§13Καὶ τὰ μὲν παράδοξα ἐκ τούτων δεῖ ζητεῖν τῶν τόπων· περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποιῆσαι ἀδολεσχεῖν, ὃ μὲν λέγομεν τὸ ἀδολεσχεῖν, εἰρήκαμεν ἤδη.
And paradoxes must be sought from these loci; but concerning making people babble, what we mean by "babbling" has already been stated.
Πάντες δὲ οἱ τοιοίδε λόγοι τοῦτο βούλονται ποιεῖν· εἰ μηδὲν διαφέρει τὸ ὄνομα ἢ τὸν λόγον εἰπεῖν, διπλάσιον δὲ καὶ διπλἆσιον ἡμίσεος ταὐτό, εἰ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡμίσεος διπλάσιον, ἔσται ἡμίσεος ἡμίσεος διπλάσιον.
And all arguments of the following sort wish to do this: if it makes no difference whether one says the name or the definition, and "double" and "double of a half" are the same, if then [something] is "double of a half", it will be "double of a half of a half".
Καὶ πάλιν ἂν ἀντὶ τοῦ διπλάσιον διπλάσιον ἡμίσεος τεθῇ, τρὶς ἔσται εἰρημένον, ἡμίσεος ἡμίσεος ἡμίσεος διπλάσιον.
And again if, instead of "double", "double of a half" is placed, it will have been said thrice, "double of a half of a half of a half".
Καὶ ἆρά ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἡδέος; τοῦτο δ᾿ ἐστὶν ὄρεξις ἡδέος· ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἐπιθυμία ὄρεξις ἡδέος ἡδέος.
And "is desire [desire] of the pleasant?" But this is "appetite for the pleasant"; therefore "desire is appetite for the pleasant of the pleasant".
Εἰσὶ δὲ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν λόγων ἔν τε τοῖς πρός τι, ὅσα μὴ μόνον τὰ γένη ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὰ πρός τι λέγεται, καὶ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν ἀποδίδοται.
All such arguments occur in the case of relative terms, wherever not only their genera but also they themselves are said to be relative, and are rendered in relation to the same and single thing.
Οἷον ἥ τε ὄρεξις τινὸς ὄρεξις καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία τινὸς ἐπιθυμία, καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον τινὸς διπλάσιον καὶ διπλάσιον ἡμίσεος.
As for instance appetite is appetite of something, and desire is desire of something, and double is double of something, and double of a half.
Καὶ ὅσων ἡ οὐσία οὐκ ὄντων πρός τι ὅλως, ὧν εἰσὶν ἕξεις ἢ πάθη ἤ τι τοιοῦτον, ἐν τῷ λόγῳ αὐτῶν προσδηλοῦται κατηγορουμένων ἐπὶ τούτοις.
And also in the case of all those things whose substance is not relative at all, but of which they are states or affections or something of that kind, in their definition they are additionally indicated when predicated of these.
Οἷον τὸ περιττὸν ἀριθμὸς μέσον ἔχων· ἔστι δ᾿ ἀριθμὸς περιττός· ἔστιν ἄρα ἀριθμὸς μέσον ἔχων ἀριθμός.
As for instance "odd" is "a number having a middle"; but there is an "odd number"; therefore there is "a number having a middle number".
Καὶ εἰ τὸ σιμὸν κοιλότης ῥινός ἐστιν, ἔστι δὲ ῥὶς σιμή, ἔστιν ἄρα ῥὶς ῥὶς κοίλη.
And if "snubness" is "hollowness of a nose", and there is a "snub nose", therefore there is a "hollow nose nose".
Φαίνονται δὲ ποιεῖν οὐ ποιοῦντες ἐνίοτε διὰ τὸ μὴ προσπυνθάνεσθαι εἰ σημαίνει τι καθ᾿ αὑτὸ λεχθὲν τὸ διπλάσιον ἢ οὐδέν, καὶ εἴ τι σημαίνει, πότερον τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ τὸ συμπέρασμα λέγειν εὐθύς.
But they sometimes seem to produce this without doing so, because they do not ask in addition whether the term "double" when stated by itself signifies something or nothing, and if it signifies something, whether it is the same or different, but they state the conclusion immediately.
Ἀλλὰ φαίνεται διὰ τὸ τὸ ὄνομα ταὐτὸ εἶναι ταὐτὸ καὶ σημαίνειν.
But it seems so because the name, being the same, is thought to signify the same thing.
§14Σολοικισμὸς δ᾿ οἷον μέν ἐστιν εἴρηται πρότερον.
What kind of thing a solecism is, has been stated before.
Ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ ποιοῦντα φαίνεσθαι καὶ ποιοῦντα μὴ δοκεῖν, καθάπερ ὁ Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγεν, εἰ ὁ μῆνις καὶ ὁ πήληξ ἄρρεν ἐστίν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λέγων οὐλομένην σολοικίζει μὲν κατ᾿ ἐκεῖνον, οὐ φαίνεται δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὁ δὲ οὐλόμενον φαίνεται μὲν ἀλλ᾿ οὐ σολοικίζει.
And it is possible both to produce this, and to seem to do so without doing so, and to do so without seeming to, just as Protagoras used to say, if "wrath" and "helmet" are masculine; for he who says "destructive" in the feminine commits a solecism according to him, though he does not seem to do so to others, while he who says "destructive" in the masculine seems to do so, but does not commit a solecism.
Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι κἂν τέχνῃ τις τοῦτο δύναιτο ποιεῖν· διὸ πολλοὶ τῶν λόγων οὐ συλλογιζόμενοι σολοικισμὸν φαίνονται συλλογίζεσθαι, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐλέγχοις.
