§2.25.1καὶ περὶ μὲν ἐνθυμημάτων, καὶ τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν φαινομένων, εἴρηται, περὶ δὲ λύσεως ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν τῶν εἰρημένων εἰπεῖν.
And concerning enthymemes, both real and apparent, has been discussed; next in order after what has been said is to speak of refutation.
ἔστιν δὲ λύειν ἢ ἀντισυλλογισάμενον ἢ ἔνστασιν ἐνεγκόντα.
It is possible to refute either by a counter-syllogism or by bringing an objection.
§2.25.2τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀντισυλλογίζεσθαι δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τόπων ἐνδέχεται ποιεῖν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδόξων, δοκοῦντα δὲ πολλὰ ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν·
Now, as for counter-syllogizing, it is clear that it can be done from the same topics; for syllogisms are formed from accepted opinions, and many opinions that seem contrary to one another exist.
§2.25.3αἱ δʼ ἐνστάσεις φέρονται καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς, τετραχῶς· ἢ γὰρ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἢ ἐκ τῶν κεκριμένων.
But objections are brought, just as in the *Topics*, in four ways: either from the argument itself, or from the similar, or from the contrary, or from what has been decided.
§2.25.4λέγω δὲ ἀφʼ ἑαυτοῦ μέν, οἷον εἰ περὶ ἔρωτος εἴη τὸ ἐνθύμημα ὡς σπουδαῖος, ἡ ἔνστασις διχῶς· ἢ γὰρ καθόλου εἰπόντα ὅτι πᾶσα ἔνδεια πονηρόν, ἢ κατὰ μέρος ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἐλέγετο Καύνιος ἔρως, εἰ μὴ ἦσαν καὶ πονηροὶ ἔρωτες. §2.25.5ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἔνστασις φέρεται, οἷον, εἰ τὸ ἐνθύμημα ἦν ὅτι ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ πάντας τοὺς φίλους εὖ ποιεῖ, ὅτι ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ ὁ μοχθηρὸς κακῶς. §2.25.6ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ὁμοίου, οἷον, εἰ ἦν τὸ ἐνθύμημα ὅτι οἱ κακῶς πεπονθότες ἀεὶ μισοῦσιν, ὅτι ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ οἱ εὖ πεπονθότες ἀεὶ φιλοῦσιν. §2.25.7αἱ δὲ κρίσεις αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων ἀνδρῶν, οἷον εἴ τις ἐνθύμημα εἶπεν ὅτι τοῖς μεθύουσι δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν, ἀγνοοῦντες γὰρ ἁμαρτάνουσιν, ἔνστασις ὅτι οὔκουν ὁ Πιττακὸς αἰνετός· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μείζους ζημίας ἐνομοθέτησεν ἐάν τις μεθύων ἁμαρτάνῃ. §2.25.8ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγεται ἐκ τεττάρων, τὰ δὲ τέτταρα ταῦτʼ ἐστίν, εἰκὸς παράδειγμα τεκμήριον σημεῖον, ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἢ ὄντων ἢ δοκούντων συνηγμένα ἐνθυμήματα ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων, τὰ δὲ διʼ ἐπαγωγῆς ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου, ἢ ἑνὸς ἢ πλειόνων, ὅταν λαβὼν τὸ καθόλου εἶτα συλλογίσηται τὰ κατὰ μέρος, διὰ παραδείγματος, τὰ δὲ διὰ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ἀεὶ ὄντος διὰ τεκμηρίου, τὰ δὲ διὰ τοῦ καθόλου τοῦ ἐν μέρει ὄντος, ἐάν τε ὂν ἐάν τε μή, διὰ σημείων, τὸ δὲ εἰκὸς οὐ τὸ ἀεὶ ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα μὲν τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων ἀεὶ ἔστι λύειν φέροντα ἔνστασιν,
I mean "from the argument itself," for instance, if the enthymeme should be about love, to the effect that it is good, the objection may be made in two ways: either by saying universally that "every lack is evil," or particularly that "there would not be the term 'Caunian love' if there were not also evil loves." An objection is brought from the contrary, for instance, if the enthymeme was that "the good man does good to all his friends," the objection is: "but neither does the wicked man do evil to all of his." From the similar, for instance, if the enthymeme was that "those who have been badly treated always hate," the objection is: "but neither do those who have been well treated always love." And judgments from well-known men, for instance, if someone said as an enthymeme that "one should show indulgence to those who are drunk, for they err in ignorance," the objection is: "then Pittacus is not to be praised; for otherwise he would not have legislated greater penalties if someone errs while drunk." Since enthymemes are said to be derived from four sources, and these four are probability, example, necessary sign, and sign, and those enthymemes drawn from what happens for the most part, or seems to do so, are from probabilities; those by induction from the similar, whether one or more, when one takes the universal and then syllogizes the particular, are by example; those through the necessary and ever-existing are through necessary signs; and those through the universal existing in the particular, whether it exists or not, are through signs; and since probability is not what is always but what is for the most part, it is clear that it is always possible to refute such enthymemes by bringing an objection.
