§11#1Ἔτι τὸ φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι ἀξιοῦν οὐ δεικνύντος ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πεῖραν λαμβάνοντος.
Furthermore, to claim to assert or deny is not the part of one who demonstrates, but of one who tests.
Ἡ γὰρ πειραστική ἐστι διαλεκτική τις καὶ θεωρεῖ οὐ τὸν εἰδότα ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀγνοοῦντα καὶ προσποιούμενον.
For the art of testing is a kind of dialectic, and its view is directed not upon the one who knows but upon the one who is ignorant and pretends to know.
Ὁ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα θεωρῶν τὰ κοινὰ διαλεκτικός, ὁ δὲ τοῦτο φαινομένως ποιῶν σοφιστικός.
Therefore, he who examines common features in accordance with the subject-matter is a dialectician, while he who does this apparently is a sophist.
Καὶ συλλογισμὸς ἐριστικὸς καὶ σοφιστικός ἐστιν εἷς μὲν ὁ φαινόμενος συλλογισμός, περὶ ὧν ἡ διαλεκτικὴ πειραστική ἐστι, κἂν ἀληθὲς τὸ συμπέρασμα ᾖ· τοῦ γὰρ διὰ τί ἀπατητικός ἐστι·
And an eristic and sophistical syllogism is, in one way, an apparent syllogism concerning those things about which dialectic is testing, even if the conclusion is true; for it is deceptive in respect of the 'why'.
καὶ ὅσοι μὴ ὄντες κατὰ τὴν ἑκάστου μέθοδον παραλογισμοὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι κατὰ τὴν τέχνην.
And so are all those paralogisms which, though not being in accordance with the method of each science, seem to be in accordance with the art.
Τὰ γὰρ ψευδογραφήματα οὐκ ἐριστικά (κατὰ γὰρ τὰ ὑπὸ τὴν τέχνην οἱ παραλογισμοί), οὐδέ γ᾿ εἴ τί ἐστι ψευδογράφημα περὶ ἀληθές, οἷον τὸ Ἱπποκράτους ἢ ὁ τετραγωνισμὸς ὁ διὰ τῶν μηνίσκων.
For false geometrical proofs are not eristic (for their paralogisms are in accordance with the things under the art), nor indeed is any false proof concerning the truth, such as that of Hippocrates or the quadrature by means of lunules.
Ἀλλ᾿ ὡς Βρύσων ἐτετραγώνιζε τὸν κύκλον, εἰ καὶ τετραγωνίζεται ὁ κύκλος, ἀλλ᾿ ὅτι οὐ κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα, διὰ τοῦτο σοφιστικός.
But the way Bryson squared the circle, even if the circle is squared, is sophistical because it is not in accordance with the subject-matter.
Ὥστε ὅ τε περὶ τῶνδε φαινόμενος συλλογισμὸς ἐριστικὸς λόγος, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα φαινόμενος συλλογισμός, κἂν ᾖ συλλογισμός, ἐριστικὸς λόγος· φαινόμενος γάρ ἐστι κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὥστ᾿ ἀπατητικὸς καὶ ἄδικος.
So that both an apparent syllogism about these things is an eristic argument, and an apparent syllogism in accordance with the subject-matter, even if it is a syllogism, is an eristic argument; for it is only apparently in accordance with the subject-matter, so that it is deceptive and unfair.
Ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ ἐν ἀγῶνι ἀδικία εἶδός τι ἔχει καὶ ἔστιν ἀδικομαχία τις, οὕτως ἐν ἀντιλογίᾳ ἀδικομαχία ἡ ἐριστική ἐστιν· ἐκεῖ τε γὰρ οἱ πάντως νικᾶν προαιρούμενοι πάντων ἅπτονται καὶ ἐνταῦθα οἱ ἐριστικοί.
For just as unfairness in a contest has a certain form and is a kind of foul fighting, so eristic is foul fighting in argument; for there, those who choose to win at all costs lay hold of everything, and so do eristic disputants here.
Οἱ μὲν οὖν τῆς νίκης αὐτῆς χάριν τοιοῦτοι ἐριστικοὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ φιλέριδες δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οἱ δὲ δόξης χάριν τῆς εἰς χρηματισμὸν σοφιστικοί· ἡ γὰρ σοφιστική ἐστιν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, χρηματιστική τις ἀπὸ σοφίας φαινομένης, διὸ φαινομένης ἀποδείξεως ἐφίενται.
Those, then, who act so for the sake of victory itself are thought to be eristic and contentious people, while those who do so for the sake of reputation leading to making money are sophistical; for sophistry is, as we said, a kind of money-making from apparent wisdom, and therefore they aim at apparent demonstration.
Καὶ τῶν λόγων τῶν αὐτῶν μέν εἰσιν οἱ φιλέριδες καὶ σοφισταί, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν ἕνεκεν.
And contentious people and sophists use the same arguments, but not for the same purposes.
Καὶ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς μὲν ἔσται σοφιστικὸς καὶ ἐριστικός, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ κατὰ ταὐτόν, ἄλλ᾿ ᾗ μὲν νίκης φαινομένης, ἐριστικός, ᾗ δὲ σοφίας, σοφιστικός· καὶ γὰρ ἡ σοφιστική ἐστι φαινομένη σοφία τις ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ οὖσα.
And the same argument will be sophistical and eristic, but not in the same respect; rather, in so far as it is for the sake of apparent victory, it is eristic, and in so far as it is for the sake of apparent wisdom, it is sophistical; for sophistry is a kind of apparent wisdom but is not real.
Ὁ δ᾿ ἐριστικός ἐστί πως οὕτως ἔχων πρὸς τὸν διαλεκτικὸν ὡς ὁ ψευδογράφος πρὸς τὸν γεωμετρικόν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν τῇ διαλεκτικῇ παραλογίζεται καὶ ὁ ψευδογράφος τὸν γεωμέτρην.
And the eristic argument stands in a certain relation to the dialectician as the writer of a false proof does to the geometer; for from the same sources as dialectic it misleads the geometer, just as the writer of a false proof does.
Ἀλλ᾿ ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἐριστικός, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ συμπερασμάτων τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν τέχνην ψευδογραφεῖ· ὁ δ᾿ ὑπὸ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν περὶ μὲν τἆλλα ὅτι ἐριστικός ἐσται δῆλον.
But the latter is not eristic, because he writes false proofs from the principles and conclusions which are under the art; whereas the one who is under dialectic will clearly be eristic concerning other matters.
Οἷον ὁ τετραγωνισμὸς ὁ μὲν διὰ τῶν μηνίσκων οὐκ ἐριστικός, ὁ δὲ Βρύσωνος ἐριστικός· καὶ τὸν μὲν οὐκ ἔστι μετενεγκεῖν ἀλλ᾿ ἢ πρὸς γεωμετρίαν μόνον διὰ τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων εἶναι ἀρχῶν, τὸν δὲ πρὸς πολλούς, ὅσοι μὴ ἴσασι τὸ δυνατὸν ἐκ ἑκάστῳ καὶ τὸ ἀδύνατον· ἁρμόσει γάρ.
For instance, the quadrature by means of lunules is not eristic, but Bryson's is eristic; and the former cannot be transferred except to geometry alone because it is from its own principles, but the latter can be transferred to many, namely, as many as do not know what is possible and what is impossible in each science; for it will apply.