§15Ἔστι δὴ πρὸς τὸ ἐλέγχειν ἓν μὲν μῆκος·
For refutation, one means is length; for it is difficult to keep many things in view at the same time.
χαλεπὸν γὰρ ἅμα πολλὰ συνορᾶν. Εἰς δὲ τὸ μῆκος τοῖς προειρημένοις στοιχείοις χρηστέον.
And for length, one must use the aforementioned elements.
Ἓν δὲ τάχος· ὑστερίζοντες γὰρ ἧττον προορῶσιν.
Another is speed; for those who lag behind foresee less.
Ἔτι δ᾿ ὀργὴ καὶ φιλονεικία· ταραττόμενοι γὰρ ἧττον δύνανται φυλάττεσθαι πάντες.
Furthermore, anger and contentiousness; for when agitated, everyone is less able to protect themselves.
Στοιχεῖα δὲ τῆς ὀργῆς τό τε φανερὸν ἑαυτὸν ποιεῖν βουλόμενον ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀναισχυντεῖν.
And the elements of anger are making oneself clearly wish to do wrong, and being altogether shameless.
Ἔτι τὸ ἐναλλὰξ τὰ ἐρωτήματα τιθέναι, ἐάν τε πρὸς ταὐτὸ πλείους τις ἔχῃ λόγους, ἐάν τε καὶ ὅτι οὕτως καὶ ὅτι οὐχ οὕτως· ἅμα γὰρ συμβαίνει ἢ πρὸς πλείω ἢ πρὸς τἀναντία ποιεῖσθαι τὴν φυλακήν.
Furthermore, placing the questions alternately, whether one has several arguments against the same thing, or both that it is so and that it is not so; for it happens that at the same time they have to defend themselves either against several things or against opposites.
Ὅλως δὲ πάντα τὰ πρὸς τὴν κρύψιν λεχθέντα πρότερον χρήσιμα καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀγωνιστικοὺς λόγους· ἡ γὰρ κρύψις ἐστὶ τοῦ λαθεῖν χάριν, τὸ δὲ λαθεῖν τῆς ἀπάτης.
In general, all the things said earlier concerning concealment are also useful for contentious arguments; for concealment is for the sake of escaping detection, and escaping detection is for the sake of deception.
Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀνανεύοντας ἅττ᾿ ἂν οἰηθῶσιν εἶναι πρὸς τὸν λόγον, ἐξ ἀποφάσεως ἐρωτητέον, ὡς τοὐναντίον βουλόμενον, ἢ καὶ ἐξ ἴσου ποιοῦντα τὴν ἐρώτησιν· ἀδήλου γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ τί βούλεται λαβεῖν ἧττον δυσκολαίνουσιν.
Against those who reject whatever they think is in favor of the argument, one must question by negation, as though desiring the opposite, or by making the question impartial; for when it is unclear what one wishes to secure, they are less obstructive.
Ὅταν τ᾿ ἐπὶ τῶν μερῶν διδῷ τις τὸ καθ᾿ ἕκαστον, ἐπάγοντα τὸ καθόλου πολλάκις οὐκ ἐρωτητέον, ἀλλ᾿ ὡς δεδομένῳ χρηστέον· ἐνίοτε γὰρ οἴονται καὶ αὐτοὶ δεδωκέναι καὶ τοῖς ἀκούουσι φαίνονται διὰ τὴν τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς μνείαν, ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἠρωτημένα μάτην.
And when anyone grants the particular cases in detail, in bringing in the universal one must often not ask, but treat it as already granted; for sometimes they themselves think they have granted it, and it seems so to the hearers because of the memory of the induction, as though those questions had not been asked in vain.
Ἐν οἷς τε μὴ ὀνόματι σημαίνεται τὸ καθόλου, ἀλλὰ τῇ ὁμοιότητι χρηστέον πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον· λανθάνει γὰρ ἡ ὁμοιότης πολλάκις.
And in cases where the universal is not designated by a name, one must use the similarity to one's advantage; for similarity often escapes notice.
Πρός τε τὸ λαβεῖν τὴν πρότασιν τοὐναντίον παραβάλλοντα χρὴ πυνθάνεσθαι.
And to secure the premise, one must ask by contrasting it with its opposite.
Οἷον εἰ δέοι λαβεῖν ὅτι δεῖ πάντα τῷ πατρὶ πείθεσθαι, πότερον ἅπαντα δεῖ πείθεσθαι τοῖς γονεῦσιν ἢ πάντ᾿ ἀπειθεῖν; καὶ τὸ πολλάκις πολλά, πότερον πολλὰ συγχωρητέον ἢ ὀλίγα; μᾶλλον γάρ, εἴπερ ἀνάγκη, δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι πολλά· παρατιθεμένων γὰρ ἐγγὺς τῶν ἐναντίων, καὶ μείζων καὶ μεγάλα φαίνεται καὶ χείρω καὶ βελτίω τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.
As for instance, if one had to secure the premise that one must obey one's father in all things: "Must one obey one's parents in all things, or disobey them in all things?" And as for "often many things", "Must one concede many things, or few?" For if it is necessary to choose, it would rather seem to be many; for when opposites are placed close together, things seem to men both greater and large, and worse and better.
