§8Ἐπεὶ δ᾿ ἔχομεν παρ᾿ ὅσα γίνονται οἱ φαινόμενοι συλλογισμοί, ἔχομεν καὶ παρ᾿ ὁπόσα οἱ σοφιστικοὶ γένοιντ᾿ ἂν συλλογισμοὶ καὶ ἔλεγχοι.
Since we possess the causes from which apparent syllogisms arise, we also possess those from which sophistical syllogisms and refutations might arise.
Λέγω δὲ σοφιστικὸν ἔλεγχον καὶ συλλογισμὸν οὐ μόνον τὸν φαινόμενον συλλογισμὸν ἢ ἔλεγχον, μὴ ὄντα δέ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν ὄντα μέν, φαινόμενον δὲ οἰκεῖον τοῦ πράγματος.
By a sophistical refutation and syllogism, I mean not only a syllogism or refutation that appears to be so but is not, but also one that is indeed so, but appears to be appropriate to the matter in question.
Εἰσὶ δ᾿ οὗτοι οἱ μὴ κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐλέγχοντες καὶ δεικνύντες ἀγνοοῦντας, ὅπερ ἦν τῆς πειραστικῆς.
These are those that do not refute according to the matter in question and do not show people to be ignorant, which was the task of the art of examination.
Ἔστι δ᾿ ἡ πειραστικὴ μέρος τῆς διαλεκτικῆς· αὕτη δὲ δύναται συλλογίζεσθαι ψεῦδος δι᾿ ἄγνοιαν τοῦ διδόντος τὸν λόγον.
Now the art of examination is a part of dialectic; and this is able to syllogize what is false because of the ignorance of the one who grants the argument.
Οἱ δὲ σοφιστικοὶ ἔλεγχοι, ἂν καὶ συλλογίζωνται τὴν ἀντίφασιν, οὐ ποιοῦσι δῆλον εἰ ἀγνοεῖ· καὶ γὰρ τὸν εἰδότα ἐμποδίζουσι τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις.
Sophistical refutations, on the other hand, even if they syllogize the contradiction, do not make it clear whether the opponent is ignorant; for they impede even the one who knows with these arguments.
Ὅτι δ᾿ ἔχομεν αὐτοὺς τῇ αὐτῇ μεθόδῳ, δῆλον· παρ᾿ ὅσα γὰρ φαίνεται τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ὡς ἠρωτημένα συλλελογίσθαι, παρὰ ταῦτα κἂν τῷ ἀποκρινομένῳ δόξειεν, ὥστ᾿ ἔσονται συλλογισμοὶ ψευδεῖς διὰ τούτων ἢ πάντων ἢ ἐνίων· ὃ γὰρ μὴ ἐρωτηθεὶς οἴεται δεδωκέναι, κἂν ἐρωτηθεὶς θείη.
It is clear that we grasp them by the same method; for the very same things that make it appear to the hearers that a conclusion has been syllogized from what was asked, would also seem so to the answerer, so that there will be false syllogisms through all or some of these; for what one thinks one has granted without being asked, one would also posit when asked.
Πλὴν ἐπί γέ τινων ἅμα συμβαίνει προσερωτᾶν τὸ ἐνδεὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐμφανίζειν, οἷον ἐν τοῖς παρὰ τὴν λέξιν καὶ τὸν σολοικισμόν.
Except that in some cases it happens at the same time to ask further what is lacking and to make the falsehood manifest, as in those cases depending on language and solecism.
Εἰ οὖν οἱ παραλογισμοὶ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως παρὰ τὸν φαινόμενον ἔλεγχόν εἰσι, δῆλον ὅτι παρὰ τοσαῦτα ἂν καὶ τῶν ψευδῶν εἴησαν συλλογισμοὶ παρ᾿ ὅσα καὶ ὁ φαινόμενος ἔλεγχος.
If, then, paralogisms of contradiction depend on the apparent refutation, it is clear that there would be syllogisms of falsehoods from just as many causes as there are of the apparent refutation.
