§17#2Ὥσπερ οὖν εἴπομεν, ἐπειδήπερ οὐδ᾿ ἔλεγχοί τινες ὄντες δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ λύσεις δόξουσιν εἶναί τινες οὐκ οὖσαι λύσεις· ἃς δή φαμεν ἐνίοτε μᾶλλον δεῖν φέρειν ἢ τὰς ἀληθεῖς ἐν τοῖς ἀγωνιστικοῖς λόγοις καὶ τῇ πρὸς τὸ διττὸν ἀπαντήσει.
Just as we said, therefore, since some, though not being refutations, seem to be so, in the same way some solutions also will seem to be [solutions] though they are not solutions; which indeed we say we must sometimes bring forward rather than the true ones in contentious discussions and in meeting double meanings.
Ἀποκριτέον δ᾿ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν δοκούντων τὸ ἔστω λέγοντα· καὶ γὰρ οὕτως ἥκιστα γίνοιτ᾿ ἂν παρεξέλεγχος· ἂν δέ τι παράδοξον ἀναγκάζηται λέγειν, ἐνταῦθα μάλιστα προσθετέον τὸ δοκεῖν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν οὔτ᾿ ἔλεγχος οὔτε παράδοξον γίνεσθαι δόξειεν.
And one must answer, in the case of things that are plausible, by saying 'let it be so'; for in this way a sophistical refutation would least arise; but if one is forced to say something paradoxical, there especially one must add 'it seems'; for thus neither a refutation nor a paradox would seem to occur.
Ἐπεὶ δὲ πῶς αἰτεῖται τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ δῆλον, οἴονται δὲ πάντες, ἂν ᾖ σύνεγγυς, ἀναιρετέον καὶ μὴ συγχωρητέον εἶναι ἔνια ὡς τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτοῦντος, ὅταν τε τοιοῦτον ἀξιοῖ τις ὃ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν συμβαίνειν ἐκ τῆς θέσεως, ᾖ δὲ ψεῦδος ἢ ἄδοξον, ταὐτὸ λεκτέον· τὰ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνοντα τῆς αὐτῆς εἶναι δοκεῖ θέσεως.
Since, moreover, how the begging of the question is asked is clear, and all think that, if it is close, some things must be rejected and not conceded on the ground that the questioner is begging the question, and when someone demands something such that it necessarily follows from the thesis, but is false or contrary to common opinion, the same must be said; for what follows of necessity is thought to belong to the same thesis.
Ἔτι ὅταν τὸ καθόλου μὴ ὀνόματι ληφθῇ ἀλλὰ παραβολῇ, λεκτέον ὅτι οὐχ ὡς ἐδόθη οὐδ᾿ ὡς προὔτεινε λαμβάνει· καὶ γὰρ παρὰ τοῦτο γίνεται πολλάκις ἔλεγχος.
Furthermore, when the universal is assumed not by a name but by a comparison, one must say that he does not take it in the way it was granted nor as he proposed it; for a refutation often occurs because of this.
Ἐξειργόμενον δὲ τούτων ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ καλῶς δεδεῖχθαι πορευτέον, ἀπαντῶντα κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον διορισμόν.
If one is excluded from these, one must proceed to [the point] that it has not been well demonstrated, meeting [the argument] according to the stated distinction.
Ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς κυρίως λεγομένοις ὀνόμασιν ἀνάγκη ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ διαιρούμενον.
In the case of words used in their proper sense, then, it is necessary to answer either simply or by making a distinction.
Ἃ δὲ συνυπονοοῦντες τίθεμεν, οἷον ὅσα μὴ σαφῶς ἀλλὰ κολοβῶς ἐρωτᾶται, παρὰ τοῦτο συμβαίνει ὁ ἔλεγχος, οἷον ἆρ᾿ ὃ ἂν ᾖ Ἀθηναίων, κτῆμά ἐστιν Ἀθηναίων; Ναί. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι τῶν ζῴων; Ναί. Κτῆμα ἄρα ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν ζῴων. Τὸν γὰρ ἄνθρωπον τῶν ζῴων λέγομεν, ὅτι ζῷόν ἐστι, καὶ Λύσανδρον τῶν Λακώνων, ὅτι Λάκων.
