§10Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ διαφορὰ τῶν λόγων ἣν λέγουσί τινες, τὸ εἶναι τοὺς μὲν πρὸς τοὔνομα λόγους, ἑτέρους δὲ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν·
And there is no such difference between arguments as some people claim, namely that some are directed towards the name and others towards the thought.
ἄτοπον γὰρ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν ἄλλους μὲν εἶναι πρὸς τοὔνομα λόγους, ἑτέρους δὲ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ τοὺς αὐτούς.
For it is absurd to suppose that some arguments are directed towards the name and others towards the thought, and that they are not the same arguments.
Τί γάρ ἐστι τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν ἀλλ᾿ ἢ ὅταν μὴ χρῆται τῷ ὀνόματι, οἰόμενος ἐρωτᾶσθαι, ἐφ᾿ ᾧ ὁ ἐρωτώμενος ἔδωκεν;
For what is it not to be directed towards the thought, other than when the questioner does not use the name in the sense in which the person questioned, thinking he was being asked, granted it?
τὸ δ᾿ αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστι καὶ πρὸς τοὔνομα.
And this is the very same thing as being directed towards the name.
Τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν, ὅταν ἐφ᾿ ᾧ ἔδωκεν διανοηθείς.
On the other hand, it is directed towards the thought when the questioner argues having in mind the same sense in which the answerer granted.
Εἰ δή τις πλείω σημαίνοντος τοῦ ὀνόματος οἴοιτο ἓν σημαίνειν καὶ ὁ ἐρωτῶν καὶ ὁ ἐρωτώμενος, οἷον ἴσως τὸν ὂν ἢ τὸ ἓν πολλὰ σημαίνει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος καὶ ὁ ἐρωτῶν Ζήνων ἓν οἰόμενος εἶναι ἠρώτησε, καὶ ἔστιν ὁ λόγος ὅτι ἓν πάντα, οὗτος πρὸς τοὔνομα ἔσται ἢ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ ἐρωτωμένου διειλεγμένος.
If, then, when a name signifies more than one thing, both the questioner and the person questioned suppose it to signify only one—as 'being' or 'one' perhaps signifies many things, yet both the answerer and the questioner, Zeno, asked assuming it to be one, and the argument is that 'all things are one'—will this be an argument directed towards the name, or towards the thought of the person questioned?
Εἰ δέ γέ τις πολλὰ οἴεται σημαίνειν, δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν.
But if, on the other hand, someone thinks it signifies many things, it is clear that it is not directed towards the thought.
Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ περὶ τοὺς τοιούτους ἐστὶ λόγους τὸ πρὸς τοὔνομα καὶ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν ὅσοι πλείω σημαίνουσιν, εἶτα περὶ ὁντινοῦν ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐστὶ τὸ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν εἶναι, ἀλλ᾿ ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἔχειν πως πρὸς τὰ δεδομένα.
For, first, the distinction between being directed towards the name and towards the thought belongs to those arguments that signify more than one thing, and then to any argument whatsoever; for being directed towards the thought does not lie in the argument itself, but in the answerer's being in a certain relation to what is granted.
Εἶτα πρὸς τοὔνομα πάντας ἐνδέχεται αὐτοὺς εἶναι.
Next, all of them can be directed towards the name.
Τὸ γὰρ πρὸς τοὔνομα τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν εἶναί ἐστιν ἐνταῦθα.
For being directed towards the name is, in this context, not being directed towards the thought.
Εἰ γὰρ μὴ πάντες, ἔσονταί τινες ἕτεροι οὔτε πρὸς τοὔνομα οὔτε πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν· οἱ δέ φασι πάντας, καὶ διαιροῦνται ἢ πρὸς τοὔνομα ἢ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν εἶναι πάντας, ἄλλους δ᾿ οὔ.
For if not all, there will be some other arguments that are directed neither towards the name nor towards the thought; but they say that all are, and divide all arguments into those directed either towards the name or towards the thought, and say there are no others.
Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσοι συλλογισμοί εἰσι παρὰ τὸ πλεοναχῶς, τούτων εἰσί τινες οἱ παρὰ τοὔνομα.
