Humanitext Reader

Aristotle · On Sophistical Refutations §7

Causes of Deception in Various Fallacies

Passage 8 of 29 · Greek

Summary

The author organizes the causes of deception in various fallacies (such as homonymy, form of expression, accident, consequent, qualification, and begging the question), explaining that they arise from the difficulty of making distinctions or from slight differences in definitions and premises.

§7Ἡ δ᾿ ἀπάτη γίνεται τῶν μὲν παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι διαιρεῖν τὸ πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον (ἔνια γὰρ οὐκ εὔπορον διελεῖν, οἷον τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ταὐτόν), τῶν δὲ παρὰ σύνθεσιν καὶ διαίρεσιν τῷ μηδὲν οἴεσθαι διαφέρειν συντιθέμενον ἢ διαιρούμενον τὸν λόγον, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πλείστων.
Deception arises, in the case of those depending on homonymy and on the formula, through the inability to distinguish multiple senses of what is said (for some things are not easy to distinguish, such as 'one', 'being', and 'same'); and in the case of those depending on composition and division, through thinking that it makes no difference whether the formula is combined or divided, as is the case in most instances.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ τὴν προσῳδίαν· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλο δοκεῖ σημαίνειν ἀνιέμενος καὶ ἐπιτεινόμενος ὁ λόγος, ἐπ᾿ οὐδενὸς ἢ οὐκ ἐπὶ πολλῶν.
Similarly also in the case of those depending on accent; for the formula does not seem to signify anything different when pronounced with a low pitch or a high pitch, either in no case or not in many cases.
Τῶν δὲ παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῆς λέξεως.
And in the case of those depending on the form of expression, it is because of the similarity of the language.
Χαλεπὸν γὰρ διελεῖν ποῖα ὡσαύτως καὶ ποῖα ὡς ἑτέρως λέγεται· σχεδὸν γὰρ ὁ τοῦτο δυνάμενος ποιεῖν ἐγγύς ἐστι τοῦ θεωρεῖν τἀληθές, μάλιστα δ᾿ ἐπίσταται συνεπινεύειν, ὅτι πᾶν τὸ κατηγορούμενόν τινος ὑπολαμβάνομεν τόδε τι καὶ ὡς ἓν ὑπακούομεν· τῷ γὰρ ἑνὶ καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ μάλιστα δοκεῖ παρέπεσθαι τὸ τόδε τι καὶ τὸ ὄν.
For it is difficult to distinguish which kinds of things are spoken of in the same way and which in a different way; indeed, practically he who is able to do this is close to beholding the truth, and he especially understands how we assent to it, because we assume everything predicated of something to be a 'this' and understand it as one; for 'this' and 'being' seem to accompany unity and substance most of all.
Διὸ καὶ τῶν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν οὗτος ὁ τρόπος θετέος, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι μᾶλλον ἡ ἀπάτη γίνεται μετ᾿ ἄλλων σκοπουμένοις ἢ καθ᾿ αὑτούς (ἡ μὲν γὰρ μετ᾿ ἄλλου σκέψις διὰ λόγων, ἡ δὲ καθ᾿ αὑτὸν οὐχ ἧττον δι᾿ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος), εἶτα καὶ καθ᾿ αὑτὸν ἀπατᾶσθαι συμβαίνει, ὅταν ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου ποιῆται τὴν σκέψιν· ἔτι ἡ μὲν ἀπάτη ἐκ τῆς ὁμοιότητος, ἡ δ᾿ ὁμοιότης ἐκ τῆς λέξεως.
Therefore, this mode also must be placed among those depending on language: first, because deception occurs more when we are examining with others than by ourselves (for inquiry with another is through words, whereas inquiry by oneself is no less through the thing itself), and secondly, because it happens that one is deceived even by oneself when one conducts the inquiry on the basis of the words; furthermore, the deception is from similarity, and the similarity is from the language.
Τῶν δὲ παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι διακρίνειν τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ ἓν καὶ πολλά, μηδὲ τοῖς ποίοις τῶν κατηγορημάτων πάντα ταὐτὰ καὶ τῷ πράγματι συμβέβηκεν.
And in the case of those depending on accident, it is through the inability to distinguish the same and the other, and the one and the many, and to what kinds of predicates all the same things also belong by accident as they do to the thing.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἑπόμενον· μέρος γάρ τι τοῦ συμβεβηκότος τὸ ἑπόμενον.
Similarly also in the case of those depending on the consequent; for the consequent is a certain part of the accident.
Ἔτι καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῶν φαίνεται καὶ ἀξιοῦται οὕτως, εἰ τόδε ἀπὸ τοῦδε μὴ χωρίζεται, μηδ᾿ ἀπὸ θατέρου χωρίζεσθαι θάτερον.
Furthermore, in many cases it appears and is assumed in this way: if this is not separated from that, neither is the other separated from the other.
Τῶν δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἔλλειψιν τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῶν παρὰ τὸ πῇ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἐν τῷ παρὰ μικρὸν ἡ ἀπάτη· ὡς γὰρ οὐδὲν προσσημαῖνον τὸ τὶ ἢ πῇ ἢ πῶς ἢ τὸ νῦν καθόλου συγχωροῦμεν.
And in the case of those depending on the deficiency of the formula and those depending on 'in a certain respect' and 'absolutely', the deception lies in the slight difference; for we concede the thesis universally as if 'in some respect', 'in a certain place', 'in a certain way', or 'now' added no further significance.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ λαμβανόντων καὶ τῶν ἀναιτίων, καὶ ὅσοι τὰ πλείω ἐρωτήματα ὡς ἓν ποιοῦσιν· ἐν ἅπασι γὰρ ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὸ παρὰ μικρόν· οὐ γὰρ διακριβοῦμεν οὔτε τῆς προτάσεως οὔτε τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ τὸν ὅρον διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν.
Similarly also in the case of those who assume the point at issue, and those who set down what is not a cause, and those who make several questions into one; for in all of these the deception is because of the slight difference; for we do not define precisely either the definition of the premise or that of the syllogism, because of the aforementioned reason.

