§18Ἐπεὶ δ᾿ ἐστὶν ἡ μὲν ὀρθὴ λύσις ἐμφάνισις ψευδοῦς συλλογισμοῦ, παρ᾿ ὁποίαν ἐρώτησιν συμβαίνει τὸ ψεῦδος, ὁ δὲ ψευδὴς συλλογισμὸς λέγεται διχῶς (ἢ γὰρ εἰ συλλελόγισται ψεῦδος, ἢ εἰ μὴ ὢν συλλογισμὸς δοκεῖ εἶναι συλλογισμός), εἴη ἂν ἥ τε εἰρημένη νῦν λύσις καὶ ἡ τοῦ φαινομένου συλλογισμοῦ παρὰ τί φαίνεται τῶν ἐρωτημάτων διόρθωσις.
Since a correct solution is the exposure of a false syllogism, showing on account of which question the falsehood occurs, and a false syllogism is spoken of in two ways (for it is either if a falsehood has been validly reasoned, or if, not being a syllogism, it seems to be a syllogism), the solution just mentioned and the correction of the apparent syllogism, showing on account of which of the questions it appears to be so, would be [solutions].
Ὥστε συμβαίνει τῶν λόγων τοὺς μὲν συλλελογισμένους ἀνελόντα, τοὺς δὲ φαινομένους διελόντα λύειν.
Consequently, it turns out that one solves arguments by demolishing those that have been validly reasoned, and by distinguishing those that are apparent.
Πάλιν δ᾿ ἐπεὶ τῶν συλλελογισμένων λόγων οἱ μὲν ἀληθὲς οἱ δὲ ψεῦδος ἔχουσι τὸ συμπέρασμα, τοὺς μὲν κατὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα ψευδεῖς διχῶς ἐνδέχεται λύειν· καὶ γὰρ τῷ ἀνελεῖν τι τῶν ἠρωτημένων, καὶ τῷ δεῖξαι τὸ συμπέρασμα ἔχον οὐχ οὕτως· τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὰς προτάσεις τῷ ἀνελεῖν τι μόνον· τὸ γὰρ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές.
Again, since of validly reasoned arguments some have a true and others a false conclusion, those that are false in respect of their conclusion can be solved in two ways: both by demolishing one of the questions asked, and by showing that the conclusion does not hold in this way; but those that are false in respect of their premises can be solved only by demolishing something, for the conclusion is true.
Ὥστε τοῖς βουλομένοις λύειν λόγον πρῶτον μὲν σκεπτέον εἰ συλλελόγισται ἢ ἀσυλλόγιστος, εἶτα πότερον ἀληθὲς τὸ συμπέρασμα ἢ ψεῦδος, ὅπως ἢ διαιροῦντες ἢ ἀναιροῦντες λύωμεν, καὶ ἀναιροῦντες ἢ ὧδε ἢ ὧδε, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη πρότερον.
Therefore, those who wish to solve an argument must first examine whether it has been validly reasoned or is unreasoned, and then whether the conclusion is true or false, so that we may solve it either by distinguishing or by demolishing, and if by demolishing, either in this way or in that way, just as was said before.
Διαφέρει δὲ πλεῖστον ἐρωτώμενόν τε καὶ μὴ λύειν λόγον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ προϊδεῖν χαλεπόν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν ἰδεῖν ῥᾷον.
And there is a very great difference between solving an argument when being questioned and when not; for to foresee is difficult, but to see at one's leisure is easier.
§19Τῶν μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν καὶ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν ἐλέγχων οἱ μὲν ἔχουσι τῶν ἐρωτημάτων τι πλείω σημαῖνον, οἱ δὲ τὸ συμπέρασμα πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον, οἷον ἐν μὲν τῷ σιγῶντα λέγειν τὸ συμπέρασμα διττόν, ἐν δὲ τῷ συνεπίστασθαι τὸν ἐπιστάμενον ἓν τῶν ἐρωτημάτων ἀμφίβολον.