Yet, of those syllogisms that depend on multiple meanings, some depend on the name.
Ἀτόπως μὲν γὰρ καὶ εἴρηται τὸ παρὰ τοὔνομα φάναι πάντας τοὺς παρὰ τὴν λέξιν· ἀλλ᾿ οὖν εἰσί τινες παραλογισμοὶ οὐ τῷ τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον πρὸς τούτους ἔχειν πως, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιονδὶ ἐρώτημα τὸν λόγον αὐτὸν ἔχειν, ὃ πλείω σημαίνει.
For it is indeed absurdly said that all arguments depending on language are depending on the name; but at any rate, there are some paralogisms that arise not because the answerer is in a certain relation to them, but because the argument itself has a question of such a kind as signifies more than one thing.
Ὅλως τε ἄτοπον τὸ περὶ ἐλέγχου διαλέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρότερον περὶ συλλογισμοῦ· ὁ γὰρ ἔλεγχος συλλογισμός ἐστιν, ὥστε χρὴ καὶ περὶ συλλογισμοῦ πρότερον ἢ περὶ ψευδοῦς ἐλέγχου· ἔστι γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος ἔλεγχος φαινόμενος συλλογισμὸς ἀντιφάσεως.
And on the whole, it is absurd to discuss refutation without first discussing the syllogism; for a refutation is a syllogism, so that one ought to discuss the syllogism before the false refutation; for such a refutation is an apparent syllogism of a contradiction.
Διὸ ἢ ἐν τῷ συλλογισμῷ ἔσται τὸ αἴτιον ἢ ἐν τῇ ἀντιφάσει (προσκεῖσθαι γὰρ δεῖ τὴν ἀντίφασιν), ὁτὲ δ᾿ ἐν ἀμφοῖν, ἂν ᾖ φαινόμενος ἔλεγχος.
Therefore, the cause will lie either in the syllogism or in the contradiction (for the contradiction must be added), and sometimes in both, if it is an apparent refutation.
Ἔστι δὲ ὁ μὲν τοῦ σιγῶντα λέγειν ἐν τῇ ἀντιφάσει, οὐκ ἐν τῷ συλλογισμῷ, ὁ δέ, ἃ μὴ ἔχοι τις, δοῦναι, ἐν ἀμφοῖν, ὁ δὲ ὅτι ἡ Ὁμήρου ποίησις σχῆμα διὰ τοῦ κύκλου ἐν τῷ συλλογισμῷ.
And the argument that 'one who is silent speaks' has its cause in the contradiction, not in the syllogism; whereas the one that 'one can give what one does not have' is in both; and the one that 'Homer's poetry is a figure because of the circle' is in the syllogism.
Ὁ δ᾿ ἐν μηδετέρῳ ἀληθὴς συλλογισμός.
But the one in neither is a true syllogism.
Ἀλλὰ δὴ ὅθεν ὁ λόγος ἦλθε, πότερον οἱ ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασι λόγοι πρὸς τὴν διάνοιάν εἰσιν ἢ οὔ;
But to return to the point from which the argument came: are the arguments in mathematics directed towards the thought or not?
καὶ εἴ τινι δοκεῖ πολλὰ σημαίνειν τὸ τρίγωνον, καὶ ἔδωκε μὴ ὡς τοῦτο τὸ σχῆμα ἐφ᾿ οὗ συνεπεράνατο ὅτι δύο ὀρθαί, πότερον πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν οὗτος διείλεκται τὴν ἐκείνου ἢ οὔ;
And if someone thinks 'triangle' signifies many things, and granted it not as that figure of which he concluded that it has two right angles, is this argument directed towards his thought or not?
Ἔτι εἰ πολλὰ μὲν σημαίνει τοὔνομα, ὁ δὲ μὴ νοεῖ μηδ᾿ οἴεται, πῶς οὗτος οὐ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν διείλεκται;
Furthermore, if the name signifies many things, but he does not notice or think so, how is this not directed towards his thought?
