§33#1Δεῖ δὲ καὶ κατανοεῖν ὅτι πάντων τῶν λόγων οἱ μέν εἰσι ῥᾴους κατιδεῖν οἱ δὲ χαλεπώτεροι, παρὰ τί καὶ ἐν τίνι παραλογίζονται τὸν ἀκούοντα, πολλάκις οἱ αὐτοὶ ἐκείνοις ὄντες.
We must also understand that of all arguments some are easier and others harder to see, in respect of what and in what they mislead the hearer, though they are often the very same as those.
Τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ λόγον δεῖ καλεῖν τὸν παρὰ ταὐτὸ γινόμενον· ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ λόγος τοῖς μὲν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν τοῖς δὲ παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τοῖς δὲ παρ᾿ ἕτερον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι διὰ τὸ μεταφερόμενον ἕκαστον μὴ ὁμοίως εἶναι δῆλον.
For we must call 'the same argument' that which arises from the same cause; but the same argument might seem to some to be dependent on the language, to others on accident, and to others on something else, because each of these when transferred is not equally clear.
Ὥσπερ οὖν ἐν τοῖς παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν, ὅσπερ δοκεῖ τρόπος εὐηθέστατος εἶναι τῶν παραλογισμῶν, τὰ μὲν καὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσίν ἐστι δῆλα (καὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγοι σχεδὸν οἱ γελοῖοι πάντες εἰσὶ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, οἷον ἀνὴρ ἐφέρετο κατὰ κλίμακος δίφρον, καὶ ὅπου στέλλεσθε; Πρὸς τὴν κεραίαν. Καὶ ποτέρα τῶν βοῶν ἔμπροσθεν τέξεται; Οὐδετέρα, ἀλλ᾿ ὄπισθεν ἄμφω. Καὶ καθαρὸς ὁ βορέας; Οὐ δῆτα· ἀπεκτόνηκε γὰρ τὸν πτωχὸν καὶ τὸν ὠνούμενον. Ἆρ᾿ Εὔαρχος; Οὐ δῆτα, ἀλλ᾿ Ἀπολλωνίδης. Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σχεδὸν οἱ πλεῖστοι.
Just as, then, in the case of arguments depending on homonymy, which seems to be the most silly type of paralogism, some are clear even to ordinary people (for almost all joke arguments are dependent on language, such as: 'A man was carrying a stool down a ladder', and 'Where are you bound for?' 'To the yard-arm.' And 'Which of the cows will calve in front?' 'Neither, but both behind.') And 'Is the north wind pure?' 'No indeed, for it has killed the beggar and the buyer.' And 'Is it Euarchos?' 'No indeed, but Apollonides.' And in the same way also most of the other joke arguments.
Τὰ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἐμπειροτάτους φαίνεται λανθάνειν· σημεῖον δὲ τούτων ὅτι μάχονται πολλάκις περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων, οἷον πότερον ταὐτὸν σημαίνει κατὰ πάντων τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἓν ἢ ἕτερον.
But some arguments of this type seem to escape even the most experienced; a sign of this is that they often fight about names, for example, whether 'being' and 'one' signify the same in all cases or something different.
Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ταὐτὸν σημαίνειν τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἕν· οἱ δὲ τὸν Ζήνωνος λόγον καὶ Παρμενίδου λύουσι διὰ τὸ πολλαχῶς φάναι τὸ ἓν λέγεσθαι καὶ τὸ ὄν.
For to some 'being' and 'one' seem to signify the same, while others solve the argument of Zeno and Parmenides by saying that 'one' and 'being' are used in many senses.
Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον οἱ μὲν ἔσονται ῥᾴους ἰδεῖν οἱ δὲ χαλεπώτεροι τῶν λόγων· καὶ λαβεῖν ἐν τίνι γένει, καὶ πότερον ἔλεγχος ἢ οὐκ ἔλεγχος, οὐ ῥᾴδιον ὁμοίως περὶ πάντων.
Likewise also regarding accident and each of the other types, some of the arguments will be easier to see and others harder; and to grasp in what class they belong, and whether they are refutations or not, is not equally easy in all cases.
Ἔστι δὲ δριμὺς λόγος ὅστις ἀπορεῖν ποιεῖ μάλιστα· δάκνει γὰρ οὗτος μάλιστα.
A sharp argument is one which especially causes difficulty; for this bites most.
Ἀπορία δ᾿ ἐστὶ διττή, ἡ μὲν ἐν τοῖς συλλελογισμένοις, ὅ τι ἀνέλῃ τις τῶν ἐρωτημάτων, ἡ δ᾿ ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς, πῶς εἴπῃ τις τὸ προταθέν.
Now, difficulty is of two kinds: one in reasoned arguments, as to which of the premises one should demolish, and the other in contentious arguments, as to how one should address the proposition.
Διόπερ ἐν τοῖς συλλογιστικοῖς οἱ δριμύτεροι λόγοι ζητεῖν μᾶλλον ποιοῦσιν.
