§16Ἐξ ὧν μὲν οὖν αἱ ἐρωτήσεις, καὶ πῶς ἐρωτητέον ἐν ταῖς ἀγωνιστικαῖς διατριβαῖς, εἴρηται· περὶ δὲ ἀποκρίσεως, καὶ πῶς χρὴ λύειν καὶ τί, καὶ πρὸς τίνα χρῆσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν λόγων ὠφέλιμοι, μετὰ ταῦτα λεκτέον.
Therefore, from what sources questions arise, and how one must question in contentious discussions, has been said; but concerning answering, and how and what one must resolve, and for what use such arguments are beneficial, must be stated next.
Χρήσιμοι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ πρὸς μὲν φιλοσοφίαν διὰ δύο.
Now, they are useful for philosophy for two reasons.
Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γινόμενοι παρὰ τὴν λέξιν ἄμεινον ἔχειν ποιοῦσι πρὸς τὸ ποσαχῶς ἕκαστον λέγεται, καὶ ποῖα ὁμοίως καὶ ποῖα ἑτέρως ἐπί τε τῶν πραγμάτων συμβαίνει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων.
First, because since they for the most part arise from language, they make us better disposed to see in how many ways each thing is said, and what things turn out similarly and what differently in the case of objects and in that of names.
Δεύτερον δὲ πρὸς τὰς καθ᾿ αὑτὸν ζητήσεις· ὁ γὰρ ὑφ᾿ ἑτέρου ῥᾳδίως παραλογιζόμενος καὶ τοῦτο μὴ αἰσθανόμενος κἂν αὐτὸς ὑφ᾿ αὑτοῦ τοῦτο πάθοι πολλάκις.
Second, they are useful for inquiry by oneself; for he who is easily misled by a fallacy by another and does not perceive it, might often suffer this same thing by himself.
Τρίτον δὲ καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἔτι πρὸς δόξαν, τὸ περὶ πάντα γεγυμνάσθαι δοκεῖν καὶ μηδενὸς ἀπείρως ἔχειν· τὸ γὰρ κοινωνοῦνται λόγων ψέγειν λόγους, μηδὲν ἔχοντα διορίζειν περὶ τῆς φαυλότητος αὐτῶν, ὑποψίαν δίδωσι τοῦ δοκεῖν δυσχεραίνειν οὐ διὰ τἀληθὲς ἀλλὰ δι᾿ ἀπειρίαν.
Third and lastly, they are useful for reputation, namely, for appearing to be trained in all things and to have no lack of experience in anything; for to censure arguments while participating in them, without being able to define anything about their badness, gives rise to the suspicion of seeming to find fault not because of the truth but because of inexperience.
Ἀποκρινομένοις δὲ πῶς ἀπαντητέον πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους, φανερόν, εἴπερ ὀρθῶς εἰρήκαμεν πρότερον ἐξ ὧν εἰσὶν οἱ παραλογισμοί, καὶ τὰς ἐν τῷ πυνθάνεσθαι πλεονεξίας ἱκανῶς διείλομεν.
On the other hand, how we must meet such arguments as respondents is clear, if indeed we have correctly stated before from what sources fallacies arise, and have sufficiently distinguished the unfair advantages in questioning.
Οὐ ταὐτὸν δ᾿ ἐστὶ λαβόντα τε τὸν λόγον ἰδεῖν καὶ λῦσαι τὴν μοχθηρίαν, καὶ ἐρωτώμενον ἀπαντᾶν δύνασθαι ταχέως. Ὃ γὰρ ἴσμεν, πολλάκις μετατιθέμενον ἀγνοοῦμεν.
But it is not the same thing to examine an argument when one has grasped it and to resolve its badness, and to be able to meet it quickly when being questioned; for what we know, we often fail to recognize when it is transposed.
Ἔτι δ᾿, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ θᾶττον καὶ τὸ βραδύτερον ἐκ τοῦ γεγυμνάσθαι γίνεται μᾶλλον, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἔχει, ὥστε, ἂν δῆλον μὲν ἡμῖν ᾖ, ἀμελέτητοι δ᾿ ὦμεν, ὑστεροῦμεν τῶν καιρῶν πολλάκις.
Furthermore, just as in other matters, speed and slowness come rather from being trained, so it is also in the case of arguments; so that, even if a thing is clear to us, if we are unpracticed, we often miss the opportunities.
Συμβαίνει δέ ποτε, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διαγράμμασιν· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἀναλύσαντες ἐνίοτε συνθεῖναι πάλιν ἀδυνατοῦμεν· οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐλέγχοις εἰδότες παρ᾿ ὃ ὁ λόγος συμβαίνει συνεῖραι διαλῦσαι τὸν λόγον ἀποροῦμεν.
And it sometimes happens, just as in geometrical diagrams; for there too, having analyzed them, we are sometimes unable to construct them again; so too in refutations, though we know on account of what the argument occurs, we are at a loss to untangle and resolve the argument.