ἢ πῶς δεῖ ἐρωτᾶν πλὴν διδόναι διαίρεσιν, εἴτ᾿ ἐρωτήσειέ τις εἰ ἔστι σιγῶντα λέγειν ἢ οὔ, ἢ ἔστι μὲν ὡς οὔ, ἔστι δ᾿ ὡς ναί;
Or how else must one ask except by offering a division—as if one were to ask whether it is possible for one who is silent to speak or not, or is it in one way no, and in another way yes?
εἰ δή τις δοίη μηδαμῶς, ὁ δὲ διαλεχθείη, ἆρ᾿ οὐ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν διείλεκται;
If, then, someone should grant that it is in no way possible, and the other argues, has he not argued towards his thought?
καίτοι ὁ λόγος δοκεῖ τῶν παρὰ τοὔνομα εἶναι.
And yet the argument is thought to be one of those depending on the name.
Οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ γένος τι λόγων τὸ πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν.
It is not, therefore, that there is any class of arguments directed towards the thought.
Ἀλλ᾿ οἱ μὲν πρὸς τοὔνομά εἰσι· καὶ τοιοῦτοι οὐ πάντες, οὐχ ὅτι οἱ ἔλεγχοι, ἀλλ᾿ οὐδ᾿ οἱ φαινόμενοι ἔλεγχοι.
But some are directed towards the name; and of these, not all are so—not only not all refutations, but not even all apparent refutations.
Εἰσὶ γὰρ καὶ μὴ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν φαινόμενοι ἔλεγχοι, οἷον οἱ παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ ἕτεροι.
For there are also apparent refutations that do not depend on language, such as those depending on accident and others.
Εἰ δέ τις ἀξιοῖ διαιρεῖν, ὅτι λέγω δὲ σιγῶντα λέγειν τὰ μὲν ὡδὶ τὰ δ᾿ ὡδί· ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γ᾿ ἐστὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἄτοπον, τὸ ἀξιοῦν (ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐ δοκεῖ τὸ ἐρωτώμενον πολλαχῶς ἔχειν, ἀδύνατον δὲ διαιρεῖν ὃ μὴ οἴεται)· ἔπειτα τὸ διδάσκειν τί ἄλλο ἔσται;
But if someone claims that we ought to divide: 'I mean by "one who is silent speaks" in this way and in that way'—this is, first of all, absurd to claim (for sometimes the question does not seem to have multiple meanings, and it is impossible to divide what one does not think has them); and then, what else will this be than teaching?
φανερὸν γὰρ ποιήσει ὡς ἔχει τῷ μήτ᾿ ἐσκεμμένῳ μήτ᾿ εἰδότι μήθ᾿ ὑπολαμβάνοντι ὅτι ἄλλως λέγεται.
For it will make clear how the matter stands to one who has neither considered it, nor knows, nor suspects that it is meant in another way.
Ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μὴ διπλοῖς τί κωλύει τοῦτο παθεῖν;
Since even in those that are not double, what is to prevent this from happening?
ἆρα ἴσαι αἱ μονάδες ταῖς δυάσιν ἐν τοῖς τέτταρσιν;
For instance, are the units in four equal to the dyads?
εἰσὶ δὲ δυάδες αἱ μὲν ὡδὶ ἐνοῦσαι αἱ δὲ ὡδί.
But the dyads are contained in it in this way and in that way.
Καὶ ἆρα τῶν ἐναντίων μία ἐπιστήμη ἢ οὔ;
And is there one science of contraries or not?
ἔστι δ᾿ ἐναντία τὰ μὲν γνωστὰ τὰ δ᾿ ἄγνωστα.
But some contraries are knowable, and others unknowable.
Ὥστ᾿ ἔοικεν ἀγνοεῖν ὁ τοῦτο ἀξιῶν ὅτι ἕτερον τὸ διδάσκειν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ ὅτι δεῖ τὸν μὲν διδάσκοντα μὴ ἐρωτᾶν ἀλλ᾿ αὐτὸν δῆλα ποιεῖν, τὸν δ᾿ ἐρωτᾶν.
Thus, the one who claims this seems to be ignorant that teaching is different from discussing, and that the teacher should not ask but make things clear himself, whereas the discussant should ask.