Σφόδρα δὲ καὶ πολλάκις ποιεῖ δοκεῖν ἐληλέγχθαι τὸ μάλιστα σοφιστικὸν συκοφάντημα τῶν ἐρωτώντων, τὸ μηδὲν συλλογισαμένους μὴ ἐρώτημα ποιεῖν τὸ τελευταῖον, ἀλλὰ συμπεραντικῶς εἰπεῖν, ὡς συλλελογισμένους, οὐκ ἄρα τὸ καὶ τό. Σοφιστικὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ κειμένου παραδόξου τὸ φαινόμενον ἀξιοῦν ἀποκρίνεσθαι προκειμένου τοῦ δοκοῦντος ἐξ ἀρχῆς, καὶ τὴν ἐρώτησιν τῶν τοιούτων οὕτω ποιεῖσθαι, πότερόν σοι δοκεῖ; ἀνάγκη γάρ, ἂν ᾖ τὸ ἐρώτημα ἐξ ὧν ὁ συλλογισμός, ἢ ἔλεγχον ἢ παράδοξον γίνεσθαι, δόντος μὲν ἔλεγχον, μὴ δόντος δὲ μηδὲ δοκεῖν φάσκοντος ἄδοξον, μὴ δόντος δὲ δοκεῖν δ᾿ ὁμολογοῦντος ἐλεγχοειδές.
And very greatly and often, that most sophistical trick of questioners makes it seem that a refutation has been accomplished: when they have syllogized nothing, they do not make the final step a question, but state it as a conclusion, as if they had syllogized, "Therefore, such-and-such is not the case." It is also sophistical, when a paradoxical thesis is laid down, to demand that the respondent answer what is plausible, while the generally accepted view is already set up from the beginning, and to formulate the question on such matters in this way: "Does it seem so to you?" For it is necessary, if the question consists of the premises from which the syllogism is constructed, that either a refutation or a paradox results: if he grants it, a refutation occurs; if he does not grant it and says it does not even seem so to him, a paradox; and if he does not grant it but admits that it seems so, something resembling a refutation.
Ἔτι καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐλεγκτικοῖς ὁμοίως τὰ ἐναντιώματα θεωρητέον ἢ πρὸς τὰ ὑφ᾿ ἑαυτοῦ λεγόμενα, ἢ πρὸς οὓς ὁμολογεῖ καλῶς λέγειν ἢ πράττειν, ἔτι πρὸς τοὺς δοκοῦντας τοιούτους ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοίους ἢ πρὸς τοὺς πλείστους ἢ πρὸς πάντας.
Furthermore, just as in rhetoric, so in refutative arguments one must similarly look for contradictions, either in relation to what is said by the respondent himself, or to those whom he admits to speak or act rightly, or further to those who seem to be of such a character, or to those who are similar, or to the majority, or to all.
Ὥσπερ τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι πολλάκις, ὅταν ἐλέγχωνται, ποιοῦσι διττόν, ἂν μέλλῃ συμβαίνειν ἐλεγχθήσεσθαι, καὶ ἐρωτῶντας χρηστέον ποτὲ τούτῳ πρὸς τοὺς ἐνισταμένους, ἂν ὡδὶ μὲν συμβαίνῃ ὡδὶ δὲ μή, ὅτι οὕτως εἴληφεν, οἷον ὁ Κλεοφῶν ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ Μανδροβούλῳ.
And just as respondents often make a distinction when they are on the point of being refuted, if they are about to be refuted, so too questioners must sometimes use this against objectors, saying that if it holds in this way but not in that, they have taken it in the former sense, as Cleophon does in the Mandrobulus.
Δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἀφισταμένους τοῦ λόγου τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων ἐπιτέμνειν, καὶ τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον, ἂν προαισθάνηται, προενίστασθαι καὶ προαγορεύειν.
One must also, when drawing back from the argument, cut short the rest of the points; and the respondent, if he perceives it beforehand, must object first and speak in advance.
Ἐπιχειρητέον δ᾿ ἐνίοτε καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα τοῦ εἰρημένου, ἐκεῖνο ἐκλαβόντας, ἐὰν μὴ πρὸς τὸ κείμενον ἔχῃ τις ἐπιχειρεῖν· ὅπερ ὁ Λυκόφρων ἐποίησε προβληθέντος λύραν ἐγκωμιάζειν.
And one must sometimes attack points other than the one stated, taking that in isolation, if one has nothing to say against the thesis laid down; which Lycophron did when he was proposed to praise the lyre.
Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀπαιτοῦντας πρός τι ἐπιχειρεῖν, ἐπειδὴ δοκεῖ δεῖν ἀποδιδόναι τὴν αἰτίαν, λεχθέντων δ᾿ ἐνίων εὐφυλακτότερον τὸ καθόλου συμβαῖνον ἐν τοῖς ἐλέγχοις, λέγειν τὴν ἀντίφασιν, ὅ τι ἔφησεν ἀποφῆσαι, ἢ ὃ ἀπέφησε φῆσαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὅτι τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη ἢ οὐχ ἡ αὐτή.
Against those who demand to direct the attack against something specific, since it seems necessary to render the cause, and because when certain things are stated, it is easier to guard against what happens universally in refutations, one must state the contradiction: to deny what he affirmed, or to affirm what he denied, and not that the knowledge of opposites is the same or not the same.
Οὐ δεῖ δὲ τὸ συμπέρασμα προτατικῶς ἐρωτᾶν· ἔνια δ᾿ οὐδ᾿ ἐρωτητέον, ἀλλ᾿ ὡς ὁμολογουμένῳ χρηστέον.
And one must not ask the conclusion in the form of a premise; some things indeed must not even be asked, but must be treated as agreed.