Ὁ δὲ φαινόμενος παρὰ τὰ μόρια τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ· ἑκάστου γὰρ ἐκλείποντος φανείη ἂν ἔλεγχος, οἷον ὁ παρὰ τὸ μὴ συμβαῖνον διὰ τὸν λόγον, ὁ εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον καὶ ὁ τὰς δύο ἐρωτήσεις μίαν ποιῶν παρὰ τὴν πρότασιν, καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ καθ᾿ αὑτὸ ὁ παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός, καὶ τὸ τούτου μόριον, ὁ παρὰ τὸ ἑπόμενον· ἔτι τὸ μὴ ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἀλλ᾿ ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου συμβαίνειν· εἶτ᾿ ἀντὶ τοῦ καθόλου τὴν ἀντίφασιν καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς ταὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως παρά τε τὸ ἐπί τι ἢ παρ᾿ ἕκαστον τούτων· ἔτι παρὰ τὸ μὴ ἐναριθμουμένου τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ λαμβάνειν.
And the apparent refutation depends on the parts of the true refutation; for if each part is lacking, an apparent refutation would appear, such as the one depending on the conclusion not following because of the argument, the one leading to the impossible, the one making two questions into one depending on the premise, and instead of 'in itself' the one depending on accident, and its part, the one depending on the consequent; furthermore, the conclusion happening not on the matter but on the language; then, instead of the universal contradiction, in the same respect, towards the same thing, and in the same way, depending on 'in a certain respect' or on each of these; furthermore, assuming the point at issue contrary to the rule of not numbering the point at issue.
Ὥστ᾿ ἔχοιμεν ἂν παρ᾿ ὅσα γίνονται οἱ παραλογισμοί· παρὰ πλείω μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἂν εἶεν, παρὰ δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα ἔσονται πάντες.
Thus we would possess all the causes from which paralogisms arise; for they could not be from more, but all will be from those mentioned.
Ἔστι δ᾿ ὁ σοφιστικὸς ἔλεγχος οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἔλεγχος, ἀλλὰ πρός τινα· καὶ ὁ συλλογισμὸς ὡσαύτως.
The sophistical refutation is not an absolute refutation, but relative to someone; and the syllogism likewise.
Ἂν μὲν γὰρ μὴ λάβῃ ὅ τε παρὰ τὸ ὁμώνυμον ἓν σημαίνειν καὶ ὁ παρὰ τὴν ὁμοιοσχημοσύνην τὸ μόνον τόδε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ὡσαύτως, οὔτ᾿ ἔλεγχοι οὔτε συλλογισμοὶ ἔσονται, οὔθ᾿ ἁπλῶς οὔτε πρὸς τὸν ἐρωτώμενον· ἐὰν δὲ λάβωσι, πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἐρωτώμενον ἔσονται, ἁπλῶς δ᾿ οὐκ ἔσονται· οὐ γὰρ ἓν σημαῖνον εἰλήφασιν, ἀλλὰ φαινόμενον, καὶ παρὰ τοῦδε.
For unless the argument depending on homonymy assumes that it signifies one thing, and the one depending on the similarity of form assumes that it signifies only a 'this', and the others likewise, they will be neither refutations nor syllogisms, either absolutely or relative to the person questioned; but if they do assume, they will be relative to the person questioned, though absolutely they will not be; for they have not grasped something signifying one thing, but what appears to be so, and from this particular person.
§9Παρὰ πόσα δ᾿ ἐλέγχονται οἱ ἐλεγχόμενοι, οὐ δεῖ πειρᾶσθαι λαμβάνειν ἄνευ τῆς τῶν ὄντων ἐπιστήμης ἁπάντων.
How many are the causes from which those who are refuted are refuted must not be attempted to be grasped without the science of all existing things.
Τοῦτο δ᾿ οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶ τέχνης· ἄπειροι γὰρ ἴσως αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ αἱ ἀποδείξεις.
But this is the task of no single art; for the sciences are perhaps infinite, so that it is clear that demonstrations are also.
Ἔλεγχοι δ᾿ εἰσὶ καὶ ἀληθεῖς· ὅσα γὰρ ἔστιν ἀποδεῖξαι, ἔστι καὶ ἐλέγξαι τὸν θέμενον τὴν ἀντίφασιν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, οἷον εἰ σύμμετρον τὴν διάμετρον ἔθηκεν, ἐλέγξειεν ἄν τις τῇ ἀποδείξει ὅτι ἀσύμμετρος.
And there are also true refutations; for whatever can be demonstrated can also be refuted by the one who posits the contradiction of the truth, as if someone posited the diagonal to be commensurable, one would refute him by the demonstration that it is incommensurable.
