§2.24.6ἄλλος διὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός, οἷον ὃ λέγει Πολυκράτης εἰς τοὺς μῦς, ὅτι ἐβοήθησαν διατραγόντες τὰς νευράς· ἢ εἴ τις φαίη τὸ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον κληθῆναι τιμιώτατον· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ κληθῆναι ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς ἐμήνισε τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἐν Τενέδῳ· ὁ δʼ ὡς ἀτιμαζόμενος ἐμήνισεν, συνέβη δὲ τοῦτο διὰ τὸ μὴ κληθῆναι.
Another is due to the accidental circumstance, for instance, what Polycrates says of the mice, that they rendered assistance by gnawing through the bowstrings; or if someone should say that being invited to dinner is most honorable; for it was because of not being invited that Achilles was angry with the Achaians at Tenedos; but he was angry as one who was being dishonored, and this happened to occur because of his not being invited.
§2.24.7ἄλλος τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἑπόμενον, οἷον ἐν τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, ὅτι μεγαλόψυχος· ὑπεριδὼν γὰρ τὴν πολλῶν ὁμιλίαν ἐν τῇ Ἴδῃ διέτριβεν καθʼ αὑτόν· ὅτι γὰρ οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι τοιοῦτοι, καὶ οὗτος μεγαλόψυχος δόξειεν ἄν.
Another is that based on the consequence, for instance, in the *Alexander*, that he is magnanimous; for having despised the company of many, he spent his time by himself on Mount Ida; for because the magnanimous are of this character, he too would seem to be magnanimous.
καὶ ἐπεὶ καλλωπιστὴς καὶ νύκτωρ πλανᾶται, μοιχός· τοιοῦτοι γάρ.
And since he is a dandy and wanders at night, he is an adulterer; for such people are like this.
ὅμοιον δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς οἱ πτωχοὶ καὶ ᾄδουσι καὶ ὀρχοῦνται, καὶ ὅτι τοῖς φυγάσιν ἔξεστιν οἰκεῖν ὅπου ἂν θέλωσιν· ὅτι γὰρ τοῖς δοκοῦσιν εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, καὶ οἷς ταῦτα ὑπάρχει δόξαιεν ἂν εὐδαιμονεῖν, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ πῶς·
And it is similar also that in temples the poor both sing and dance, and that exiles are permitted to live wherever they wish; for because these things belong to those who seem to be happy, those to whom these things belong would also seem to be happy.
διὸ καὶ εἰς τὴν ἔλλειψιν ἐμπίπτει.
But it differs in the "how"; wherefore it also falls under the fallacy of omission.
§2.24.8ἄλλος παρὰ τὸ ἀναίτιον ὡς αἴτιον, οἷον τῷ ἅμα ἢ μετὰ τοῦτο γεγονέναι· τὸ γὰρ μετὰ τοῦτο ὡς διὰ τοῦτο λαμβάνουσιν, καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις, οἷον ὡς ὁ Δημάδης τὴν Δημοσθένους πολιτείαν πάντων τῶν κακῶν αἰτίαν· μετʼ ἐκείνην γὰρ συνέβη ὁ πόλεμος.
Another is based on taking the non-cause as cause, for instance, because of something happening at the same time or after it; for they take what is after this as being because of this, and especially those in politics, as Demades said that the policy of Demosthenes was the cause of all evils; for after it the war occurred.
§2.24.9ἄλλος παρὰ τὴν ἔλλειψιν τοῦ πότε καὶ πῶς, οἷον ὅτι δικαίως Ἀλέξανδρος ἔλαβε τὴν Ἑλένην· αἵρεσις γὰρ αὐτῇ ἐδόθη παρὰ τοῦ πατρός.
Another is based on the omission of "when" and "how", for instance, that Alexander justly took Helen; for a choice was given to her by her father.
οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἴσως, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρῶτον· καὶ γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ μέχρι τούτου κύριος.
For it was not always, perhaps, but at first; for the father's authority lasted only until then.
ἢ εἴ τις φαίη τὸ τύπτειν τοὺς ἐλευθέρους ὕβριν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ πάντως, ἀλλʼ ὅταν ἄρχῃ χειρῶν ἀδίκων.
