§20Φανερὸν δὲ καὶ τοὺς παρὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν πῶς λυτέον· ἂν γὰρ διαιρούμενος καὶ συντιθέμενος ὁ λόγος ἕτερον σημαίνῃ, συμπεραινομένου τοὐναντίον λεκτέον.
It is also clear how one should solve those arguments that depend on division and composition; for if the argument, when divided or composed, signifies something else, when the conclusion is drawn, one must state the opposite.
Εἰσὶ δὲ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι παρὰ τὴν σύνθεσιν ἢ διαίρεσιν. Ἆρ᾿ ᾧ εἶδες σὺ τοῦτον τυπτόμενον, τούτῳ ἐτύπτετο οὗτος; καὶ ᾧ ἐτύπτετο, τούτῳ σὺ εἶδες; Ἔχει μὲν οὖν τι κἀκ τῶν ἀμφιβόλων ἐρωτημάτων, ἀλλ᾿ ἔστι παρὰ σύνθεσιν.
And all such arguments depend on composition or division: 'Is that with which you saw this man being beaten, with that was he beaten? and that with which he was beaten, with that did you see?' Now it has something also of ambiguous questions, but it is dependent on composition.
Οὐ γάρ ἐστι διττὸν τὸ παρὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν· οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος γίνεται διαιρούμενος, εἴπερ μὴ καὶ τὸ ὄρος καὶ ὅρος τῇ προσῳδίᾳ λεχθὲν σημαίνει ἕτερον.
For that which depends on division is not double in meaning; for the same expression does not result when divided, unless indeed 'oros' and 'horos', spoken with their breathing/accent, signify something different.
Ἀλλ᾿ ἐν μὲν τοῖς γεγραμμένοις ταὐτὸν ὄνομα, ὅταν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν στοιχείων γεγραμμένον ᾖ καὶ ὡσαύτως, κἀκεῖ δ᾿ ἤδη παράσημα ποιοῦνται, τὰ δὲ φθεγγόμενα οὐ ταὐτά.
But in written things, the name is the same when it is written from the same letters and in the same way—and even there they now make diacritical marks—but the spoken things are not the same.
Ὥστ᾿ οὐ διττὸν τὸ παρὰ διαίρεσιν.
So that which depends on division is not double.
Φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐ πάντες οἱ ἔλεγχοι παρὰ τὸ διττόν, καθάπερ τινές φασιν.
And it is also clear that not all refutations depend on the double meaning, as some say.
Διαιρετέον οὖν τῷ ἀποκρινομένῳ· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν ἰδεῖν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς τυπτόμενον καὶ τὸ φάναι ἰδεῖν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς τυπτόμενον.
Therefore, the answerer must make a division; for it is not the same to see with the eyes someone being beaten and to say to see with the eyes someone being beaten.
Καὶ ὁ Εὐθυδήμου δὲ λόγος, ἆρ᾿ οἶδας σὺ νῦν οὔσας ἐν Πειραιεῖ τριήρεις ἐν Σικελίᾳ ὤν; Καὶ πάλιν, ἆρ᾿ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα σκυτέα μοχθηρὸν εἶναι; εἴη δ᾿ ἄν τις ἀγαθὸς ὢν σκυτεὺς μοχθηρός· ὥστ᾿ ἔσται ἀγαθὸς σκυτεὺς μοχθηρός.
And also the argument of Euthydemus: 'Do you know now triremes being in Piraeus, being in Sicily?' And again: 'Is it possible for one who is a good shoemaker to be bad?' But someone might be a bad man while being a good shoemaker; so that he will be a bad good shoemaker.
Ἆρ᾿ ὧν αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι σπουδαῖαι, σπουδαῖα τὰ μαθήματα; Τοῦ δὲ κακοῦ σπουδαῖον τὸ μάθημα· σπουδαῖον ἄρα μάθημα τὸ κακόν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ κακὸν καὶ μάθημα τὸ κακόν, ὥστε κακὸν μάθημα τὸ κακόν. Ἀλλ᾿ ἐστὶ κακῶν σπουδαία ἐπιστήμη. Ἆρ᾿ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν νῦν ὅτι σὺ γέγονας; Γέγονας ἄρα νῦν. Ἢ ἄλλο σημαίνει διαιρεθέν· ἀληθὲς γὰρ εἰπεῖν νῦν ὅτι σὺ γέγονας, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ νῦν γέγονας.