Ὥστε πάντων δεήσει ἐπιστήμονας εἶναι· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔσονται παρὰ τὰς ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰ τούτων συμπεράσματα, οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὰς ἐν ἰατρικῇ, οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν.
Thus it will be necessary to be scientific in all things; for some refutations will depend on the principles in geometry and their conclusions, others on those in medicine, and others on those of other sciences.
Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οἱ ψευδεῖς ἔλεγχοι ὁμοίως ἐν ἀπείροις· καθ᾿ ἑκάστην γὰρ τέχνην ἐστὶ ψευδὴς συλλογισμός, οἷον κατὰ γεωμετρίαν ὁ γεωμετρικὸς καὶ κατὰ ἰατρικὴν ὁ ἰατρικός.
But indeed, false refutations are likewise among infinite things; for in each art there is a false syllogism, as in geometry the geometrical one, and in medicine the medical one.
Λέγω δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην τὸ κατὰ τὰς ἐκείνης ἀρχάς.
And by 'according to the art' I mean according to its principles.
Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι οὐ πάντων τῶν ἐλέγχων ἀλλὰ τῶν παρὰ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν ληπτέον τοὺς τόπους· οὗτοι γὰρ κοινοὶ πρὸς ἅπασαν τέχνην καὶ δύναμιν.
It is clear, then, that we must grasp the topics not of all refutations, but of those depending on dialectic; for these are common to every art and power.
Καὶ τὸν μὲν καθ᾿ ἑκάστην ἐπιστήμην ἔλεγχον τοῦ ἐπιστήμονός ἐστι θεωρεῖν, εἴτε μὴ ὢν φαίνεται εἴ τ᾿ ἔστι, διὰ τί ἔστι· τὸν δ᾿ ἐκ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ ὑπὸ μηδεμίαν τέχνην τῶν διαλεκτικῶν.
And it belongs to the scientist to contemplate the refutation in each science, whether it appears to be so when it is not, or if it is, why it is; whereas the one depending on common things and under no art belongs to dialecticians.
Εἰ γὰρ ἔχομεν ἐξ ὧν οἱ ἔνδοξοι συλλογισμοὶ περὶ ὁτιοῦν, ἔχομεν ἐξ ὧν οἱ ἔλεγχοι· ὁ γὰρ ἔλεγχός ἐστιν ἀντιφάσεως συλλογισμός, ὥστ᾿ ἢ εἷς ἢ δύο συλλογισμοὶ ἀντιφάσεως ἔλεγχός ἐστιν.
For if we possess the sources from which reputable syllogisms about anything arise, we possess those from which refutations arise; for a refutation is a syllogism of contradiction, so that either one or two syllogisms of contradiction constitute a refutation.
Ἔχομεν ἄρα παρ᾿ ὁπόσα πάντες εἰσὶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι.
We possess, then, all the causes from which all such refutations arise.
Εἰ δὲ τοῦτ᾿ ἔχομεν, καὶ τὰς λύσεις ἔχομεν· αἱ γὰρ τούτων ἐνστάσεις λύσεις εἰσίν.
And if we possess this, we also possess the solutions; for the objections to these are the solutions.
Ἔχομεν δέ, παρ᾿ ὁπόσα γίνονται, καὶ τοὺς φαινομένους, φαινομένους δὲ οὐχ ὁτῳοῦν ἀλλὰ τοῖς τοιοῖσδε· ἀόριστα γάρ ἐστιν, ἐάν τις σκοπῇ παρ᾿ ὁπόσα φαίνονται τοῖς τυχοῦσιν.
We also possess, in the same number as the causes of their generation, the apparent ones—apparent, however, not to just anyone, but to such and such people; for they are indefinite if one considers how many are apparent to ordinary people.
Ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι τοῦ διαλεκτικοῦ ἐστὶ τὸ δύνασθαι λαβεῖν παρ᾿ ὅσα γίνεται διὰ τῶν κοινῶν ἢ ὢν ἔλεγχος ἢ φαινόμενος ἔλεγχος, καὶ ἢ διαλεκτικὸς ἢ φαινόμενος διαλεκτικὸς ἢ πειραστικός.
So it is manifest that it belongs to the dialectician to be able to grasp from how many causes there arises, through common principles, either a real or an apparent refutation, and either a dialectical or an apparently dialectical or an examinational one.