§31Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀπαγόντων εἰς ταὐτὸ πολλάκις εἰπεῖν, φανερὸν ὡς οὐ δοτέον τῶν πρός τι λεγομένων σημαίνειν τι χωριζομένας καθ᾿ αὑτὰς τὰς κατηγορίας, οἷον διπλάσιον ἄνευ τοῦ διπλάσιον ἡμίσεος, ὅτι ἐμφαίνεται.
As for those who lead one to say the same thing repeatedly, it is clear that, in the case of relative terms, one must not grant that their predications signify anything when separated by themselves—for instance, "double" without "double of a half," because it is implied in it.
Καὶ γὰρ τὰ δέκα ἐν τοῖς ἑνὸς δέουσι δέκα καὶ τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐν τῷ μὴ ποιῆσαι, καὶ ὅλως ἐν τῇ ἀποφάσει ἡ φάσις· ἀλλ᾿ ὅμως οὐκ εἴ τις λέγοι τοδὶ μὴ εἶναι λευκόν, λέγει αὐτὸ λευκὸν εἶναι.
For "ten" is implied in "ten lacking one," and "to do" in "not to do," and generally the affirmation in the negation; but nonetheless, if someone says "this is not white," he does not thereby say that it is white.
Τὸ δὲ διπλάσιον οὐδὲ σημαίνει οὐδὲν ἴσως, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ἐν τῷ ἡμίσει· εἰ δ᾿ ἄρα καὶ σημαίνει, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ ταὐτὸ καὶ συνῃρημένον.
And "double" itself perhaps does not signify anything at all, just as "double" in "double of a half" does not; or if indeed it does signify something, it is not the same as when it is combined.
Οὐδ᾿ ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐν τῷ εἴδει, οἷον εἰ ἔστιν ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἐπιστήμη, ὅπερ τὸ κοινόν· ἐκεῖνο δ᾿ ἦν ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστητοῦ. Ἐν δὲ τοῖς δι᾿ ὧν δηλοῦται κατηγορουμένοις τοῦτο λεκτέον, ὡς οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ χωρὶς καὶ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ δηλούμενον.
Nor is knowledge the same as when it is in a particular species—for example, if medicine is "knowledge," which is the common term; but the latter was "knowledge of what is knowable." In the case of terms whose predicates are declared through them, one must say this: that what is signified is not the same when separate and when in the definition.
Τὸ γὰρ κοῖλον κοινῇ μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ δηλοῖ ἐπὶ τοῦ σιμοῦ καὶ τοῦ ῥοικοῦ, προστιθέμενον δὲ οὐδὲν κωλύει, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τῇ ῥινὶ τὸ δὲ τῷ σκέλει συμβαίνει· ἔνθα μὲν γὰρ τὸ σιμόν, ἔνθα δὲ τὸ ῥαιβὸν σημαίνει· καὶ οὐδὲν διαφέρει εἰπεῖν ῥὶς σιμὴ ἢ ῥὶς κοίλη. Ἔτι οὐ δοτέον τὴν λέξιν κατ᾿ εὐθύ· ψεῦδος γάρ ἐστιν.
For "hollow" signifies the same thing in general in the case of "snub" and "bandy," but when it is added, nothing prevents it, as one happens to apply to the nose and the other to the leg; for in the former case it signifies "snub," and in the latter "bandy"; and it makes no difference whether one says "a snub nose" or "a hollow nose." Furthermore, one must not grant the expression in the nominative; for it is false.
Οὐ γάρ ἐστι τὸ σιμὸν ῥὶς κοίλη ἀλλὰ ῥινὸς τοδί, οἷον πάθος, ὥστ᾿ οὐδὲν ἄτοπον, εἰ ἡ ῥὶς ἡ σιμὴ ῥίς ἐστιν ἔχουσα κοιλότητα ῥινός. §32Περὶ δὲ τῶν σολοικισμῶν παρ᾿ ὅ τι μὲν φαίνονται συμβαίνειν, εἴπομεν πρότερον, ὡς δὲ λυτέον, ἐπ᾿ αὐτῶν τῶν λόγων ἔσται φανερόν.