So it is clear that someone could produce this by art as well; wherefore many arguments, though not syllogizing a solecism, seem to syllogize it, just as in the case of refutations.
Εἰσὶ δὲ πάντες σχεδὸν οἱ φαινόμενοι σολοικισμοὶ παρὰ τὸ τόδε, καὶ ὅταν ἡ πτῶσις μήτε ἄρρεν μήτε θῆλυ δηλοῖ ἀλλὰ τὸ μεταξύ.
And almost all apparent solecisms occur because of the word "this", and when the inflection signifies neither masculine nor feminine but the intermediate.
Τὸ μὲν οὗτος ἄρρεν σημαίνει, τὸ δ᾿ αὕτη θῆλυ· τὸ δὲ τοῦτο θέλει μὲν τὸ μεταξὺ σημαίνειν, πολλάκις δὲ σημαίνει κἀκείνων ἑκάτερον, οἷον τί τοῦτο; Καλλιόπη, ξύλον, Κορίσκος.
For "this man" signifies masculine, and "this woman" feminine; but "this thing" aims to signify the intermediate, but often signifies each of those as well, as for instance, "What is this?" "Calliope", "wood", "Coriscus".
Τοῦ μὲν οὖν ἄρρενος καὶ τοῦ θήλεος διαφέρουσιν αἱ πτώσεις ἅπασαι, τοῦ δὲ μεταξὺ αἱ μὲν αἱ δ᾿ οὔ.
Therefore, of the masculine and the feminine all the cases differ, but of the intermediate some do and some do not.
Δοθέντος δὴ πολλάκις τοῦτο, συλλογίζονται ὡς εἰρημένου τοῦτον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλην πτῶσιν ἀντ᾿ ἄλλης.
When, therefore, "this" has been granted, they often syllogize as if "this man" in the accusative had been said; and similarly they substitute one case for another.
Ὁ δὲ παραλογισμὸς γίνεται διὰ τὸ κοινὸν εἶναι τὸ τοῦτο πλειόνων πτώσεων· τὸ γὰρ τοῦτο σημαίνει ὁτὲ μὲν οὗτος ὁτὲ δὲ τοῦτον.
And the fallacy occurs because the word "this" is common to several cases; for "this" signifies sometimes "this man" in the nominative and sometimes "this man" in the accusative.
Δεῖ δ᾿ ἐναλλὰξ σημαίνειν, μετὰ μὲν τοῦ ἔστι τὸ οὗτος, μετὰ δὲ τοῦ εἶναι τὸ τοῦτον, οἷον ἔστι Κορίσκος, εἶναι Κορίσκον.
But it ought to signify them alternately: with "is" the nominative "this man", but with "to be" the accusative "this man", as for instance "is Coriscus", "to be Coriscus" in the accusative.
Καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν θηλέων ὀνομάτων ὡσαύτως, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λεγομένων μὲν σκευῶν, ἐχόντων δὲ θηλείας ἢ ἄρρενος κλῆσιν.
And likewise in the case of feminine nouns, and in the case of those things which are called "utensils" but have a feminine or masculine designation.
Ὅσα γὰρ εἰς τὸ ο̄ καὶ τὸ ν̄ τελευτᾷ, ταῦτα μόνα σκεύους ἔχει κλῆσιν, οἷον ξύλον, σχοινίον, τὰ δὲ μὴ οὕτως ἄρρενος ἢ θήλεος, ὧν ἔνια φέρομεν ἐπὶ τὰ σκεύη, οἷον ἀσκὸς μὲν ἄρρεν τοὔνομα, κλίνη δὲ θῆλυ.
For whatever end in -o and -n, these alone have the designation of a utensil, as for instance "wood", "rope"; but those which do not so end have that of a masculine or a feminine, some of which we apply to utensils, as for instance "leather bag" is masculine in name, and "bed" is feminine.
Διόπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὡσαύτως τὸ ἔστι καὶ τὸ εἶναι διοίσει.
Wherefore in the case of these things too, "is" and "to be" will differ in the same way.
Καὶ τρόπον τινὰ ὅμοιός ἐστιν ὁ σολοικισμὸς τοῖς παρὰ τὸ τὰ μὴ ὅμοια ὁμοίως λεγομένοις ἐλέγχοις.
And in a way a solecism is similar to those refutations which occur because of what is not similar being expressed similarly.
Ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐκείνοις ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, τούτοις ἐπὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων συμπίπτει σολοικίζειν· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ καὶ λευκὸν καὶ πρᾶγμα καὶ ὄνομά ἐστιν.
For just as in those cases it happens that one errs in respect of things, so in these cases one errs in respect of names; for "man" and "white" are both things and names.
Φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι τὸν σολοικισμὸν πειρατέον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων πτώσεων συλλογίζεσθαι.
It is clear, then, that one must attempt to syllogize a solecism from the aforesaid inflections.
Εἴδη μὲν οὖν ταῦτα τῶν ἀγωνιστικῶν λόγων καὶ μέρη τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τρόποι οἱ εἰρημένοι.
These, then, are the kinds of contentious arguments, and the parts of the kinds, and the methods mentioned.
Διαφέρει δ᾿ οὐ μικρόν, ἐὰν ταχθῇ πως τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐρώτησιν πρὸς τὸ λανθάνειν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς.
But it makes no small difference if the matters concerning the question are arranged in a certain way to secure concealment, just as in dialectic.
Ἐφεξῆς οὖν τοῖς εἰρημένοις ταῦτα πρῶτον λεκτέον.
Next in order, therefore, to what has been said, these matters must first be discussed.