§4.13Ὅτι δ’ οὐ παντὸς ξηροῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ τροφίμου οἱ χυμοὶ ἢ πάθος εἰσὶν ἢ στέρησις, δεῖ λαβεῖν ἐντεῦθεν, ὅτι οὔτε τὸ ξηρὸν ἄνευ τοῦ ὑγροῦ οὔτε τὸ ὑγρὸν ἄνευ τοῦ ξηροῦ· τροφὴ γὰρ οὐδὲν αὐτῶν τοῖς ζῴοις, ἀλλὰ τὸ μεμιγμένον.
That tastes are an affection or privation not of every dry thing, but of that which is nutritious, must be grasped from this: that neither is the dry without the moist, nor the moist without the dry; for none of them is nourishment by itself for animals, but rather the mixture.
§4.14Καὶ ἔστι τῆς προσφερομένης τροφῆς τοῖς ζῴοις τὰ μὲν ἁπτὰ τῶν αἰσθητῶν αὔξησιν ποιοῦντα καὶ φθίσιν· τούτων μὲν γὰρ αἴτιον ᾗ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν τὸ προσφερόμενον· ταῦτα γὰρ ποιεῖ καὶ αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν· τρέφει δὲ ᾗ γευστὸν τὸ προσφερόμενον· πάντα γὰρ τρέφεται τῷ γλυκεῖ, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ μεμιγμένως.
And of the nourishment supplied to animals, those of the sensibles that are tangible produce growth and decay; for the cause of these is the supplied food insofar as it is hot and cold (for these produce both growth and decay); but it nourishes insofar as the supplied food is tastable; for all things are nourished by the sweet, either simply or in a mixture.
§4.15Δεῖ μὲν οὖν διορίζειν περὶ τούτων ἐν τοῖς περὶ γενέσεως, νῦν δ’ ὅσον ἀναγκαῖον ἅψασθαι αὐτῶν.
Therefore, we must define these things in On Generation, but for now we must touch upon them as much as is necessary.
Τὸ γὰρ θερμὸν αὐξάνει καὶ δημιουργεῖ τὴν τροφήν, καὶ τὸ μὲν κοῦφον ἕλκει, τὸ δ’ ἁλμυρὸν καὶ πικρὸν καταλείπει διὰ βάρος.
For the hot increases and fashions the nourishment, and draws the light, but leaves behind the salty and the bitter because of their weight.
Ὃ δὴ ἐν τοῖς ἔξω σώμασι ποιεῖ τὸ ἔξω θερμόν, τοῦτο ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν ζῴων καὶ φυτῶν· διὸ τρέφεται τῷ γλυκεῖ.
What, then, the external hot does in external bodies, this the hot in the nature of animals and plants does; therefore they are nourished by the sweet.
§4.16Συμμίγνυνται δ’ οἱ ἄλλοι χυμοὶ εἰς τὴν τροφὴν τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τῷ ἁλμυρῷ καὶ ὀξεῖ, ἀντὶ ἡδύσματος.
The other tastes are mixed into the nourishment in the same manner as the salty and the sour, as a condiment.
Ταῦτα δὲ διὰ τὸ ἀντισπᾶν τῷ λίαν τρόφιμον εἶναι τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ ἐπιπολαστικόν.
These are for the purpose of counteracting the sweet which is excessively nutritious and apt to float on the stomach.
Ὥσπερ δὲ τὰ χρώματα ἐκ λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος μίξεώς ἐστιν, οὕτως οἱ χυμοὶ ἐκ γλυκέος καὶ πικροῦ.
And just as colors are from a mixture of white and black, so also tastes are from sweet and bitter.
§4.17Καὶ κατὰ λόγον δὴ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἕκαστοί εἰσιν, εἴτε κατ’ ἀριθμούς τινας τῆς μίξεως καὶ κινήσεις, εἴτε καὶ ἀορίστως.
And indeed, each is in accordance with a ratio of more and less, whether according to certain numbers of the mixture and movements, or even indefinitely.
Οἱ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ποιοῦντες μιγνύμενοι, οὗτοι ἐν ἀριθμοῖς μόνον.
But those that produce pleasure when mixed are only in numbers.
Ὁ μὲν οὖν λιπαρὸς τοῦ γλυκέος ἐστὶ χυμός, τὸ δ’ ἁλμυρὸν καὶ πικρὸν σχεδὸν τὸ αὐτό, ὁ δὲ αὐστηρὸς καὶ δριμὺς καὶ στρυφνὸς καὶ ὀξὺς ἀνὰ μέσον.
Now, the oily is a taste belonging to the sweet, and the salty and the bitter are almost the same, while the harsh, the pungent, the astringent, and the sour are in between.
§4.18Σχεδὸν γὰρ ἴσα καὶ τὰ τῶν χυμῶν εἴδη καὶ τὰ τῶν χρωμάτων ἐστίν.
For indeed, the species of tastes and those of colors are almost equal.
Ἑπτὰ γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων εἴδη, ἄν τις τιθῇ, ὥσπερ εὔλογον, τὸ φαιὸν μέλαν τι εἶναι· λείπεται γὰρ τὸ ξανθὸν μὲν τοῦ λευκοῦ εἶναι ὥσπερ τὸ λιπαρὸν τοῦ γλυκέος, τὸ φοινικοῦν δὲ καὶ ἁλουργὸν καὶ πράσινον καὶ κυανοῦν μεταξὺ τοῦ λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα μικτὰ ἐκ τούτων.