For "snub" is not "a hollow nose" but an affection, as it were, of a nose; so there is nothing absurd if "a snub nose" is "a nose having the hollowness of a nose." As for solecisms, we have stated before what makes them appear to occur; but how they are to be solved will be clear from the arguments themselves.
Ἅπαντες γὰρ οἱ τοιοίδε τοῦτο βούλονται κατασκευάζειν. Ἆρ᾿ ὃ λέγεις ἀληθῶς, καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο ἀληθῶς;
For all such arguments wish to establish this: "Is that which you say truly, also truly this?
Φῇς δ᾿ εἶναί τι λίθον· ἔστιν ἄρα τι λίθον. Ἢ τὸ λέγειν λίθον οὐκ ἔστι λέγειν ὃ ἀλλ᾿ ὅν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τοῦτον·
You say that something is a stone (accusative); therefore something is a stone (accusative)." But saying "a stone" (accusative) is not saying "what" (neuter) but "whom" (masculine), and not "this" (neuter) but "this" (masculine accusative).
εἰ οὖν ἔροιτό τις, ἆρ᾿ ὃν ἀληθῶς λέγεις, ἔστι τοῦτον, οὐκ ἂν δοκοίη ἑλληνίζειν, ὥσπερ οὐδ᾿ εἰ ἔροιτο, ἆρ᾿ ἣν λέγεις εἶναι, ἔστιν οὗτος; Ξύλον δ᾿ εἶπεν οὗτος, ἢ ὅσα μήτε θῆλυ μήτ᾿ ἄρρεν σημαίνει, οὐδὲν διαφέρει.
If, then, someone were to ask, "Is whom you say truly, this (accusative)?" it would not seem to be correct Greek, just as if one were to ask, "Is whom (feminine accusative) you say to be, this (masculine nominative)?" But with "wood" (neuter) and whatever signifies neither feminine nor masculine, it makes no difference.
Διὸ καὶ οὐ γίνεται σολοικισμός, εἰ ὃ λέγεις εἶναι, ἔστι τοῦτο;
Therefore no solecism occurs if you ask, "Is what you say to be, this?
ξύλον δὲ λέγεις εἶναι· ἔστιν ἄρα ξύλον. Ὁ δὲ λίθος καὶ τὸ οὗτος ἄρρενος ἔχει κλῆσιν.
You say it is wood; therefore it is wood." But "stone" and "this" have a masculine designation.
Εἰ δή τις ἔροιτο, ἆρ᾿ οὗτός ἐστιν αὕτη; εἶτα πάλιν, τί δ᾿; οὐχ οὗτός ἐστι Κορίσκος;
If, then, someone were to ask, "Is this (masculine) this (feminine)?" and then again, "What of it?
εἶτ᾿ εἴπειεν, ἔστιν ἄρα οὗτος αὕτη, οὐ συλλελόγισται τὸν σολοικισμόν, οὐδ᾿ εἰ τὸ Κορίσκος σημαίνει ὅπερ αὕτη, μὴ δίδωσι δὲ ἀποκρινόμενος, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τοῦτο προσερωτηθῆναι.
Is not this Coriscus?" and then were to say, "Therefore this (masculine) is this (feminine)," he has not reasoned a solecism, not even if "Coriscus" signifies the same as "this" (feminine), unless the respondent grants it; but this must be asked in addition.
Εἰ δὲ μήτ᾿ ἔστιν μήτε δίδωσιν, οὐ συλλελόγισται οὔτε τῷ ὄντι οὔτε πρὸς τὸν ἠρωτημένον.
And if he neither is nor grants it, he has not reasoned a solecism, neither in reality nor against the person questioned.
Ὁμοίως οὖν δεῖ κἀκεῖ τὸν λίθον σημαίνειν οὗτος.
In the same way, therefore, "the stone" must signify "this" (masculine) in that case too.
Εἰ δὲ μήτε ἔστι μήτε δίδοται, οὐ λεκτέον τὸ συμπέρασμα· φαίνεται δὲ παρὰ τὸ τὴν ἀνόμοιον πτῶσιν τοῦ ὀνόματος ὁμοίαν φαίνεσθαι.
