§1.5Λεκτέον δὲ τί ὅρος, τί ἴδιον, τί γένος, τί συμβεβηκός.
We must state what is a definition, what is a property, what is a genus, and what is an accident.
Ἔστι δ᾿ ὅρος μὲν λόγος ὁ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι σημαίνων.
Now, a definition is a phrase signifying the essence.
Ἀποδίδοται δὲ ἢ λόγος ἀντ᾿ ὀνόματος ἢ λόγος ἀντὶ λόγου· δυνατὸν γὰρ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ λόγου τινὰ σημαινομένων ὁρίσασθαι.
It is rendered either as a phrase in place of a name, or as a phrase in place of a phrase; for it is possible also to define some of the things signified by a phrase.
Ὅσοι δ᾿ ὁπωσοῦν ὀνόματι τὴν ἀπόδοσιν ποιοῦνται, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἀποδιδόασιν οὗτοι τὸν τοῦ πράγματος ὁρισμόν, ἐπειδὴ πᾶς ὁρισμὸς λόγος τίς ἐστιν.
But those who in any way whatever make the rendering by a name, clearly do not render the definition of the thing, since every definition is a certain phrase.
Ὁρικὸν μέντοι καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον θετέον, οἷον ὅτι καλόν ἐστι τὸ πρέπον. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ πότερον ταὐτὸν αἴσθησις καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἢ ἕτερον· καὶ γὰρ περὶ τοὺς ὁρισμούς, πότερον ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον, ἡ πλείστη γίνεται διατριβή.
However, we must also classify as "definitional" such a thing as, for example, that "the fitting is beautiful." And likewise also the question whether sensation and knowledge are the same or different; for indeed, the greatest part of the discussion about definitions is concerned with whether they are the same or different.
Ἁπλῶς δὲ ὁρικὰ πάντα λεγέσθω τὰ ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν ὄντα μέθοδον τοῖς ὁρισμοῖς. Ὅτι δὲ πάντα τὰ νῦν ῥηθέντα τοιαῦτ᾿ ἐστί, δῆλον ἐξ αὐτῶν.
In short, let all things that fall under the same method as definitions be called "definitional." That all the things just mentioned are of this kind is clear from themselves.
Δυνάμενοι γὰρ ὅτι ταὐτὸν καὶ ὅτι ἕτερον διαλέγεσθαι, τῷ αὐτῷ τρόπῳ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ὁρισμοὺς ἐπιχειρεῖν εὐπορήσομεν· δείξαντες γὰρ ὅτι οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἀνῃρηκότες ἐσόμεθα τὸν ὁρισμόν.
For being able, to argue that they are the same and that they are different, we shall also have an abundance of means to attack definitions in the same way; for having shown that it is not the same, we shall have demolished the definition.
Οὐ μὴν ἀντιστρέφει γε τὸ νῦν ῥηθέν· οὐ γὰρ ἱκανὸν πρὸς τὸ κατασκευάσαι τὸν ὁρισμὸν τὸ δεῖξαι ταὐτὸν ὄν.
Yet what has just been said does not convert; for to show that it is the same is not sufficient for establishing the definition.
Πρὸς μέντοι τὸ ἀνασκευάσαι αὔταρκες τὸ δεῖξαι ὅτι οὐ ταὐτόν.
To refute it, however, to show that it is not the same is quite sufficient.
Ἴδιον δ᾿ ἐστὶν ὃ μὴ δηλοῖ μὲν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, μόνῳ δ᾿ ὑπάρχει καὶ ἀντικατηγορεῖται τοῦ πράγματος, οἷον ἴδιον ἀνθρώπου τὸ γραμματικῆς εἶναι δεκτικόν· εἰ γὰρ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι, γραμματικῆς δεκτικός ἐστι, καὶ εἰ γραμματικῆς δεκτικός ἐστιν, ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν.
A property is that which does not indicate the essence, but belongs to that thing alone and is counter-predicated of the thing, for example, it is a property of man to be capable of learning grammar; for if he is a man, he is capable of learning grammar, and if he is capable of learning grammar, he is a man.
Οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἴδιον λέγει τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλῳ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον τὸ καθεύδειν ἀνθρώπῳ, οὐδ᾿ ἂν τύχῃ κατά τινα χρόνον μόνῳ ὑπάρχον.
For no one calls that which is capable of belonging to something else a property, for example, sleeping in the case of man, even if it should happen to belong to him alone for some time.
Εἰ δ᾿ ἄρα τι καὶ λέγοιτο τῶν τοιούτων ἴδιον, οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ ποτὲ ἢ πρός τι ἴδιον ῥηθήσεται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ δεξιῶν εἶναι ποτὲ ἴδιόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ δίπουν πρός τι ἴδιον τυγχάνει λεγόμενον, οἷον τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς ἵππον καὶ κύνα.
If indeed any such thing should be called a property, it will be called a property not absolutely, but "at some time" or "relative to something"; for to be on the right side is a property "at some time," while to be two-footed happens to be called a property "relative to something," as in the case of man relative to horse and dog.
Ὅτι δὲ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλῳ ὑπάρχειν οὐθὲν ἀντικατηγορεῖται, δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον, εἴ τι καθεύδει, ἄνθρωπον εἶναι.
