§6#1Ἢ δὴ οὕτως διαιρετέον τοὺς φαινομένους συλλογισμοὺς καὶ ἐλέγχους, ἢ πάντας ἀνακτέον εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἐλέγχου ἄγνοιαν, ἀρχὴν ταύτην ποιησαμένους· ἔστι γὰρ ἅπαντας ἀναλῦσαι τοὺς λεχθέντας τρόπους εἰς τὸν τοῦ ἐλέγχου διορισμόν.
Either indeed one must divide apparent syllogisms and refutations in this way, or reduce them all to the ignorance of refutation, making this our starting point; for it is possible to resolve all the mentioned modes into the definition of refutation.
Πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ἀσυλλόγιστοι· δεῖ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν κειμένων συμβαίνειν τὸ συμπέρασμα, ὥστε λέγειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀλλὰ μὴ φαίνεσθαι.
First of all, if they are non-syllogistic; for the conclusion must follow from the premises, so as to say "of necessity" and not just apparently.
Ἔπειτα καὶ κατὰ τὰ μέρη τοῦ διορισμοῦ.
Secondly, also according to the parts of the definition.
Τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῇ λέξει οἱ μέν εἰσι παρὰ τὸ διττόν, οἷον ἥ τε ὁμωνυμία καὶ ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ ὁμοιοσχημοσύνη (σύνηθες γὰρ τὸ πάντα ὡς τόδε τι σημαίνειν), ἡ δὲ σύνθεσις καὶ διαίρεσις καὶ προσῳδία τῷ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν λόγον ἢ τοὔνομα διαφέρον.
For of those in the language, some are due to double meaning, such as homonymy, the phrase, and similarity of form (for it is customary to signify everything as "this something"); while composition, division, and accent are due to the phrase or the name being different and not the same.
Ἔδει δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα ταὐτόν, εἰ μέλλει ἔλεγχος ἢ συλλογισμὸς ἔσεσθαι, οἷον εἰ λώπιον, μὴ ἱμάτιον συλλογίσασθαι ἀλλὰ λώπιον.
And this also ought to be the same, just as the thing is the same, if there is to be a refutation or syllogism; for example, if the thing is a cloak, one must syllogize not "mantle" but "cloak".
Ἀληθὲς μὲν γὰρ κἀκεῖνο, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ συλλελόγισται, ἀλλ᾿ ἔτι ἐρωτήματος δεῖ, ὅτι ταὐτὸν σημαίνει, πρὸς τὸν ζητοῦντα τὸ διὰ τί.
For that other conclusion is indeed true, but it has not been syllogized; rather, a further question is still needed, to show that it signifies the same thing, for the person who asks "why?".
Οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ὁρισθέντος τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ φανεροὶ γίνονται.
Those depending on accident become clear once "syllogism" has been defined.
Τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ ὁρισμὸν δεῖ καὶ τοῦ ἐλέγχου γίνεσθαι, πλὴν προσκεῖσθαι τὴν ἀντίφασιν· ὁ γὰρ ἔλεγχος συλλογισμὸς ἀντιφάσεως.
For the same definition must apply also to refutation, except that the contradiction is added; for refutation is a syllogism of a contradiction.
Εἰ οὖν μή ἐστι συλλογισμὸς τοῦ συμβεβηκότος, οὐ γίνεται ἔλεγχος.
If, then, there is no syllogism of the accident, no refutation occurs.
Οὐ γὰρ εἰ τούτων ὄντων ἀνάγκη τόδ᾿ εἶναι, τοῦτο δ᾿ ἐστὶ λευκόν, ἀνάγκη λευκὸν εἶναι διὰ τὸν συλλογισμόν.
For it is not the case that if, these things being so, this must be, and this is white, it must be white because of the syllogism.
Οὐδ᾿ εἰ τὸ τρίγωνον δυοῖν ὀρθαῖν ἴσας ἔχει, συμβέβηκε δ᾿ αὐτῷ σχήματι εἶναι ἢ πρώτῳ ἢ ἀρχῇ, ὅτι σχῆμα ἢ ἀρχὴ ἢ πρῶτον τοῦτο.
Nor, if the triangle has angles equal to two right angles, and it happens to be a figure or primary or a starting point, is it because it is a figure or starting point or primary that this has it.
Οὐ γὰρ ᾗ σχῆμα οὐδ᾿ ᾗ πρῶτον, ἀλλ᾿ ᾗ τρίγωνον, ἡ ἀπόδειξις.
For the demonstration is not qua figure or qua primary, but qua triangle.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
And similarly in other cases.
Ὥστ᾿ εἰ ὁ ἔλεγχος συλλογισμός τις, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὁ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔλεγχος.
So that if refutation is a kind of syllogism, a refutation based on accident would not be a refutation.
Ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοῦτο καὶ οἱ τεχνῖται καὶ ὅλως οἱ ἐπιστήμονες ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνεπιστημόνων ἐλέγχονται κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ ποιοῦνται τοὺς συλλογισμοὺς πρὸς τοὺς εἰδότας.
But it is because of this that even craftsmen and generally scientists are refuted by the unscientific; for they make their syllogisms based on accident against those who know.
Οἱ δ᾿ οὐ δυνάμενοι διαιρεῖν ἢ ἐρωτώμενοι διδόασιν ἢ οὐ δόντες οἴονται δεδωκέναι.
And those who are unable to make distinctions either grant the premises when asked, or, even if they do not grant them, think they have granted them.
Οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὸ πῇ καὶ ἁπλῶς, ὅτι οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἡ κατάφασις καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις.
Those depending on "in a certain respect" and "absolutely" occur because the affirmation and negation are not of the same thing.
Τοῦ γὰρ πῇ λευκοῦ τὸ πῇ οὐ λευκόν, τοῦ δ᾿ ἁπλῶς λευκοῦ τὸ ἁπλῶς οὐ λευκὸν ἀπόφασις.
For the negation of "white in a certain respect" is "not white in a certain respect", while the negation of "absolutely white" is "absolutely not white".
Εἰ οὖν δόντος πῇ εἶναι λευκὸν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰρημένου λαμβάνει, οὐ ποιεῖ ἔλεγχον, φαίνεται δὲ διὰ τὴν ἄγνοιαν τοῦ τί ἐστιν ἔλεγχος.
If, therefore, when the respondent grants that a thing is white in a certain respect, the inquirer takes it as if it were said absolutely, he does not produce a refutation, though he appears to do so because of the ignorance of what a refutation is.
Φανερώτατοι δὲ πάντων οἱ πρότερον λεχθέντες παρὰ τὸν τοῦ ἐλέγχου διορισμόν· διὸ καὶ προσηγορεύθησαν οὕτως·
Most obvious of all are those previously mentioned as depending on the definition of refutation; and this is why they were so named.
παρὰ γὰρ τοῦ λόγου τὴν ἔλλειψιν ἡ φαντασία γίνεται, καὶ διαιρουμένοις οὕτως κοινὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι τούτοις θετέον τὴν τοῦ λόγου ἔλλειψιν.
For the illusion arises from the deficiency of the definition, and for those who divide them in this way, we must set down the deficiency of the definition as common to all of these.