'Are those things of which the sciences are good, the subjects of study good?' 'But the study of the bad is good; therefore the bad is a good subject of study.' 'But surely the bad is both bad and a subject of study, so that the bad is a bad subject of study.' 'But there is a good science of bad things.' 'Is it true to say now that you have been born?' 'Therefore, you have been born now.' Or rather it signifies something else when divided; for it is true to say now that you have been born, but not that you have been born now.
Ἆρ᾿ ὡς δύνασαι καὶ ἃ δύνασαι, οὕτως καὶ ταῦτα ποιήσαις ἄν; Οὐ κιθαρίζων δ᾿ ἔχεις δύναμιν τοῦ κιθαρίζειν· κιθαρίσαις ἂν ἄρα οὐ κιθαρίζων. Ἢ οὐ τούτου ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ οὐ κιθαρίζων κιθαρίζειν, ἀλλ᾿ ὅτε οὐ ποιεῖ, τοῦ ποιεῖν.
'Is it the case that as you are able and what you are able, so and these things you would do?' 'But while not playing the cithara you have the power of playing the cithara; therefore, you would play the cithara while not playing the cithara.' Or rather he does not have the power of this—of playing the cithara while not playing it—but rather, when he is not doing it, of doing it.
Λύουσι δέ τινες τοῦτον καὶ ἄλλως.
And some solve this in another way also.
Εἰ γὰρ ἔδωκεν ὡς δύναται ποιεῖν, οὔ φασι συμβαίνειν μὴ κιθαρίζοντα κιθαρίζειν· οὐ γὰρ πάντως ὡς δύναται ποιεῖν, δεδόσθαι ποιήσειν· οὐ ταὐτὸν δ᾿ εἶναι ὡς δύναται καὶ πάντως ὡς δύναται ποιεῖν.
For if he granted that he does as he is able, they say it does not follow that one plays the cithara while not playing; for it has not been granted that he will do it in every way as he is able to do, and it is not the same to do as one is able and in every way as one is able.
Ἀλλὰ φανερὸν ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λύουσιν· τῶν γὰρ παρὰ ταὐτὸν λόγων ἡ αὐτὴ λύσις, αὕτη δ᾿ οὐχ ἁρμόσει ἐπὶ πάντας οὐδὲ πάντως ἐρωτωμένους, ἀλλ᾿ ἔστι πρὸς τὸν ἐρωτῶντα, οὐ πρὸς τὸν λόγον.
But it is clear that they do not solve it well; for of arguments depending on the same thing, the solution is the same, but this solution will not apply to all nor to any way they are questioned, but is directed against the questioner, not against the argument.
§21Παρὰ δὲ τὴν προσῳδίαν λόγοι μὲν οὐκ εἰσίν, οὔτε τῶν γεγραμμένων οὔτε τῶν λεγομένων, πλὴν εἴ τινες ὀλίγοι γένοιντ᾿ ἄν, οἷον οὗτος ὁ λόγος. Ἆρά γ᾿ ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ καταλύεις οἰκία; Ναί. Οὐκοῦν τὸ οὐ καταλύεις τοῦ καταλύεις ἀπόφασις; Ναί. Ἔφησας δ᾿ εἶναι τὸ οὗ καταλύεις οἰκίαν· ἡ οἰκία ἄρα ἀπόφασις. Ὡς δὴ λυτέον, δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸ σημαίνει ὀξύτερον τὸ δὲ βαρύτερον ῥηθέν.
But arguments depending on accent do not exist, either among written or spoken things, except perhaps if a few should occur, such as this argument: 'Is that where you lodge (hou katalyeis) a house?' 'Yes.' 'Then is not "you do not lodge" (ou katalyeis) the negation of "you lodge" (katalyeis)?' 'Yes.' 'But you said that where you lodge (hou katalyeis) is a house; therefore, the house is a negation.' How it must be solved is clear; for the same thing is not signified when pronounced more sharply and more gravely.