§2.25.9ἡ δὲ λύσις φαινομένη ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀληθὴς ἀεί· οὐ γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ εἰκός λύει ὁ ἐνιστάμενος, ἀλλʼ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον·
But the refutation is apparent and not always true; for the objector does not refute by showing that it is not probable, but that it is not necessary.
§2.25.10διὸ καὶ ἀεὶ ἔστι πλεονεκτεῖν ἀπολογούμενον μᾶλλον ἢ κατηγοροῦντα διὰ τοῦτον τὸν παραλογισμόν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ μὲν κατηγορῶν διὰ εἰκότων ἀποδείκνυσιν, ἔστι δὲ οὐ ταὐτὸ λῦσαι ἢ ὅτι οὐκ εἰκὸς ἢ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀεὶ δʼ ἔχει ἔνστασιν τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ᾖ ἅμʼ ἀεὶ εἰκός, ἀεὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον), ὁ δὲ κριτὴς οἴεται, ἂν οὕτω λυθῇ, ἢ οὐκ εἰκὸς εἶναι ἢ οὐχ αὑτῷ κριτέον, παραλογιζόμενος, ὥσπερ ἐλέγομεν (οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀναγκαίων δεῖ αὐτὸν μόνον κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ γνώμῃ τῇ ἀρίστῃ κρίνειν), οὔκουν ἱκανὸν ἂν λύσῃ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ λύειν ὅτι οὐκ εἰκός.
Therefore, it is always possible to have an advantage in defending rather than in accusing because of this paralogism; for since the accuser proves by means of probabilities, and it is not the same thing to refute on the ground that it is not probable or that it is not necessary, and what is for the most part always admits of an objection (for otherwise, if it were not always probable, it would also always be necessary), the judge thinks, if the refutation is made in this way, either that it is not probable or that he must not judge, being deceived by the paralogism as we said (for he must not judge only from necessary things, but also from probabilities; for this is what it means to judge "according to the best opinion"); therefore, it is not sufficient if one refutes by showing that it is not necessary, but one must refute by showing that it is not probable.
§2.25.11τοῦτο δὲ συμβήσεται ἐὰν ᾖ ἡ ἔνστασις μᾶλλον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ.
And this will happen if the objection is more for the most part.
ἐνδέχεται δὲ εἶναι τοιαύτην διχῶς, ἢ τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ τοῖς πράγμασιν, κυριώτατα δὲ εἰ ἀμφοῖν· εἰ γὰρ τὰ πλείω καὶ πλεονάκις οὕτως, τοῦτʼ ἐστὶν εἰκὸς μᾶλλον.
Such an objection can be so in two ways, either in respect to time or in respect to facts, and most authoritatively if in both; for if things are more so and more often so, this is more probable.
§2.25.12λύεται δὲ καὶ τὰ σημεῖα καὶ τὰ διὰ σημείου ἐνθυμήματα εἰρημένα, κἂν ᾖ ὑπάρχοντα, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις· ὅτι γὰρ ἀσυλλόγιστόν ἐστιν πᾶν σημεῖον, δῆλον ἡμῖν ἐκ τῶν Ἀναλυτικῶν.
And signs and enthymemes stated through signs are also refuted, even if they are existing facts, as was said in the first books; for that every sign is unsyllogistic is clear to us from the *Analytics*.
§2.25.13πρὸς δὲ τὰ παραδειγματώδη ἡ αὐτὴ λύσις καὶ τὰ εἰκότα· ἐάν τε γὰρ ἔχωμεν ἕν τι οὐχ οὕτω, λέλυται, ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ καὶ τὰ πλείω ἢ πλεονάκις ἄλλως, ἐάν τε καὶ τὰ πλείω καὶ τὰ πλεονάκις οὕτω, μαχετέον ἢ ὅτι τὸ παρὸν οὐχ ὅμοιον ἢ οὐχ ὁμοίως, ἢ διαφοράν γέ τινα ἔχει.
Against examples, the same refutation applies as to probabilities; for if we have some one instance which is not so, it is refuted on the ground that it is not necessary, even if the majority of cases or more frequently they are otherwise; and if the majority and more frequently are so, we must fight either on the ground that the present case is not similar, or not in a similar way, or at least has some difference.
§2.25.14τὰ δὲ τεκμήρια καὶ τεκμηριώδη ἐνθυμήματα κατὰ μὲν τὸ ἀσυλλόγιστον οὐκ ἔσται λῦσαι (δῆλον δὲ καὶ τοῦθʼ ἡμῖν ἐκ τῶν Ἀναλυτικῶν), λείπεται δʼ ὡς οὐχ ὑπάρχει τὸ λεγόμενον δεικνύναι.
But necessary signs and enthymemes based on them cannot be refuted on the ground of being unsyllogistic (and this also is clear to us from the *Analytics*); there remains only to show that what is stated does not exist.
εἰ δὲ φανερὸν καὶ ὅτι ὑπάρχει καὶ ὅτι τεκμήριον, ἄλυτον ἤδη γίγνεται τοῦτο· πάντα γὰρ γίγνεται ἀπόδειξις ἤδη φανερά.
But if it is clear both that it exists and that it is a necessary sign, it becomes irrefutable; for everything then becomes a clear demonstration.