§7.20Ἡ δ’ αἰτία εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν περὶ τούτου.
And the explanation for this has been given in what went before.
Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐθείς ἐστι χρόνος ἀναίσθητος, ἐκ τούτων φανερόν· περὶ δὲ τῆς πρότερον λεχθείσης ἀπορίας σκεπτέον, πότερον ἐνδέχεται ἅμα πλειόνων αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται.
That there is, therefore, no imperceptible time is clear from these considerations; but we must investigate the difficulty mentioned before, whether it is possible or not to perceive several things simultaneously.
Τὸ δ’ ἅμα λέγω ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ ἀτόμῳ χρόνῳ πρὸς ἄλληλα.
By "simultaneously" I mean in one and the same indivisible time relative to each other.
§7.21Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἆρ’ ὧδ’ ἐνδέχεται, ἅμα μέν, ἑτέρῳ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ οὐ τῷ ἀτόμῳ, οὕτω δ’ ἀτόμῳ ὡς παντὶ ὄντι συνεχεῖ;
First of all, then, is it possible in this way: namely, simultaneously, but with a different part of the soul, and not with an indivisible part, yet with what is indivisible in the sense of being entirely continuous?
Ἢ ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν τὰ κατὰ τὴν μίαν αἴσθησιν, οἷον λέγω ὄψιν, εἰ ἔσται ἄλλῳ αἰσθανομένη ἄλλου καὶ ἄλλου χρώματος, πλείω τε μέρη ἕξει εἴδει ταὐτά;
Or is it because, in the first place, in the case of things falling under a single sense—such as sight, I mean—if sight is to perceive different colors with different parts, it will have multiple parts that are the same in species?
§7.22Καὶ γὰρ ἃ αἰσθάνεται, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐστίν.
For indeed, the objects which it perceives are in the same genus.
Εἰ δὲ ὅτι ὡς δύο ὄμματα φαίη τις, οὐδὲν κωλύει, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ὅτι ἴσως ἐκ μὲν τούτων ἕν τι γίνεται καὶ μία ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτῶν· ἐκεῖ δέ, εἰ μὲν ἓν τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, ἐκεῖνο τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ἔσται, εἰ δὲ χωρίς, οὐχ ὁμοίως ἕξει.
But if someone should say that, just as there are two eyes, nothing prevents it being so in the soul as well, the answer is that perhaps from these a single thing is formed and their activity is single; whereas in the soul, if that which comes from both is one, that will be the perceiving subject, but if they are separate, the case will not be similar.
§7.23Ἔτι αἰσθήσεις αἱ αὐταὶ πλείους ἔσονται, ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἐπιστήμας διαφόρους φαίη· οὔτε γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργεια ἄνευ τῆς καθ’ αὑτὴν ἔσται δυνάμεως, οὔτ’ ἄνευ ταύτης ἔσται αἴσθησις.
Furthermore, the same senses will be multiple, just as if someone were to speak of different knowledges of the same object; for neither will the activity exist without its own capacity, nor without this will there be perception.
Εἰ δὲ τούτων ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ ἀτόμῳ αἰσθάνεται, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐνεδέχετο τούτων ἅμα πλειόνων ἢ τῶν τῷ γένει ἑτέρων.
And if it perceives these in a single and indivisible time, it is clear that it does so also in the case of the others; for it was more possible to perceive several of these simultaneously than those that are different in genus.
§7.24Εἰ δὲ δὴ ἄλλῳ μὲν γλυκέος ἄλλῳ δὲ λευκοῦ αἰσθάνεται ἡ ψυχὴ μέρει, ἤτοι τὸ ἐκ τούτων ἕν τί ἐστιν ἢ οὐχ ἕν.
But if the soul perceives sweet with one part and white with another, then either what comes from these is some one thing or it is not one.
Ἀλλ’ ἀνάγκη ἕν·
But it must be one; for the perceiving part is some one thing.
ἓν γάρ τι τὸ αἰσθητικόν ἐστι μέρος. Τίνος οὖν ἐκεῖνο ἑνός;
Of what single thing, then, is that perceiving part the part?
Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐκ τούτων ἕν.
For nothing that is one comes from these.
Ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἕν τι εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, ᾧ ἅπαντα αἰσθάνεται, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ἄλλο δὲ γένος δι’ ἄλλου.
Therefore, there must be some one thing in the soul by which it perceives everything, as has been said before, though it perceives each different genus through a different medium.
§7.25Ἆρ’ οὖν ᾗ μὲν ἀδιαίρετόν ἐστι κατ’ ἐνέργειαν, ἕν τί ἐστι τὸ αἰσθητικὸν γλυκέος καὶ λευκοῦ, ὅταν δὲ διαιρετὸν γένηται κατ’ ἐνέργειαν, ἕτερον;
Is it then the case that, insofar as it is indivisible in activity, the perceiving subject of sweet and white is some one thing, but when it becomes divisible in activity, it is different?
Ἢ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν ἐνδέχεται, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς.
Or, just as is possible in the case of the things themselves, is it so also in the case of the soul?
Τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ λευκὸν καὶ γλυκύ ἐστι, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά, εἰ μὴ χωριστὰ τὰ πάθη ἀλλήλων, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι ἕτερον ἑκάστῳ.
For the same and numerically one thing is both white and sweet, and many other things, if the properties are not separable from one another, though the being of each is different.
§7.26Ὁμοίως τοίνυν θετέον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν εἶναι ἀριθμῷ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πάντων, τῷ μέντοι εἶναι ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον τῶν μὲν γένει τῶν δὲ εἴδει.
Similarly, then, we must assume also in the case of the soul that the perceiving subject of all things is the same and numerically one, although in its being it is different—in some cases in genus, in others in species.
Ὥστε καὶ αἰσθάνοιτ’ ἂν ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἑνί, λόγῳ δ’ οὐ τῷ αὐτῷ.
Consequently, it would perceive simultaneously with the same and single subject, but not with the same definition.
Ὅτι δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν πᾶν ἐστὶ μέγεθος καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδιαίρετον αἰσθητόν, δῆλον.
And that every perceptible object is a magnitude, and there is no indivisible perceptible object, is clear.
§7.27Ἔστι γὰρ ὅθεν μὲν οὐκ ἂν ὀφθείη, ἄπειρον τὸ ἀπόστημα, ὅθεν δὲ ὁρᾶται, πεπερασμένον.
For there is a distance from which it cannot be seen, which is infinite, but that from which it is seen is finite.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ὀσφραντὸν καὶ ἀκουστὸν καὶ ὅσων μὴ αὐτῶν ἁπτόμενοι αἰσθάνονται.
Similarly also with what is smelled, what is heard, and whatever things they perceive without touching them directly.
Ἔστι δέ τι ἔσχατον τοῦ ἀποστήματος ὅθεν οὐχ ὁρᾶται, καὶ πρῶτον ὅθεν ὁρᾶται.
And there is a certain last limit of the distance from which it is not seen, and a first limit from which it is seen.
§7.28Τοῦτο δὴ ἀνάγκη ἀδιαίρετον εἶναι, οὗ ἐν μὲν τῷ ἐπέκεινα οὐκ ἐνδέχεται αἰσθάνεσθαι ὄντος, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐπὶ ταδὶ ἀνάγκη αἰσθάνεσθαι.
This limit must be indivisible; for if the object is beyond it, it is not possible to perceive it, but if it is on this side, it must be perceived.
Εἰ δή τί ἐστιν ἀδιαίρετον αἰσθητόν, ὅταν τεθῇ ἐπὶ τῷ ἐσχάτῳ ὅθεν ἐστὶν ὕστατον μὲν οὐκ αἰσθητὸν πρῶτον δ’ αἰσθητόν, ἅμα συμβήσεται ὁρατὸν εἶναι καὶ ἀόρατον· τοῦτο δ’ ἀδύνατον.
If, then, there is some indivisible perceptible object, when it is placed at the limit, it will follow that it is simultaneously visible and invisible; but this is impossible.
Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τίνα τρόπον ἔχει καὶ κοινῇ καὶ καθ’ ἕκαστον αἰσθητήριον εἴρηται·
Regarding, then, the sense-organs and the perceptible objects, how they are conditioned, both in common and with respect to each individual sense-organ, has been stated.