§6#2Οἵ τε παρὰ τὸ λαμβάνειν τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ καὶ τὸ ἀναίτιον ὡς αἴτιον τιθέναι δῆλοι διὰ τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ.
Those depending on assuming the point at issue and on setting down what is not a cause as a cause are also clear through the definition.
Δεῖ γὰρ τὸ συμπέρασμα τῷ ταῦτ᾿ εἶναι αἴτια τοῦ συμβαίνειν, ὅπερ οὐκ ἦν ἐν τοῖς ἀναιτίοις· καὶ πάλιν μὴ ἀριθμουμένου τοῦ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὅπερ οὐκ ἔχουσιν οἱ παρὰ τὴν αἴτησιν τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ.
For the conclusion must follow by virtue of these things being the causes of its following, which was not the case in those that are not causes; and again, without the point at issue being numbered among the premises, which is not the case for those who depend on begging the point at issue.
Οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἑπόμενον μέρος εἰσὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος· τὸ γὰρ ἑπόμενον συμβέβηκε, διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος, ὅτι τὸ μὲν συμβεβηκὸς ἔστιν ἐφ᾿ ἑνὸς μόνου λαβεῖν, οἷον ταὐτὸ εἶναι τὸ ξανθὸν καὶ μέλι καὶ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ κύκνον, τὸ δὲ παρεπόμενον ἀεὶ ἐν πλείοσιν· τὰ γὰρ ἑνὶ ταὐτῷ ταὐτὰ καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἀξιοῦμεν εἶναι ταὐτά· διὸ γίνεται παρὰ τὸ ἑπόμενον ἔλεγχος.
Those depending on the consequent are a part of the accident; for the consequent is an accident, but it differs from the accident in that the accident can be taken in the case of one thing only, such as the yellow and honey being the same, and the white and a swan; whereas the consequent is always in several things; for we claim that things that are the same as one and the same thing are also the same as each other; wherefore the refutation depending on the consequent occurs.
Ἔστι δ᾿ οὐ πάντως ἀληθές, οἷον ἂν ᾖ λευκὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκός· καὶ γὰρ ἡ χιὼν καὶ ὁ κύκνος τῷ λευκῷ ταὐτόν.
But this is not always true, for instance, if it is white by accident; for both snow and swan are the same as the white.
Ἢ πάλιν, ὡς ἐν τῷ Μελίσσου λόγῳ, τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι λαμβάνει τὸ γεγονέναι καὶ ἀρχὴν ἔχειν, ἢ τὸ ἴσοις γίνεσθαι καὶ ταὐτὸ μέγεθος λαμβάνειν.
Or again, as in the argument of Melissus, he assumes that to have come into being and to have a starting point are the same, or that to become equal and to take the same magnitude are the same.
Ὅτι γὰρ τὸ γεγονὸς ἔχει ἀρχήν, καὶ τὸ ἔχον ἀρχὴν γεγονέναι ἀξιοῖ, ὡς ἄμφω ταὐτὰ ὄντα τῷ ἀρχὴν ἔχειν, τό τε γεγονὸς καὶ τὸ πεπερασμένον.
For because that which has come into being has a starting point, he claims also that what has a starting point has come into being, as if both are the same by virtue of having a starting point, namely, that which has come into being and that which is limited.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἴσων γινομένων εἰ τὰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέγεθος καὶ ἓν λαμβάνοντα ἴσα γίνεται, καὶ τὰ ἴσα γινόμενα ἓν μέγεθος λαμβάνει.
And similarly in the case of things that become equal: if things that take the same and single magnitude become equal, then also things that become equal take a single magnitude.
Ὥστε τὸ ἑπόμενον λαμβάνει.
Thus he assumes the consequent.
Ἐπεὶ οὖν ὁ παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἔλεγχος ἐν τῇ ἀγνοίᾳ τοῦ ἐλέγχου, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ ὁ παρὰ τὸ ἑπόμενον.
Since, therefore, the refutation depending on accident lies in the ignorance of refutation, it is clear that the one depending on the consequent does so too.
Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἄλλως.
But we must examine this in another way as well.
Οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ τὰ πλείω ἐρωτήματα ἓν ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ μὴ διαρθροῦν ἡμᾶς ἢ μὴ διαιρεῖν τὸν τῆς προτάσεως λόγον.
Those depending on making several questions into one consist in our not articulating or not dividing the formula of the premise.
Ἡ γὰρ πρότασίς ἐστιν ἓν καθ᾿ ἑνός.
For a premise is one thing predicated of one thing.
Ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὅρος ἑνὸς μόνου καὶ ἁπλῶς τοῦ πράγματος, οἷον ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἑνὸς μόνου ἀνθρώπου· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
For the same definition is of one thing only and absolutely of the thing, as of 'man' and of one single man; and similarly in other cases.
Εἰ οὖν μία πρότασις ἡ ἓν καθ᾿ ἑνὸς ἀξιοῦσα, καὶ ἁπλῶς ἔσται πρότασις ἡ τοιαύτη ἐρώτησις.
If, therefore, a single premise is that which claims one thing of one thing, such a question will also be, absolutely, a premise.
Ἐπεὶ δ᾿ ὁ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ προτάσεων, ὁ δ᾿ ἔλεγχος συλλογισμός, καὶ ὁ ἔλεγχος ἔσται ἐκ προτάσεων.
Since, however, a syllogism is composed of premises, and refutation is a syllogism, refutation also will be composed of premises.
Εἰ οὖν ἡ πρότασις ἓν καθ᾿ ἑνός, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ οὗτος ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἐλέγχου ἀγνοίᾳ· φαίνεται γὰρ εἶναι πρότασις ἡ οὐκ οὖσα πρότασις.
If, then, a premise is one thing of one thing, it is clear that this also lies in the ignorance of refutation; for what is not a premise appears to be a premise.
Εἰ μὲν οὖν δέδωκεν ἀπόκρισιν ὡς πρὸς μίαν ἐρώτησιν, ἔσται ἔλεγχος, εἰ δὲ μὴ δέδωκεν ἀλλὰ φαίνεται, φαινόμενος ἔλεγχος.
If, therefore, the respondent has given an answer as if to a single question, there will be a refutation; but if he has not given it, but only appears to have done so, it will be an apparent refutation.
Ὥστε πάντες οἱ τόποι πίπτουσιν εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἐλέγχου ἄγνοιαν, οἱ μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, ὅτι φαινομένη ἀντίφασις, ὅπερ ἦν ἴδιον τοῦ ἐλέγχου, οἱ δ᾿ ἄλλοι παρὰ τὸν τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ ὅρον.
So that all the fallacies fall into the ignorance of refutation—those depending on language because there is an apparent contradiction, which was the peculiar characteristic of refutation, and the others because of the definition of the syllogism.