But if it neither is nor is granted, the conclusion must not be stated; but it appears so because the dissimilar case of the noun appears similar.
Ἆρ᾿ ἀληθές ἐστιν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἔστιν αὕτη, ὅπερ εἶναι φῂς αὐτήν; εἶναι δὲ φῂς ἀσπίδα·
"Is it true to say that this (feminine nominative) is what you say her (feminine accusative) to be?
ἔστιν ἄρα αὕτη ἀσπίδα. Ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εἰ μὴ τὸ αὕτη ἀσπίδα σημαίνει ἀλλ᾿ ἀσπίς, τὸ δ᾿ ἀσπίδα ταύτην.
You say she is a shield (feminine accusative); therefore this (nominative) is a shield (accusative)." Or is it not necessary, if "this" (nominative) does not signify "shield" (accusative) but "shield" (nominative), while "shield" (accusative) signifies "this" (accusative)?
Οὐδ᾿ εἰ ὃ φῂς εἶναι τοῦτον, ἐστὶν οὗτος, φῂς δ᾿ εἶναι Κλέωνα, ἔστιν ἄρα οὗτος Κλέωνα· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν οὗτος Κλέωνα· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι ὅ φημι εἶναι τοῦτον, ἔστιν οὗτος, οὐ τοῦτον· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἑλληνίζοι οὕτως τὸ ἐρώτημα λεχθέν.
Nor is it necessary, if "what you say this (masculine accusative) to be, is this (masculine nominative)," and you say he is Cleon (accusative), "therefore this (nominative) is Cleon (accusative)"; for "this" (nominative) is not "Cleon" (accusative); for it was said that "what I say to be this (accusative), is this (nominative)," not "this (accusative)"; for the question, if asked in this way, would not even be correct Greek.
Ἆρ᾿ ἐπίστασαι τοῦτο;
"Do you know this (neuter)?
τοῦτο δ᾿ ἐστὶ λίθος· ἐπίστασαι ἄρα λίθος. Ἢ οὐ ταὐτὸ σημαίνει τὸ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ ἆρ᾿ ἐπίστασαι τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῷ τοῦτο δὲ λίθος, ἀλλ᾿ ἐν μὲν τῷ πρώτῳ τοῦτον, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὑστέρῳ οὗτος.
And this (neuter) is a stone (nominative); therefore you know a stone (nominative)." Or does "this" not signify the same in "Do you know this?" and in "And this is a stone," but in the former it signifies "this" (masculine accusative) and in the latter "this" (masculine nominative)?
Ἆρ᾿ οὗ ἐπιστήμην ἔχεις, ἐπίστασαι τοῦτο;
"Do you know that of which you have knowledge?
ἐπιστήμην δ᾿ ἔχεις λίθου· ἐπίστασαι ἄρα λίθου. Ἢ τὸ μὲν τούτου λίθου λέγεις, τὸ δὲ τοῦτον λίθον·
And you have knowledge of a stone (genitive); therefore you know of a stone (genitive)." Or do you say "of this" (genitive) "stone" (genitive) in the one case, but "this" (accusative) "stone" (accusative) in the other?
ἐδόθη δ᾿, οὗ ἐπιστήμην ἔχεις, ἐπίστασθαι, οὐ τούτου, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο, ὥστ᾿ οὐ λίθου ἀλλὰ τὸν λίθον.
And it was granted that you know that of which you have knowledge, not "of this" (genitive) but "this" (accusative); so that you know not "of a stone" (genitive) but "the stone" (accusative).
Οτι μὲν οὖν οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν λόγων οὐ συλλογίζονται σολοικισμὸν ἀλλὰ φαίνονται, καὶ διὰ τί τε φαίνονται καὶ πῶς ἀπαντητέον πρὸς αὐτούς, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.
That, therefore, such arguments do not reason a solecism but only appear to do so, and why they appear so and how one must meet them, is clear from what has been said.