§7.11Ἔτι εἰ αἱ τῶν ἐναντίων κινήσεις ἐναντίαι, ἅμα δὲ τὰ ἐναντία ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἀτόμῳ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν, ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν αἴσθησιν τὴν μίαν ἐναντία ἐστίν, οἷον γλυκὺ πικρῷ, τούτων οὐκ ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο αἰσθάνεσθαι ἅμα.
Furthermore, if the movements of contraries are contrary, and it is not possible for contraries to co-exist at the same time in the same indivisible [subject or time], and contraries fall under the single sense, such as sweet and bitter, it would not be possible to perceive these simultaneously.
§7.12Ὁμοίως δὲ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ μὴ ἐναντία· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ λευκοῦ τὰ δὲ τοῦ μέλανός ἐστιν, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως, οἷον τῶν χυμῶν οἱ μὲν τοῦ γλυκέος οἱ δὲ τοῦ πικροῦ.
Similarly, it is clear that neither can one perceive things that are not contraries simultaneously; for some belong to the side of white, others to the side of black, and similarly in other cases, as among flavors some belong to sweet, others to bitter.
Οὐδὲ τὰ μεμιγμένα ἅμα· λόγοι γάρ εἰσιν ἀντικειμένων, οἷον τὸ διὰ πασῶν καὶ τὸ διὰ πέντε, ἂν μὴ ὡς ἓν αἰσθάνηται.
Nor can one perceive mixed things simultaneously; for they are ratios of opposites, such as the octave and the fifth, unless they are perceived as one.
§7.13Οὕτως δ’ εἶς λόγος ὁ τῶν ἄκρων γίνεται, ἄλλως δ’ οὔ· ἔσται γὰρ ἅμα ὁ μὲν πολλοῦ πρὸς ὀλίγον ἢ περιττοῦ πρὸς ἄρτιον, ὁ δ’ ὀλίγου πρὸς πολὺ ἢ ἀρτίου πρὸς περιττόν.
And in this way, a single ratio of the extremes is formed, but otherwise not; for there will be simultaneously one ratio of much to little or of odd to even, and another of little to much or of even to odd.
§7.14Εἰ οὖν πλεῖον ἔτι ἀπέχει ἀλλήλων καὶ διαφέρει τὰ συστοίχως μὲν λεγόμενα ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ γένει τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει (λέγω δ’ οἷον τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν καλῶ σύστοιχα, γένει δ’ ἕτερα· τὸ γλυκὺ δὲ τοῦ μέλανος πλεῖον ἔτι τῷ εἴδει διαφέρει ἢ τὸ λευκόν), ἔτι ἂν ἧττον ἅμα ἐνδέχοιτο αὐτὰ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ τὰ τῷ γένει ταὐτά.
If, therefore, those things which are called coordinates but belong to different genera are still more distant and different from one another than those in the same genus—I mean, for example, I call sweet and white coordinates, though they are different in genus; and sweet differs still more in species from black than white does—then it would be still less possible to perceive them simultaneously than those that are the same in genus.
§7.15Ὥστ’ εἰ μὴ ταῦτα, οὐδ’ ἐκεῖνα.
Consequently, if not the former, neither the latter.
Ὃ δὲ λέγουσί τινες τῶν περὶ τὰς συμφωνίας, ὅτι οὐχ ἅμα μὲν ἀφικνοῦνται οἱ ψόφοι, φαίνονται δέ, καὶ λανθάνει, ὅταν ὁ χρόνος ᾖ ἀναίσθητος, πότερον ὀρθῶς λέγεται ἢ οὔ;
But as for what some of those who study concords say, namely, that the sounds do not arrive simultaneously, but only appear to do so, and that this escapes our notice when the time interval is imperceptible—is this said correctly or not?
§7.16Τάχα γὰρ ἂν φαίη τις καὶ νῦν παρὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖν ἅμα ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν, ὅτι οἱ μεταξὺ χρόνοι λανθάνουσιν.
For perhaps someone might say that even in the present case, it is because of this that we seem to see and hear simultaneously, namely, because the intervening times escape our notice.