Of the refutations, then, that depend on homonymy and ambiguity, some have one of the questions signifying more than one thing, while others have the conclusion spoken of in multiple ways; for example, in 'the speaking of the silent' the conclusion is double, whereas in 'the knowing person co-knowing' one of the questions is ambiguous.
Καὶ τὸ διττὸν ὁτὲ μὲν ἔστιν, ὁτὲ δ᾿ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλὰ σημαίνει τὸ διττὸν τὸ μὲν ὂν τὸ δ᾿ οὐκ ὄν.
And the double meaning sometimes exists, and sometimes does not exist but the double meaning signifies one thing which is and another which is not.
Ὅσοις μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ τέλει τὸ πολλαχῶς, ἂν μὴ προσλάβῃ τὴν ἀντίφασιν, οὐ γίνεται ἔλεγχος, οἷον ἐν τῷ τὸν τυφλὸν ὁρᾶν· ἄνευ γὰρ ἀντιφάσεως οὐκ ἦν ἔλεγχος.
In those cases, then, where the multiple meaning is at the end, unless it takes on the contradiction, no refutation occurs, as in 'the blind man seeing'; for without contradiction there was no refutation.
Ὅσοις δ᾿ ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτήμασιν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη προαποφῆσαι τὸ διττόν· οὐ γὰρ πρὸς τοῦτο ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο ὁ λόγος.
But in those where it is in the questions, it is not necessary to deny the double meaning beforehand; for the argument is not directed towards this, but proceeds through this.
Ἐν ἀρχῇ μὲν οὖν τὸ διπλοῦν καὶ. ὄνομα καὶ λόγον οὕτως ἀποκριτέον, ὅτι ἔστιν ὡς, ἔστι δ᾿ ὡς οὔ, ὥσπερ τὸ σιγῶντα λέγειν, ὅτι ἔστιν ὡς, ἔστι δ᾿ ὡς οὔ.
At the beginning, then, when a double name or expression is proposed, one must answer thus: 'in one way it is so, and in another way it is not,' just as with 'the speaking of the silent,' [one must say] that in one way it is so, and in another way it is not.
Καὶ τὰ δέοντα πρακτέον ἔστιν ἅ, ἔστι δ᾿ ἃ οὔ· τὰ γὰρ δέοντα λέγεται πολλαχῶς.
And 'one must do what is duty' — in some cases yes, in others no; for 'duties' is spoken of in multiple ways.
Ἐὰν δὲ λάθῃ, ἐπὶ τέλει προστιθέντα τῇ ἐρωτήσει διορθωτέον· ἆρ᾿ ἔστι σιγῶντα λέγειν; Οὔ, ἀλλὰ τόνδε σιγῶντα. Καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔχουσι δὲ τὸ πλεοναχῶς ἐν ταῖς προτάσεσιν ὁμοίως.
But if it escapes notice, one must correct it at the end by adding to the question: 'Is it possible for the silent to speak?' 'No, but for this person while silent [to speak].' And similarly also in those arguments that have the multiple meaning in the premises.
Οὐκ ἄρα συνεπίστανται ὅτι ἐπίστανται; Ναί, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχ οἱ οὕτως ἐπιστάμενοι· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι συνεπίστασθαι καὶ ὅτι τοὺς ὡδὶ ἐπισταμένους οὐκ ἔστιν.
'Do they not then co-know that they know?' 'Yes, but not those who know in this way'; for it is not the same to say that it is impossible to co-know, and that it is impossible for those who know in this specific way [to do so].
Ὅλως τε μαχετέον, ἂν καὶ ἁπλῶς συλλογίζηται, ὅτι οὐχ ὃ ἔφησεν ἀπέφησε πρᾶγμα, ἀλλ᾿ ὄνομα· ὥστ᾿ οὐκ ἔλεγχος.
And in general, even if he reasons simply, one must fight back by saying that he has not denied the thing which one asserted, but only the name; so that there is no refutation.