§7.1Ἔστι δέ τις ἀπορία καὶ ἄλλη τοιάδε περὶ αἰσθήσεως, πότερον ἐνδέχεται δυεῖν ἅμα αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἀτόμῳ χρόνῳ, ἢ οὔ, εἰ δὴ ἀεὶ ἡ μείζων κίνησις τὴν ἐλάττω ἐκκρούει· διὸ ἐπιφερομένων ἐπὶ τὰ ὄμματα οὐκ αἰσθάνονται, ἐὰν τύχωσι σφόδρα τι ἐννοοῦντες ἢ φοβούμενοι ἢ ἀκούοντες πολὺν ψόφον.
There is also another such puzzle about perception: whether it is possible to perceive two things simultaneously in the same indivisible time, or not, if indeed the greater movement always drives out the lesser; which is why, when things are brought before their eyes, people do not perceive them if they happen to be thinking deeply about something, or fearing, or hearing a loud noise.
§7.2Τοῦτο δὴ ὑποκείσθω, καὶ ὅτι ἑκάστου μᾶλλον ἔστιν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἁπλοῦ ὄντος ἢ κεκραμένου, οἷον οἴνου ἀκράτου ἢ κεκραμένου, καὶ μέλιτος, καὶ χρόας, καὶ τῆς νήτης μόνης ἢ ἐν τῷ διὰ πασῶν, διὰ τὸ ἀφανίζειν ἄλληλα.
Let this then be assumed, and also that each thing is more perceivable when it is simple than when it is mixed, such as unmixed wine rather than mixed, and honey, and color, and the highest note alone rather than in the octave, because they obscure one another.
§7.3Τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖ ἐξ ὧν ἕν τι γίνεται.
And this is produced by those things from which some single thing is formed.
Εἰ δὴ ἡ μείζων τὴν ἐλάττω κίνησιν ἐκκρούει, ἀνάγκη, ἂν ἅμα ὦσι, καὶ αὐτὴν ἧττον αἰσθητὴν εἶναι ἢ εἰ μόνη ἦν· ἀφαιρεῖται γάρ τι ἡ ἐλάττων μιγνυμένη, εἴπερ ἅπαντα τὰ ἁπλᾶ μᾶλλον αἰσθητά ἐστίν.
If indeed the greater movement drives out the lesser, it is necessary, if they are simultaneous, that even this movement itself is less perceivable than if it were alone; for the lesser, when mixed, takes away something, if indeed all simple things are more perceivable.
Ἐὰν ἄρα ἴσαι ὦσιν ἕτεραι οὖσαι, οὐδετέρας ἔσται αἴσθησις· ἀφανιεῖ γὰρ ἡ ἑτέρα ὁμοίως τὴν ἑτέραν.
If, then, they are equal but different, there will be perception of neither; for the one will obscure the other equally.
Ἁπλῆς δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθάνεσθαι.
And it is not possible to perceive either as simple.
§7.4Ὥστε ἢ οὐδεμία ἔσται αἴσθησις ἢ ἄλλη ἐξ ἀμφοῖν.
So that either there will be no perception at all, or there will be another one arising from both.
Ὅπερ καὶ γίνεσθαι δοκεῖ ἐκ τῶν κεραννυμένων ἐν ᾧ ἂν μιχθῶσιν.
Which is indeed what seems to happen in the case of things that are blended, in whatever they are mixed.
§7.5Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐκ μὲν ἐνίων γίνεταί τι, ἐκ δ’ ἐνίων οὐ γίνεται, τοιαῦτα δὲ τὰ ὑφ’ ἑτέραν αἴσθησιν· μίγνυνται γὰρ ὧν τὰ ἔσχατα ἕν· οὐκ ἔστι δ’ ἐκ λευκοῦ καὶ ὀξέος ἓν γενέσθαι ἀλλ’ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς ἐξ ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος συμφωνία· οὐκ ἄρα οὐδ’ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐνδέχεται αὐτῶν ἅμα.
Since, then, from some things a single thing is formed, but from others it is not, and those things that fall under different senses are of the latter kind—for those things mix whose extremes are one, but it is not possible for a single thing to be formed from white and sharp except by accident, and not as a concord is formed from high and low pitch—therefore it is not possible to perceive them simultaneously either.
§7.6Ἴσαι μὲν γὰρ οὖσαι αἱ κινήσεις ἀφανιοῦσιν ἀλλήλας, ἐπεὶ μία οὐ γίνεται ἐξ αὐτῶν.
For if the movements are equal, they will obscure one another, since no single movement is formed from them.
