§6.12Ἆρ’ οὖν οὕτω καὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον καὶ τὸ φῶς;
Is it then the same also with the object of sight and light?
Καθάπερ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φησὶν ἀφικνεῖσθαι πρότερον τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ πρὶν πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν ἢ ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν.
Just as Empedocles too says that the light from the sun arrives first at the intermediate space before reaching the sight or the earth.
§6.13Δόξειε δ’ ἂν εὐλόγως τοῦτο συμβαίνειν· τὸ γὰρ κινούμενον κινεῖταί ποθέν ποι, ὥστ’ ἀνάγκη εἶναί τινα καὶ χρόνον ἐν ᾧ κινεῖται ἐκ θατέρου πρὸς θάτερον· ὁ δὲ χρόνος πᾶς διαιρετός, ὥστε ἦν ὅτε οὔπω ἑωρᾶτο ἀλλ’ ἔτ’ ἐφέρετο ἡ ἀκτὶς ἐν τῷ μεταξύ.
And this would seem to happen reasonably; for that which moves, moves from somewhere to somewhere, so that there must also be some time in which it moves from the one to the other; and all time is divisible, so that there was a time when it was not yet seen but the ray was still being carried in the intermediate space.
§6.14Καὶ εἰ ἅπαν ἅμα ἀκούει καὶ ἀκήκοε καὶ ὅλως αἰσθάνεται καὶ ᾔσθηται, καὶ μή ἐστι γένεσις αὐτῶν, ἀλλ’ εἰσὶν ἄνευ τοῦ γίνεσθαι ὅμως οὐδὲν ἧττον, ὥσπερ ὁ ψόφος ἤδη γεγενημένης τῆς πληγῆς οὔπω πρὸς τῇ ἀκοῇ.
And even if one simultaneously hears and has heard, and in general perceives and has perceived, and there is no generation of these, but they exist without coming to be, nevertheless, it is no less the case, just as sound, when the blow has already occurred, is not yet at the hearing.
§6.15Δηλοῖ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ τῶν γραμμάτων μετασχημάτισις, ὡς γιγνομένης τῆς φορᾶς ἐν τῷ μεταξύ· οὐ γὰρ τὸ λεχθὲν φαίνονται ἀκηκοότες διὰ τὸ μετασχηματίζεσθαι φερόμενον τὸν ἀέρα.
And this is also shown by the alteration of letters, on the ground that the transmission occurs in the medium; for they do not appear to have heard what was said, because the air in transmission is altered.
Ἆρ’ οὖν οὕτω καὶ τὸ χρῶμα καὶ τὸ φῶς;
Is it then the same also with color and light?
§6.16Οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῷ πῶς ἔχειν τὸ μὲν ὁρᾷ τὸ δ’ ὁρᾶται, ὥσπερ ἴσα ἐστίν· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἔδει που ἑκάτερον εἶναι· τοῖς γὰρ ἴσοις γινομένοις οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἢ ἐγγὺς ἢ πόρρω ἀλλήλων εἶναι.
For surely it is not by being in a certain state that the one sees and the other is seen, as is the case with equal things; for then there would be no need for each to be somewhere; for to things that are equal, it makes no difference whether they are near or far from each other.
§6.17Ἣ περὶ μὲν τὸν ψόφον καὶ τὴν ὀσμὴν τοῦτο συμβαίνειν εὔλογον· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ συνεχῆ μέν, ἀλλ’ ὅμως μεμέρισται ἀμφοτέρων ἡ κίνησις.
Or, while in the case of sound and odor, it is reasonable that this happens; for though air and water are continuous, yet the movement of both is divided.
Διὸ καὶ ἔστι μὲν ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀκούει ὁ πρῶτος καὶ ὁ ὕστερος καὶ ὀσφραίνεται, ἔστι δ’ ὡς οὔ.
Therefore, there is a sense in which the first and the later person hear and smell the same thing, and a sense in which they do not.
§6.18Δοκεῖ δέ τισιν εἶναι ἀπορία καὶ περὶ τούτων· ἀδύνατον γάρ φασί τινες ἄλλον ἄλλῳ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀκούειν ἢ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τ’ εἶναι πολλοὺς καὶ χωρὶς ὄντας ἀκούειν ἢ ὀσφραίνεσθαι· τὸ γὰρ ἓν χωρὶς ἂν αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ εἶναι.