And that none of the things capable of belonging to another is counter-predicated is clear; for it is not necessary that, if something is sleeping, it is a man.
Γένος δ᾿ ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφερόντων τῷ εἴδει ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενον. Ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι δὲ κατηγορεῖσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα λεγέσθω, ὅσα ἁρμόττει ἀποδοῦναι ἐρωτηθέντας τί ἐστι τὸ προκείμενον, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἁρμόττει, ἐρωτηθέντα τί ἐστι τὸ προκείμενον, εἰπεῖν ὅτι ζῷον.
A genus is that which is predicated of many things differing in species, in the category of "what is it." And let those things be said to be predicated in the category of "what is it" which are appropriate to render when asked what the proposed thing is, just as in the case of man, when asked what the proposed thing is, it is appropriate to say that he is an animal.
Γενικὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ πότερον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἄλλο ἄλλῳ ἢ ἐν ἑτέρῳ.
And also generic is the question whether one thing is in the same genus as another, or in a different one.
Καὶ γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον πίπτει τῷ γένει· διαλεχθέντες γὰρ ὅτι τὸ ζῷον γένος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῦ βοός, διειλεγμένοι ἐσόμεθα ὅτι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει.
For such a thing also falls under the same method as genus; for having argued that animal is the genus of man, and likewise also of ox, we shall have argued that they are in the same genus.
Ἐὰν δὲ τοῦ μὲν ἑτέρου δείξωμεν ὅτι γένος ἐστί, τοῦ δὲ ἑτέρου ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι, διειλεγμένοι ἐσόμεθα ὅτι οὐκ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ταῦτ᾿ ἐστίν.
But if we show that it is the genus of one, but is not of the other, we shall have argued that these are not in the same genus.
Συμβεβηκὸς δέ ἐστιν ὃ μηδὲν μὲν τούτων ἐστί, μήτε ὅρος μήτε ἴδιον μήτε γένος, ὑπάρχει δὲ τῷ πράγματι, καὶ ὃ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν ὁτῳοῦν ἑνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον τὸ καθῆσθαι ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν τινὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν.
An accident is that which is none of these, neither definition, nor property, nor genus, but belongs to the thing, and which is capable of belonging to any single and same thing, and of not belonging, for example, to sit is capable of belonging to some same person, and of not belonging.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ λευκόν· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ οὐθὲν κωλύει ὁτὲ μὲν λευκὸν ὁτὲ δὲ μὴ λευκὸν εἶναι.
And likewise also white; for nothing prevents the same thing from being at one time white and at another not white.
Ἔστι δὲ τῶν τοῦ συμβεβηκότος ὁρισμῶν ὁ δεύτερος βελτίων· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ πρώτου ῥηθέντος ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ μέλλει τις συνήσειν, προειδέναι τί ἐστιν ὅρος καὶ γένος καὶ ἴδιον, ὁ δὲ δεύτερος αὐτοτελής ἐστι πρὸς τὸ γνωρίζειν τί ποτ᾿ ἐστὶ τὸ λεγόμενον καθ᾿ αὑτό.
Of the definitions of accident, the second is better; for when the first is stated, it is necessary, if one is to understand it, to know beforehand what definition, genus, and property are, whereas the second is self-sufficient for knowing what the thing spoken of is by itself.
Προσκείσθωσαν δὲ τῷ συμβεβηκότι καὶ αἱ πρὸς ἄλληλα συγκρίσεις, ὁπωσοῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος λεγόμεναι, οἷον πότερον τὸ καλὸν ἢ τὸ συμφέρον αἱρετώτερον, καὶ πότερον ὁ κατ᾿ ἀρετὴν ἢ ὁ κατ᾿ ἀπόλαυσιν ἡδίων βίος, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο παραπλησίως τυγχάνει τούτοις λεγόμενον· ἐπὶ πάντων γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων, ποτέρῳ μᾶλλον τὸ κατηγορούμενον συμβέβηκεν, ἡ ζήτησις γίνεται.
And let there be added to accident also comparisons with one another, in whatever way they are spoken of on the basis of accident, for example, whether the beautiful or the expedient is more desirable, and whether the life according to virtue or that according to enjoyment is more pleasant, and if anything else happens to be spoken of in a similar way to these; for in all such cases, the inquiry is as to which of the two the predicate more belongs as an accident.
Δῆλον δ᾿ ἐξ αὐτῶν ὅτι τὸ συμβεβηκὸς οὐθὲν κωλύει ποτὲ καὶ πρός τι ἴδιον γίνεσθαι, οἷον τὸ καθῆσθαι συμβεβηκὸς ὄν, ὅταν τις μόνος κάθηται, τότε ἴδιον ἔσται, μὴ μόνου δὲ καθημένου πρὸς τοὺς μὴ καθημένους ἴδιον.
And it is clear from these very things that nothing prevents an accident from becoming a property both "at some time" and "relative to something," for example, sitting, which is an accident, when someone sits alone, will then be a property, and when he does not sit alone, it is a property relative to those who are not sitting.
Ὥστε καὶ πρός τι καὶ ποτὲ οὐθὲν κωλύει τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἴδιον γίνεσθαι.
So that nothing prevents an accident from becoming a property both relative to something and at some time.
Ἁπλῶς δ᾿ ἴδιον οὐκ ἔσται.
But absolutely it will not be a property.