Therefore, in syllogistic arguments, the sharper arguments make us search more.
Ἔστι δὲ συλλογιστικὸς μὲν λόγος δριμύτατος, ἂν ἐξ ὅτι μάλιστα δοκούντων ὅτι μάλιστα ἔνδοξον ἀναιρῇ.
And a syllogistic argument is sharpest if, from premises that are as plausible as possible, it demolishes a conclusion that is as plausible as possible.
Εἷς γὰρ ὢν ὁ λόγος μετατιθεμένης τῆς ἀντιφάσεως ἅπαντας ὁμοίους ἕξει τοὺς συλλογισμούς· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐξ ἐνδόξων ὁμοίως ἔνδοξον ἀναιρήσει ἢ κατασκευάσει, διόπερ ἀπορεῖν ἀναγκαῖον.
For the argument being one, if the contradiction is transposed, it will have all its syllogisms similar; for from plausible premises it will always likewise demolish or establish a plausible conclusion; therefore, difficulty is necessary.
Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος δριμύς, ὁ ἐξ ἴσου τὸ συμπέρασμα ποιῶν τοῖς ἐρωτήμασι, δεύτερος δ᾿ ὁ ἐξ ἁπάντων ὁμοίων· οὗτος γὰρ ὁμοίως ποιήσει ἀπορεῖν ὁποῖον τῶν ἐρωτημάτων ἀναιρετέον.
Now, such an argument is sharpest which makes the conclusion of equal plausibility with the premises; and second is that which is from all similar premises; for this will likewise cause difficulty as to which of the premises is to be demolished.
Τοῦτο δὲ χαλεπόν· ἀναιρετέον μὲν γάρ, ὅ τι δ᾿ ἀναιρετέον, ἄδηλον.
And this is difficult; for though one must be demolished, which one must be demolished is unclear.
Τῶν δ᾿ ἐριστικῶν δριμύτατος μὲν ὁ πρῶτον εὐθὺς ἄδηλος πότερον συλλελόγισται ἢ οὔ, καὶ πότερον παρὰ ψεῦδος ἢ διαίρεσίν ἐστιν ἡ λύσις, δεύτερος δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ δῆλος μὲν ὅτι παρὰ διαίρεσιν ἢ ἀναίρεσίν ἐστι, μὴ φανερὸς δ᾿ ὢν διὰ τίνος τῶν ἠρωτημένων ἀναίρεσιν ἢ διαίρεσιν λυτέος ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πότερον αὕτη παρὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἢ παρά τι τῶν ἐρωτημάτων ἐστίν.
Of contentious arguments, the sharpest is that which is at first sight unclear whether it has reasoned or not, and whether the solution is by way of falsehood or distinction; and second of the others is that which is clear that it depends on distinction or demolition, but is not manifest through which of the questions asked it is to be solved by demolition or distinction, but whether this solution is in respect of the conclusion or of one of the questions.
Ἐνίοτε μὲν οὖν ὁ μὴ συλλογισθεὶς λόγος εὐήθης ἐστίν, ἐὰν ᾖ λίαν ἄδοξα ἢ ψευδῆ τὰ λήμματα· ἐνίοτε δ᾿ οὐκ ἄξιος καταφρονεῖσθαι.
Sometimes, then, an argument that has not reasoned is silly, if its premises are too implausible or false; but sometimes it is not worthy of contempt.
Ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἐλλείπῃ τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐρωτημάτων, περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος καὶ δι᾿ ὅ, καὶ μὴ προσλαβὼν τοῦτο καὶ μὴ συλλογισάμενος εὐήθης ὁ συλλογισμός, ὅταν δὲ τῶν ἔξωθεν, οὐκ εὐκαταφρόνητος οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλ᾿ ὁ μὲν λόγος ἐπιεικής, ὁ δ᾿ ἐρωτῶν ἠρώτηκεν οὐ καλῶς.
For when it omits some such question as that which the argument is about and through which it is, and fails to assume this and to reason, the syllogism is silly; but when it omits something external, it is by no means to be despised, but the argument is decent, though the questioner has asked badly.
Ἔστι τε, ὥσπερ λύειν ὁτὲ μὲν πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὁτὲ δὲ πρὸς τὸν ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὴν ἐρώτησιν ὁτὲ δὲ πρὸς οὐδέτερον τούτων, ὁμοίως καὶ ἐρωτᾶν ἔστι καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι καὶ πρὸς τὴν θέσιν καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον καὶ πρὸς τὸν χρόνον, ὅταν ᾖ πλείονος χρόνου δεομένη ἡ λύσις ἢ τοῦ παρόντος καιροῦ τὸ διαλεχθῆναι πρὸς τὴν λύσιν.
And just as it is possible sometimes to solve with reference to the argument, sometimes with reference to the questioner and the questioning, and sometimes with reference to neither of these, likewise one can also question and reason with reference to the thesis, and to the respondent, and to time, when the solution requires more time than the present opportunity allows for discussing the solution.