§1.16Περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ πολλαχῶς διὰ τούτων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων σκεπτέον· τὰς δὲ διαφορὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς τε τοῖς γένεσι πρὸς ἄλληλα θεωρητέον, οἷον τίνι διαφέρει δικαιοσύνη ἀνδρίας καὶ φρόνησις σωφροσύνης (ταῦτα γὰρ ἅπαντα ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γένους ἐστίν), καὶ ἐξ ἄλλου πρὸς ἄλλο τῶν μὴ πολὺ λίαν διεστηκότων, οἷον τίνι αἴσθησις ἐπιστήμης· ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν πολὺ διεστηκότων κατάδηλοι παντελῶς αἱ διαφοραί.
Therefore, concerning what is said in many ways, one must examine it by these and similar means; and one must observe the differences, both within the genera themselves in relation to one another—for example, in what way justice differs from courage, and prudence from temperance (for all these are from the same genus)—and also of one thing from another among those that are not too widely separated, for example, in what way sensation differs from knowledge; for in the case of things that are widely separated, the differences are completely obvious.
§1.17Τὴν δὲ ὁμοιότητα σκεπτέον ἐπί τε τῶν ἐν ἑτέροις γένεσιν, ὡς ἕτερον πρὸς ἕτερόν τι, οὕτως ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο, οἷον ὡς ἐπιστήμη πρὸς ἐπιστητόν, οὕτως αἴσθησις πρὸς αἰσθητόν· καὶ ὡς ἕτερον ἐν ἑτέρῳ τινί, οὕτως ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ, οἷον ὡς ὄψις ἐν ὀφθαλμῷ, νοῦς ἐν ψυχῇ, καὶ ὡς γαλήνη ἐν θαλάσσῃ, νηνεμία ἐν ἀέρι.
And one must examine similarity both in the case of things in different genera, in the way that as one thing is to a certain other thing, so is another to another, for example, as knowledge is to the object of knowledge, so is sensation to the object of sensation; and as one thing is in a certain other, so is another in another, for example, as sight is in the eye, so is intellect in the soul, and as calm is in the sea, so is windlessness in the air.
Μάλιστα δ᾿ ἐν τοῖς πολὺ διεστῶσι γυμνάζεσθαι δεῖ· ῥᾷον γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν δυνησόμεθα τὰ ὅμοια συνορᾶν.
Especially one must train oneself in the case of things that are widely separated; for we shall be able more easily to see the similarities in the remaining cases.
Σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ὄντα, εἴ τι ἅπασιν ὑπάρχει ταὐτόν, οἷον ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ κυνί· ᾗ γὰρ ὑπάρχει τι αὐτοῖς ταὐτόν, ταύτῃ ὅμοιά ἐστιν.
And one must also examine things that are in the same genus, whether there is something identical belonging to all of them, for example, to man, horse, and dog; for in so far as something identical belongs to them, to this extent they are similar.
§1.18Χρήσιμον δὲ τὸ μὲν ποσαχῶς λέγεται ἐπεσκέφθαι πρός τε τὸ σαφές (μᾶλλον γὰρ ἄν τις εἰδείη τί τίθησιν, ἐμφανισθέντος ποσαχῶς λέγεται) καὶ πρὸς τὸ γίνεσθαι κατ᾿ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ μὴ πρὸς τοὔνομα τοὺς συλλογισμούς.
Now, to have examined in how many ways a term is said is useful, first, for clarity (for one would know better what one is positing, once it is made clear in how many ways it is said), and second, so that reasoning may be directed towards the actual thing and not towards the name.
Ἀδήλου γὰρ ὄντος ποσαχῶς λέγεται, ἐνδέχεται μὴ ἐπὶ ταὐτὸν τόν τε ἀποκρινόμενον καὶ τὸν ἐρωτῶντα φέρειν τὴν διάνοιαν· ἐμφανισθέντος δὲ ποσαχῶς λέγεται καὶ ἐπὶ τί φέρων τίθησι, γελοῖος ἂν φαίνοιτο ὁ ἐρωτῶν, εἰ μὴ πρὸς τοῦτο τὸν λόγον ποιοῖτο.