But to some there seems to be a puzzle also about these things; for some say it is impossible for one person and another to hear or see or smell the same thing; for they say it is not possible for many who are separate to hear or smell [the same thing]; for otherwise the single thing would be separate from itself.
§6.19Ἢ τοῦ μὲν κινήσαντος πρῶτον, οἷον τῆς κώδωνος ἢ λιβανωτοῦ ἢ πυρός, τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑνὸς ἀριθμῷ αἰσθάνονται πάντες, τοῦ δὲ δὴ ἰδίου ἑτέρου ἀριθμῷ, εἴδει δὲ τοῦ αὑτοῦ, διὸ ἅμα πολλοὶ ὁρῶσι καὶ ὀσμῶνται καὶ ἀκούουσιν.
Or is it that they all perceive the same and numerically one thing in the case of that which first initiated the movement, such as the bell, the frankincense, or the fire, but they perceive what is peculiar to each as numerically different, though the same in species, which is why many simultaneously see, smell, and hear?
Ἔστι δ’ οὔτε σώματα ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ πάθος καὶ κίνησίς τις (οὐ γὰρ ἂν τοῦτο συνέβαινεν), οὔτ’ ἄνευ σώματος.
And these are neither bodies, but rather a certain affection and movement (for otherwise this would not happen), nor yet are they without body.
§6.20Περὶ δὲ τοῦ φωτὸς ἄλλος λόγος· τῷ εἶναι γάρ τι φῶς ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ οὐ κίνησίς τις.
But about light, there is another account; for light exists by being something, and is not a certain movement.
Ὅλως δὲ οὐδὲ ὁμοίως ἐπί τε ἀλλοιώσεως ἔχει καὶ φορᾶς· αἱ μὲν γὰρ φοραὶ εὐλόγως εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ πρῶτον ἀφικνοῦνται (δοκεῖ δ’ ὁ ψόφος εἶναι φερομένου τινὸς κίνησις), ὅσα δ’ ἀλλοιοῦται, οὐκέτι ὁμοίως· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἀθρόον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, καὶ μὴ τὸ ἥμισυ πρότερον, οἷον τὸ ὕδωρ ἅμα πᾶν πήγνυσθαι.
In general, it is not even similar in the case of alteration and of transmission; for transmissions reasonably arrive first at the medium (and sound seems to be a movement of something transmitted), but as for things that undergo alteration, it is no longer similar; for it is possible for a thing to be altered all at once, and not the half of it first, as water freezes all at once.
§6.21Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ἂν ᾖ πολὺ τὸ θερμαινόμενον ἢ πηγνύμενον, τὸ ἐχόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐχομένου πάσχει, τὰ δὲ πρῶτον ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀλλοιοῦντος μεταβάλλει, καὶ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἅμα ἀλλοιοῦσθαι καὶ ἀθρόον.
Nevertheless, if that which is heated or frozen is large, the adjacent part is affected by the adjacent part, while the first parts change under the influence of the altering agent itself, and it is not necessary that they be altered simultaneously and all at once.
§6.22Ἦν δ’ ἂν καὶ τὸ γεύεσθαι ὥσπερ ἡ ὀσμή, εἰ ἐν ὑγρῷ ἦμεν καὶ πορρωτέρω ἔτι πρὶν θιγεῖν αὐτοῦ ᾐσθανόμεθα.
And tasting would also be like smell, if we were in a liquid and perceived it from further away before touching it.
Εὐλόγως δ’ ὧν ἐστὶ μεταξὺ τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου, οὐχ ἅμα πάντα πάσχει, πλὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ φωτὸς διὰ τὸ εἰρημένον.
And it is reasonable that, in the case of those senses where there is something intermediate to the sense organ, not all parts are affected simultaneously, except in the case of light, for the reason stated.
Διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὁρᾶν· τὸ γὰρ φῶς ποιεῖ τὸ ὁρᾶν.
And for the same reason in the case of seeing; for light produces seeing.