But as for things which we lay down with an additional implication, such as things asked not clearly but in a mutilated way, a refutation occurs because of this; e.g., 'Is whatever belongs to Athenians a possession of Athenians?' 'Yes.' 'And similarly also in other cases.' 'But is man of animals?' 'Yes.' 'Therefore man is a possession of animals.' For we say that man is 'of animals' because he is an animal, and Lysander 'of Lacedaemonians' because he is a Lacedaemonian.
Δῆλον οὖν ὡς ἐν οἷς ἀσαφὲς τὸ προτεινόμενον οὐ συγχωρητέον ἁπλῶς.
It is clear, then, that in cases where what is proposed is unclear, one must not concede simply.
Ὅταν δὲ δυοῖν ὄντοιν θατέρου μὲν ὄντος ἐξ ἀνάγκης θάτερον εἶναι δοκῇ, θατέρου δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἐρωτώμενον πρότερον δεῖ τὸ ἔλαττον διδόναι· χαλεπώτερον γὰρ συλλογίσασθαι ἐκ πλειόνων.
When, of two things, if the one exists, the other seems necessarily to exist, but if the other exists, this does not necessarily [exist], when asked, one must grant the lesser first; for it is harder to reason from more premises.
Ἐὰν δ᾿ ἐπιχειρῇ ὅτι τῷ μέν ἐστιν ἐναντίον τῷ δ᾿ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἂν ὁ λόγος ἀληθὴς ᾖ, ἐναντίον φάναι, ὄνομα δὲ μὴ κεῖσθαι τοῦ ἑτέρου.
And if he argues that to the one there is a contrary, but to the other there is not, if the statement is true, one should say that there is a contrary, but that no name has been established for the other's contrary.
Ἐπεὶ δ᾿ ἔνια μὲν ὧν λέγουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ τὸν μὴ συγχωροῦντα ψεύδεσθαι ἂν φαῖεν ἔνια δ᾿ οὔ, οἷον ὅσα ἀμφιδοξοῦσιν (πότερον γὰρ φθαρτὴ ἢ ἀθάνατος ἡ ψυχὴ τῶν ζῴων, οὐ διώρισται τοῖς πολλοῖς) ἐν οἷς οὖν ἄδηλον ποτέρως εἴωθε λέγεσθαι τὸ προτεινόμενον, πότερον ὡς αἱ γνῶμαι (καλοῦσι γὰρ γνώμας καὶ τὰς ἀληθεῖς δόξας καὶ τὰς ὅλας ἀποφάσεις), ἢ ὡς ἡ διάμετρος ἀσύμμετρος. Ἔτι οὗ τἀληθὲς ἀμφιδοξεῖται, μάλιστα μεταφέρων ἄν τις λανθάνοι τὰ ὀνόματα περὶ τούτων.
Since people would say that he who does not concede some of the things they say is lying, but in some cases they would not, such as those about which opinions are divided (for whether the soul of animals is perishable or immortal is not determined by the majority), therefore, in cases where it is unclear in which of the two ways the proposed statement is usually said, whether as 'opinions' (for they call opinions both true beliefs and general assertions) or as 'the diagonal is incommensurable', and further, where the truth is disputed, one would best escape notice by shifting the terms concerning these things.
Διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἄδηλον εἶναι ποτέρως ἔχει τἀληθές, οὐ δόξει σοφίζεσθαι, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἀμφιδοξεῖν οὐ δόξει ψεύδεσθαι· ἡ δὲ μεταφορὰ ποιήσει τὸν λόγον ἀνεξέλεγκτον.
For because it is unclear which way the truth lies, he will not seem to be sophistical; and because of the divided opinion, he will not seem to be lying; and the shift of meaning will make the argument unrefutable.
Ἔτι ὅσα ἄν τις προαισθάνηται τῶν ἐρωτημάτων, προενστατέον καὶ προαγορευτέον· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μάλιστα τὸν πυνθανόμενον κωλύσειεν.
Furthermore, whatever questions one foresees, one must object beforehand and state beforehand [one's distinction]; for in this way one would best obstruct the inquirer.