For there are seven species of both, if one posits, as is reasonable, that grey is a kind of black; for it remains that yellow belongs to white, just as the oily does to the sweet, while crimson, purple, green, and blue are between white and black, and the others are mixed from these.
§4.19Καὶ ὥσπερ τὸ μέλαν στέρησις ἐν τῷ διαφανεῖ τοῦ λευκοῦ, οὕτω τὸ ἁλμυρὸν καὶ πικρὸν τοῦ γλυκέος ἐν τῷ τροφίμῳ ὑγρῷ.
And just as black is a privation of white in the transparent, so the salty and the bitter are of the sweet in the nutritious moist.
Διὸ καὶ ἡ τέφρα τῶν κατακαομένων πικρὰ πάντων· ἐξίκμασται γὰρ τὸ πότιμον ἐξ αὐτῶν.
Therefore, the ash of all things burned is bitter; for the potable moisture has been dried out of them.
Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων, ὅσοι λέγουσι περὶ αἰσθήσεως, ἀτοπώτατόν τι ποιοῦσιν· πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἁπτὰ ποιοῦσιν.
But Democritus and most of the natural philosophers, as many as speak about sensation, do a most absurd thing; for they make all sensible objects tangible.
§4.20Καίτοι εἰ οὕτω τοῦτ’ ἔχει, δῆλον ὡς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων ἑκάστη ἁφή τις ἐστίν· τοῦτο δ’ ὅτι ἀδύνατον, οὐ χαλεπὸν συνιδεῖν.
And yet, if this is so, it is clear that each of the other senses is also a kind of touch; but that this is impossible, it is not difficult to see.
Ἔτι δὲ τοῖς κοινοῖς τῶν αἰσθήσεων πασῶν χρῶνται ὡς ἰδίοις· μέγεθος γὰρ καὶ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ τραχὺ καὶ τὸ λεῖον, ἔτι δὲ τὸ ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ ἀμβλὺ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ὄγκοις κοινὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεών ἐστιν, εἰ δὲ μὴ πασῶν, ἀλλ’ ὄψεώς γε καὶ ἁφῆς.
Moreover, they use the common sensibles of all the senses as if they were proper; for magnitude, shape, the rough, and the smooth, and further, the acute and the obtuse in bulks, are common to the senses, if not to all, at least to sight and touch.
§4.21Διὸ καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἀπατῶνται, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδίων οὐκ ἀπατῶνται, οἷον ὄψις περὶ χρώματος καὶ ἀκοὴ περὶ ψόφων.
Therefore, they are deceived about these, but they are not deceived about the proper objects, just as sight is not deceived about color and hearing about sounds.
Οἱ δὲ τὰ ἴδια εἰς ταῦτα ἀνάγουσιν, ὥσπερ Δημόκριτος· τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν τὸ μὲν τραχύ φησιν εἶναι τὸ δὲ λεῖον, εἰς δὲ τὰ σχήματα ἀνάγει τοὺς χυμούς.
But they reduce the proper objects to these common ones, as Democritus does; for he says that white is smooth and black is rough, and he reduces tastes to shapes.
Καίτοι ἢ οὐδεμιᾶς ἢ μᾶλλον τῆς ὄψεως τὰ κοινὰ γνωρίζειν.
And yet, it is the role of either none of the senses or rather of sight to recognize the common sensibles.
§4.22Εἰ δ’ ἄρα τῆς γεύσεως μᾶλλον, τὰ γοῦν ἐλάχιστα τῆς ἀκριβεστάτης ἐστὶν αἰσθήσεως διακρίνειν περὶ ἕκαστον γένος, ὥστε ἐχρῆν τὴν γεῦσιν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κοινῶν αἰσθάνεσθαι μάλιστα καὶ τῶν σχημάτων εἶναι κριτικωτάτην.
But if indeed it is rather of taste, at least it belongs to the most accurate sense to distinguish the smallest things in each class, so that taste should have perceived the other common sensibles also in the highest degree, and have been the most critical of shapes.
§4.23Ἔτι τὰ μὲν αἰσθητὰ πάντα ἔχει ἐναντίωσιν, οἷον ἐν χρώματι τῷ μέλανι τὸ λευκὸν καὶ ἐν χυμοῖς τῷ γλυκεῖ τὸ πικρόν· σχῆμα δὲ σχήματι οὐ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἐναντίον· τίνι γὰρ τῶν πολυγώνων περιφερὲς ἐναντίον;
Moreover, all sensible objects have contrariety, as in color white is contrary to black, and in tastes the bitter to the sweet; but shape does not seem to be contrary to shape; for to which of the polygons is the circular contrary?
§4.24Ἔτι ἀπείρων ὄντων τῶν σχημάτων ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τοὺς χυμοὺς εἶναι ἀπείρους· διὰ τί γὰρ ὁ μὲν ἂν ποιήσειεν αἴσθησιν, ὁ δ’ οὐκ ἂν ποιήσειεν;
Furthermore, since shapes are infinite, it is necessary that tastes also are infinite; for why would one shape produce sensation, while another would not?
Καὶ περὶ μὲν τοῦ γευστοῦ καὶ χυμοῦ εἴρηται· τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα πάθη τῶν χυμῶν οἰκείαν ἔχει τὴν σκέψιν ἐν τῇ φυσιολογίᾳ τῇ περὶ τῶν φυτῶν.
And so, concerning the tastable and taste, it has been stated; for the other affections of tastes have their proper inquiry in the natural philosophy concerning plants.