Ἢ τοῦτ’ οὐκ ἀληθές, οὐδ’ ἐνδέχεται χρόνον εἶναι ἀναίσθητον οὐδένα οὐδὲ λανθάνειν, ἀλλὰ παντὸς ἐνδέχεται αἰσθάνεσθαι.
Or is this not true, and is it impossible for there to be any imperceptible time or for it to escape notice, but rather it is possible to perceive every time?
§7.17Εἰ γὰρ ὅτε αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τις αἰσθάνεται ἢ ἄλλου ἐν συνεχεῖ χρόνῳ, μὴ ἐνδέχεται τότε λανθάνειν ὅτι ἐστίν, ἔστι δέ τις ἐν τῷ συνεχεῖ καὶ τοσοῦτος ὅσος ὅλως ἀναίσθητός ἐστι, δῆλον ὅτι τότε λανθάνοι ἂν εἰ ἔστιν αὐτὸς αὑτόν, καὶ εἰ ὁρᾷ, καὶ οὐκ αἰσθάνεται·
For if, when someone perceives himself or something else in a continuous time, it is impossible for it to escape his notice then that he exists, and yet there is in that continuous time some part of such a size as to be completely imperceptible, it is clear that he would then be unaware of whether he himself exists, and if he sees, he would not be perceiving [that he sees].
καὶ εἰ αἰσθάνεται, ἔτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη οὔτε χρόνος οὔτε πρᾶγμα οὐδὲν ὃ αἰσθάνεται ἢ ἐν ᾧ, εἰ μὴ οὕτως, ὅτι ἐν τούτου τινὶ ἢ ὅτι τούτου τι ὁρᾷ, εἴπερ ἔστι τι μέγεθος καὶ χρόνου καὶ πράγματος ἀναίσθητον ὅλως διὰ μικρότητα· εἰ γὰρ τὴν ὅλην ὁρᾷ, καὶ αἰσθάνεται τὸν αὐτὸν συνεχῶς χρόνον, οὐ τῶν νῦν τούτων τινί.
And even if he does perceive, there would no longer be any time or any object that he perceives or in which he perceives, except in this sense, that he sees in some part of this time or sees some part of this object, if indeed there is some magnitude both of time and of object that is completely imperceptible due to its smallness; for if he sees the whole, and perceives during the same continuous time, it is not by means of any of these "nows" (or imperceptible parts).
§7.18Ἀφῃρήσθω ἡ τὸ Γ Β, ἐν ᾗ οὐκ ᾐσθάνετο.
Let CB, in which he was not perceiving, be subtracted.
Οὐκοῦν ἐν ταύτης τινὶ ἢ ταύτης τι, ὥσπερ τὴν γῆν ὁρᾷ ὅλην, ὅτι τοδὶ αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐνιαυτῷ βαδίζει, ὅτι ἐν τῷδε τῷ μέρει αὐτοῦ.
Then, is it in some part of this or of some part of this [that he perceives], just as he sees the whole earth because he sees this part of it, and walks in the year because he walks in this part of it?
Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐν τῷ Β Γ οὐδὲν αἰσθάνεται.
But indeed, in BC he perceives nothing.
Τῷ ἄρα ἐν τούτου τινὶ τοῦ Α Β αἰσθάνεσθαι λέγεται τοῦ ὅλου αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὴν ὅλην.
Therefore, it is by perceiving in some part of this AB that he is said to perceive the whole and the whole [magnitude].
§7.19Ὁ δ’ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς Α Γ· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐν τινὶ καὶ τινός, ὅλου δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθάνεσθαι.
And the same argument applies also to AC; for he is always perceiving in some part and of some part, and it is not possible to perceive the whole.
Ἅπαντα μὲν οὖν αἰσθητά ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ οὐ φαίνεται ὅσα ἐστίν· τοῦ γὰρ ἡλίου τὸ μέγεθος ὁρᾷ καὶ τὸ τετράπηχυ πόρρωθεν, ἀλλ’ οὐ φαίνεται ὅσον, ἀλλ’ ἐνίοτε ἀδιαίρετον, ὁρᾷ δ’ οὐκ ἀδιαίρετον.
All things, therefore, are perceptible, but they do not appear as great as they are; for he sees the magnitude of the sun, even its four-cubit size, from a distance, but it does not appear how great it is, but sometimes as indivisible, although he does not see an indivisible thing.