Or if someone should say that striking free men is an outrage; for it is not so in every case, but only when one begins the unjust violence.
§2.24.10ἔτι ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς παρὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς καὶ μὴ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τί, γίγνεται φαινόμενος συλλογισμός, οἷον ἐν μὲν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ὅτι ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἔστι γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὂν μὴ ὄν, καὶ ὅτι ἐπιστητὸν τὸ ἄγνωστον, ἔστιν γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν τὸ ἄγνωστον ὅτι ἄγνωστον, οὕτως καὶ ἐν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς ἐστιν φαινόμενον ἐνθύμημα παρὰ τὸ μὴ ἁπλῶς εἰκὸς ἀλλὰ τὶ εἰκός.
Furthermore, just as in eristic arguments a fallacious syllogism arises from what is absolute and not absolute, but particular, as in Dialectic that "non-being is", for non-being is non-being, and that "the unknown is known", for the unknown is known to be unknown—so also in Rhetoric there is an apparent enthymeme from what is not absolutely probable but particularly probable.
ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο οὐ καθόλου, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων λέγει
"
τάχʼ ἄν τις εἰκὸς αὐτὸ τοῦτʼ εἶναι λέγοι,
βροτοῖσι πολλὰ τυγχάνειν οὐκ εἰκότα.
And this is not universal, just as Agathon also says: "Perhaps someone might say this very thing is probable, that many improbable things happen to mortals.
"
γίγνεται γὰρ τὸ παρὰ τὸ εἰκός, ὥστε εἰκὸς καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὸ εἰκός, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔσται τὸ μὴ εἰκὸς εἰκός.
"For what is against probability happens, so that what is against probability is also probable, and if so, the improbable will be probable.
ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐριστικῶν τὸ κατὰ τί καὶ πρὸς τί καὶ πῇ οὐ προστιθέμενα ποιεῖ τὴν συκοφαντίαν, καὶ ἐνταῦθα παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς εἶναι μὴ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ τὶ εἰκός.
But not absolutely, but just as in eristic arguments the omission of "in what respect", "in relation to what", and "in what way" produces the sophistry, so here too it is because of the probability being not absolute but particular.
§2.24.11ἔστι δʼ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ τόπου ἡ Κόρακος τέχνη συγκειμένη· ἄν τε γὰρ μὴ ἔνοχος ᾖ τῇ αἰτίᾳ, οἷον ἀσθενὴς ὢν αἰκίας φεύγει (οὐ γὰρ εἰκός), κἂν ἔνοχος ᾖ, οἷον ἰσχυρὸς ὤν (οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, ὅτι εἰκὸς ἔμελλε δόξειν)
.
And the *Art* of Corax is composed of this topic; for whether the accused is not liable to the charge, for instance, being weak he is prosecuted for assault (for it is not probable), or whether he is liable, for instance, being strong (for it is not probable, because it was bound to seem probable).
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἢ γὰρ ἔνοχον ἀνάγκη ἢ μὴ ἔνοχον εἶναι τῇ αἰτίᾳ· φαίνεται μὲν οὖν ἀμφότερα εἰκότα, ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰκός, τὸ δὲ οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ εἴρηται· καὶ τὸ τὸν ἥττω δὲ λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν τοῦτʼ ἔστιν. καὶ ἐντεῦθεν δικαίως ἐδυσχέραινον οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὸ Πρωταγόρου ἐπάγγελμα· ψεῦδός τε γάρ ἐστιν, καὶ οὐκ ἀληθὲς ἀλλὰ φαινόμενον εἰκός, καὶ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ τέχνῃ ἀλλʼ ἢ ἐν ῥητορικῇ καὶ ἐριστικῇ.
And similarly in other cases; for one must be either liable or not liable to the charge; both then appear probable, but the one is really probable, and the other not absolutely but in the way described; and this is "to make the worse argument appear the better." And hence men were justly displeased at the promise of Protagoras; for it is a lie, and not true but apparent probability, and exists in no other art than Rhetoric and Eristic.