For when it is unclear in how many ways it is said, it is possible that the respondent and the questioner do not direct their minds to the same thing; but once it has been made clear in how many ways it is said and to which of them the respondent refers when he posits it, the questioner would appear ridiculous if he did not direct his argument to this.
Χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ παραλογισθῆναι καὶ πρὸς τὸ παραλογίσασθαι.
It is also useful both for not being misled by fallacious reasoning and for misleading others with it.
Εἰδότες γὰρ ποσαχῶς λέγεται οὐ μὴ παραλογισθῶμεν, ἀλλ᾿ εἰδήσομεν ἐὰν μὴ πρὸς ταὐτὸ τὸν λόγον ποιῆται ὁ ἐρωτῶν· αὐτοί τε ἐρωτῶντες δυνησόμεθα παραλογίσασθαι, ἐὰν μὴ τυγχάνῃ εἰδὼς ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος ποσαχῶς λέγεται.
For knowing in how many ways it is said, we shall by no means be misled, but we shall know if the questioner does not direct his argument to the same thing; and we ourselves, when questioning, shall be able to mislead the respondent, if he does not happen to know in how many ways it is said.
Τοῦτο δ᾿ οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων δυνατόν, ἀλλ᾿ ὅταν ᾖ τῶν πολλαχῶς λεγομένων τὰ μὲν ἀληθῆ τὰ δὲ ψευδῆ.
But this is not possible in all cases, but only when, among the things said in many ways, some are true and others are false.
Ἔστι δὲ οὐκ οἰκεῖος ὁ τρόπος οὗτος τῆς διαλεκτικῆς· διὸ παντελῶς εὐλαβητέον τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς τὸ τοιοῦτον, τὸ πρὸς τοὔνομα διαλέγεσθαι, ἐὰν μή τις ἄλλως ἐξαδυνατῇ περὶ τοῦ προκειμένου διαλέγεσθαι.
This method, however, is not proper to dialectic; therefore, dialecticians must completely guard against such a thing—namely, arguing against the name—unless one is otherwise utterly unable to discuss the subject in question.
Τὸ δὲ τὰς διαφορὰς εὑρεῖν χρήσιμον πρός τε τοὺς συλλογισμοὺς τοὺς περὶ ταὐτοῦ καὶ ἑτέρου καὶ πρὸς τὸ γνωρίζειν τί ἕκαστόν ἐστιν.
On the other hand, to find the differences is useful both for reasonings concerning identity and difference, and for recognizing what each thing is.
Ὅτι μὲν οὖν πρὸς τοὺς συλλογισμοὺς τοὺς περὶ ταὐτοῦ καὶ ἑτέρου χρήσιμον, δῆλον· εὑρόντες γὰρ διαφορὰν τῶν προκειμένων ὁποιανοῦν δεδειχότες ἐσόμεθα ὅτι οὐ ταὐτόν·
Now, that it is useful for reasonings concerning identity and difference is clear; for having found any difference whatsoever between the subjects in question, we shall have shown that they are not identical.
πρὸς δὲ τὸ γνωρίζειν τί ἐστι, διότι τὸν ἴδιον τῆς οὐσίας ἑκάστου λόγον ταῖς περὶ ἕκαστον οἰκείαις διαφοραῖς χωρίζειν εἰώθαμεν.
And for recognizing what a thing is, it is useful because we are accustomed to distinguish the definition proper to the essence of each thing by means of the differences proper to each.
Ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὁμοίου θεωρία χρήσιμος πρός τε τοὺς ἐπακτικοὺς λόγους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως συλλογισμοὺς καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόδοσιν τῶν ὁρισμῶν.
And the observation of similarity is useful for inductive arguments, for reasonings from hypothesis, and for the rendering of definitions.
Πρὸς μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐπακτικοὺς λόγους, διότι τῇ καθ᾿ ἕκαστα ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐπαγωγῇ τὸ καθόλου ἀξιοῦμεν ἐπάγειν· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιόν ἐστιν ἐπάγειν μὴ εἰδότας τὰ ὅμοια.