Notes

  1. ¦1¦τῶν μὲν παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον — The genitive phrase `τῶν...` limits the subject of the main clause, `ἡ ἀπάτη` (deception), indicating "in the case of [the fallacies] depending on...". Contextually, a word meaning "fallacies" or "refutations" is omitted, and the genitive phrase itself denotes the categories of fallacies.
  2. ¦2¦ἀνιέμενος καὶ ἐπιτεινόμενος ὁ λόγος — The passive participles `ἀνιέμενος` (lowered/relaxed in pitch) and `ἐπιτεινόμενος` (raised/tightened in pitch) refer to the pitch accent of Classical Greek. Here they function adjectivally as circumstantial participles modifying the subject `ὁ λόγος` (the statement/formula), meaning "a statement pronounced with a low or high pitch."
  3. ¦2¦μάλιστα δ᾿ ἐπίσταται συνεπινεύειν — The verb `ἐπίσταται` ("knows how to/is capable of") takes the infinitive `συνεπινεύειν` ("to nod assent/to agree"). The subject is the person mentioned just before who "is able to do this [make the distinction]" (`ὁ τοῦτο δυνάμενος ποιεῖν`), implying that such a person is most knowledgeable about why people are prone to nod assent [to the fallacy].
  4. ¦3¦μηδὲ τοῖς ποίοις τῶν κατηγορημάτων πάντα ταὐτὰ καὶ τῷ πράγματι συμβέβηκεν — A subordinate clause introduced by the interrogative/relative adjective `τοῖς ποίοις` (to what kinds of). Literally: "[through being unable to distinguish] to what kinds of predicates all the same things also belong by accident as they do to the thing itself." This explains the nature of the fallacy of accident, where one fails to realize that attributes of a subject do not automatically transfer to all of its predicates.
  5. ¦4¦ἐν τῷ παρὰ μικρὸν — Composed of the preposition `ἐν` and the substantivized phrase `τῷ παρὰ μικρόν` ("the [difference] by a little/slight margin"). It means "the deception lies in the slight difference," capturing the psychology of fallacy where the presence or absence of qualifications (like "in some respect" or "now") is overlooked because the textual difference is minor, leading to unconditional assent.

Cite this passage

Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations §7. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg040.humanitext-grc1:7

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