσις πρόβλημα· οὐ πᾶν δὲ πρόβλημα θέσις, ἐπειδὴ ἔνια τῶν προβλημάτων τοιαῦτ᾿ ἐστὶ περὶ ὧν οὐδετέρως δοξάζομεν.
Therefore, a thesis is also a problem, but not every problem is a thesis, since some of the problems are of such a kind that we have no opinion either way about them.
Ὅτι δέ ἐστι καὶ ἡ θέσις πρόβλημα, δῆλον· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἢ τοὺς πολλοὺς τοῖς σοφοῖς περὶ τὴν θέσιν ἀμφισβητεῖν ἢ ὁποτερουσοῦν ἑαυτοῖς, ἐπειδὴ ὑπόληψίς τις παράδοξος ἡ θέσις ἐστίν.
And that a thesis is also a problem is clear; for it is necessary from what has been said that either the many dispute with the wise concerning the thesis, or either group among themselves, since a thesis is a certain paradoxical belief.
Σχεδὸν δὲ νῦν πάντα τὰ διαλεκτικὰ προβλήματα θέσεις καλοῦνται.
But nowadays nearly all dialectical problems are called theses.
Διαφερέτω δὲ μηδὲν ὁπωσοῦν λεγόμενον· οὐ γὰρ ὀνοματοποιῆσαι βουλόμενοι διείλομεν οὕτως αὐτά, ἀλλ᾿ ἵνα μὴ λανθάνωσιν ἡμᾶς τίνες αὐτῶν τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι διαφοραί.
But let it make no difference however it is said; for we did not divide them thus wishing to coin words, but so that the differences that happen to be among them may not escape us.
Οὐ δεῖ δὲ πᾶν πρόβλημα οὐδὲ πᾶσαν θέσιν ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλ᾿ ἣν ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις τῶν λόγου δεομένων καὶ μὴ κολάσεως ἢ αἰσθήσεως· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀποροῦντες πότερον δεῖ τοὺς θεοὺς τιμᾶν καὶ τοὺς γονέας ἀγαπᾶν ἢ οὒ κολάσεως δέονται, οἱ δὲ πότερον ἡ χιὼν λευκὴ ἢ οὒ αἰσθήσεως.
But we must not examine every problem nor every thesis, but only that which one might be perplexed about of those needing argument, and not punishment or perception; for those who are perplexed whether one ought to honor the gods and love one's parents or not need punishment, while those [perplexed] whether snow is white or not need perception.
Οὐδὲ δὴ ὧν σύνεγγυς ἡ ἀπόδειξις, οὐδ᾿ ὧν λίαν πόρρω· τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει ἀπορίαν, τὰ δὲ πλείω ἢ κατὰ γυμναστικήν. §1.12Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων χρὴ διελέσθαι πόσα τῶν λόγων εἴδη τῶν διαλεκτικῶν.
Nor indeed those of which the proof is close at hand, nor those of which it is too far; for the former do not have difficulty, while the latter are more than is suitable for training. These things having been defined, we must divide how many species of dialectical arguments there are.
Ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐπαγωγή, τὸ δὲ συλλογισμός.
One is induction, and the other is deduction.
Καὶ συλλογισμὸς μὲν τί ἐστιν, εἴρηται πρότερον, ἐπαγωγὴ δὲ ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν καθ᾿ ἕκαστον ἐπὶ τὰ καθόλου ἔφοδος, οἷον εἰ ἔστι κυβερνήτης ὁ ἐπιστάμενος κράτιστος καὶ ἡνίοχος, καὶ ὅλως ἐστὶν ὁ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ἕκαστον ἄριστος.
And what deduction is has been said before, but induction is the passage from particulars to universals, for example, if the skilled helmsman is the best, and also the [skilled] charioteer, then generally the skilled person concerning each thing is the best.
Ἔστι δ᾿ ἡ μὲν ἐπαγωγὴ πιθανώτερον καὶ σαφέστερον καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν γνωριμώτερον καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς κοινόν, ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς βιαστικώτερον καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς ἐνεργέστερον.
And induction is more persuasive, clearer, more known according to perception, and common to the many, while deduction is more coercive and more effective against those who contradict.