Ἐὰν δ’ ἄνισοι, ἡ κρείττων αἴσθησιν ἐμποιήσει, ἐπεὶ μᾶλλον ἅμα δυεῖν αἴσθοιτ’ ἂν ἡ ψυχὴ τῇ μιᾷ αἰσθήσει ὧν μία αἴσθησις, οἷον ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἅμα ἡ κίνησις τῆς μιᾶς ταύτης ἢ τοῖν δυοῖν, οἷον ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς.
But if they are unequal, the stronger will produce perception, since the soul would more easily perceive two things simultaneously with a single sense in those cases where there is a single sense, as of high and low pitch; for the movement of this single sense is more simultaneous than that of the two, such as sight and hearing.
§7.7Τῇ μιᾷ δὲ ἅμα δυοῖν οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἂν μὴ μιχθῇ· τὸ γὰρ μῖγμα ἓν βούλεται εἶναι, τοῦ δ’ ἑνὸς μία αἴσθησις, ἡ δὲ μία ἅμα αὑτῇ.
But it is not possible to perceive two things simultaneously with a single sense unless they are mixed; for the mixture tends to be one, and of the one there is a single perception, and the single perception is simultaneous with itself.
Ὥστ’ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῶν μεμιγμένων ἅμα αἰσθάνεται, ὅτι μιᾷ αἰσθήσει κατ’ ἐνέργειαν αἰσθάνεται· ἑνὸς μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμῷ ἡ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν μία, εἴδει δὲ ἡ κατὰ δύναμιν μία.
So that of necessity one perceives mixed things simultaneously, because one perceives them with a single perception in actuality; for the perception in actuality is one in number for what is one in number, but the perception in potentiality is one in species.
Καὶ εἰ μία τοίνυν ἡ αἴσθησις ἡ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν, ἓν ἐκεῖνα ἐρεῖ.
And if, therefore, the perception in actuality is one, it will say that those things are one.
§7.8Μεμῖχθαι ἄρα ἀνάγκη αὐτά.
It is necessary, therefore, that they be mixed.
Ὅταν ἄρα μὴ ᾖ μεμιγμένα, δύο ἔσονται αἰσθήσεις αἱ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν.
Therefore, when they are not mixed, there will be two perceptions in actuality.
Ἀλλὰ κατὰ μίαν δύναμιν καὶ ἄτομον χρόνον μίαν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὴν ἐνέργειαν· μιᾶς γὰρ εἰσάπαξ μία κίνησις καὶ χρῆσις, μία δὲ ἡ δύναμις.
But according to a single potentiality and in an indivisible time, the actuality must be one; for of a single potentiality, there is a single movement and use at one time, and the potentiality is one.
Οὐκ ἄρα ἐνδέχεται δυεῖν ἅμα αἰσθάνεσθαι τῇ μιᾷ αἰσθήσει.
Therefore it is not possible to perceive two things simultaneously with a single sense.
§7.9Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τὰ ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν αἴσθησιν ἅμα ἀδύνατον, ἐὰν ᾖ δύο, δῆλον ὅτι ἧττον ἔτι τὰ κατὰ δύο αἰσθήσεις ἐνδέχεται ἅμα αἰσθάνεσθαι, οἷον λευκὸν καὶ γλυκύ.
But indeed, if it is impossible to perceive simultaneously things that fall under the same sense, if they are two, it is clear that it is still less possible to perceive simultaneously things belonging to two different senses, such as white and sweet.
Φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ μὲν τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἓν ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδενὶ ἑτέρῳ λέγειν ἀλλ’ ἢ τῷ ἅμα, τὸ δὲ τῷ εἴδει ἓν τῇ κρινούσῃ αἰσθήσει καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ.
For the soul seems to declare what is one in number by nothing else than its being simultaneous, but what is one in species by the judging sense and the manner.
§7.10Λέγω δὲ τοῦτο, ὅτι ἴσως τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, ἕτερον τῷ εἴδει ὄν, ἡ αὐτὴ κρίνει, καὶ τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ πικρόν, ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν ἑαυτῇ, ἐκείνης δ’ ἄλλη, ἀλλ’ ἑτέρως ἑκάτερον τῶν ἐναντίων, ὡς δ’ αὕτως ἑαυταῖς τὰ σύστοιχα, οἷον ὡς ἡ γεῦσις τὸ γλυκύ, οὕτως ἡ ὄψις τὸ λευκόν· ὡς δ’ αὕτη τὸ μέλαν, οὕτως ἐκείνη τὸ πικρόν.
And I say this because, perhaps, white and black, being different in species, are judged by the same sense, and sweet and bitter are judged by the same sense, which is same with itself though different from the former; but each judges each of the contraries in a different way, and similarly they judge their corresponding coordinates in relation to themselves: for example, as taste judges sweet, so sight judges white; and as the latter judges black, so the former judges bitter.