Now, for inductive arguments, it is useful because we claim to induce the universal by means of induction of particulars in the case of similar things; for it is not easy to induce if we do not know the similar things.
Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως συλλογισμούς, διότι ἔνδοξόν ἐστιν, ὥς ποτε ἐφ᾿ ἑνὸς τῶν ὁμοίων ἔχει, οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν.
And for reasonings from hypothesis, it is useful because it is reputable that as it holds in the case of one of the similar things, so it holds also in the case of the rest.
Ὥστε πρὸς ὅ τι ἂν αὐτῶν εὐπορῶμεν διαλέγεσθαι, προδιομολογησόμεθα, ὥς ποτε ἐπὶ τούτων ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ προκειμένου ἔχειν.
Thus, regarding whichever of them we are well-equipped to discuss, we shall agree beforehand that as it holds in these cases, so it holds also in the case of the subject in question.
Δείξαντες δὲ ἐκεῖνο καὶ τὸ προκείμενον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως δεδειχότες ἐσόμεθα· ὑποθέμενοι γάρ, ὥς ποτε ἐπὶ τούτων ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ προκειμένου ἔχειν, τὴν ἀπόδειξιν πεποιήμεθα.
And having shown that, we shall also have shown the subject in question from hypothesis; for having hypothesized that as it holds in these cases, so it holds also in the case of the subject in question, we have made our demonstration.
Πρὸς δὲ τὴν τῶν ὁρισμῶν ἀπόδοσιν, διότι δυνάμενοι συνορᾶν τί ἐν ἑκάστῳ ταὐτόν, οὐκ ἀπορήσομεν εἰς τί δεῖ γένος ὁριζομένους τὸ προκείμενον τιθέναι· τῶν γὰρ κοινῶν τὸ μάλιστα ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενον γένος ἂν εἴη.
And for the rendering of definitions, it is useful because, being able to see what is identical in each case, we shall not be at a loss as to what genus we must place the subject in when defining it; for of the common terms, that which is predicated most of all in the category of essence would be the genus.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πολὺ διεστῶσι χρήσιμος πρὸς τοὺς ὁρισμοὺς ἡ τοῦ ὁμοίου θεωρία, οἷον ὅτι ταὐτὸν γαλήνη μὲν ἐν θαλάσσῃ, νηνεμία δ᾿ ἐν ἀέρι (ἑκάτερον γὰρ ἡσυχία), καὶ ὅτι στιγμὴ ἐν γραμμῇ καὶ μονὰς ἐν ἀριθμῷ. ἑκάστερον γὰρ ἀρχή.
Similarly also in the case of things that are widely separated, the observation of similarity is useful for definitions, for example, that calm in the sea and windlessness in the air are the same (for each is stillness), and that a point in a line and a unit in a number are the same (for each is a starting point).
Ὥστε τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ πάντων γένος ἀποδιδόντες δόξομεν οὐκ ἀλλοτρίως ὁρίζεσθαι.
Thus, by rendering the common genus over all of them, we shall not seem to define in an alien manner.
Σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ οἱ ὁριζόμενοι οὕτως εἰώθασιν ἀποδιδόναι· τήν τε γὰρ μονάδα ἀρχὴν ἀριθμοῦ φασὶν εἶναι καὶ τὴν στιγμὴν ἀρχὴν γραμμῆς.
And indeed, those who define are virtually accustomed to render them in this way; for they say that the unit is the starting point of number, and the point the starting point of a line.
Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι εἰς τὸ κοινὸν ἀμφοτέρων γένος τιθέασιν.
It is clear, therefore, that they place both in their common genus.
Τὰ μὲν οὖν ὄργανα δι᾿ ὧν οἱ συλλογισμοὶ ταῦτ᾿ ἐστίν· οἱ δὲ τόποι πρὸς οὓς χρήσιμα τὰ λεχθέντα οἵδε εἰσίν.
These, then, are the instruments through which reasonings are carried out; and the topics for which the things mentioned are useful are the following.