§2.24.1ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μὲν εἶναι συλλογισμόν, τὸν δὲ μὴ εἶναι μὲν φαίνεσθαι δέ, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐνθύμημα τὸ μὲν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι ἐνθύμημα φαίνεσθαι δέ, ἐπείπερ τὸ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός τις.
Since it is possible that one thing is a real syllogism and another is not, but only appears to be so, it must also be that one enthymeme is a real one, and another is not a real enthymeme but only appears to be, since the enthymeme is a species of syllogism.
§2.24.2τόποι δʼ εἰσὶ τῶν φαινομένων ἐνθυμημάτων εἷς μὲν ὁ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, καὶ τούτου ἓν μὲν μέρος, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς, τὸ μὴ συλλογισάμενον συμπερασματικῶς τὸ τελευταῖον εἰπεῖν,
οὐκ ἄρα τὸ καὶ τό, ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ καὶ τό
, ἐν τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι τὸ συνεστραμμένως καὶ ἀντικειμένως εἰπεῖν φαίνεται ἐνθύμημα (ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη λέξις χώρα ἐστὶν ἐνθυμήματος)· καὶ ἔοικε τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως.
Of the topoi of apparent enthymemes, one is that based on verbal expression. Of this, one part, as in Dialectic, is when one has not drawn a syllogism but states the final conclusion as if it were a deduction, saying "Therefore, not this and that, but this and that must be so." In enthymemes, stating things in a compressed and antithetical manner appears to be an enthymeme (for such expression is the domain of the enthymeme); and such a case seems to arise from the form of the expression.
ἔστι δὲ εἰς τὸ τῇ λέξει συλλογιστικῶς λέγειν χρήσιμον τὸ συλλογισμῶν πολλῶν κεφάλαια λέγειν, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν ἔσωσε, τοῖς δʼ ἑτέροις ἐτιμώρησε, τοὺς δʼ Ἕλληνας ἠλευθέρωσε· ἕκαστον μὲν γὰρ τούτων ἐξ ἄλλων ἀπεδείχθη, συντεθέντων δὲ φαίνεται καὶ ἐκ τούτων τι γίγνεσθαι.
To speak syllogistically through verbal expression, it is also useful to state the headings of many syllogisms, such as "Some he saved, others he avenged, and the Greeks he set free." For each of these was proved from other sources, but when they are put together, it appears that something further is produced from them as well.
ἓν δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν, τὸ φάναι σπουδαῖον εἶναι μῦν, ἀφʼ οὗ γʼ ἐστὶν ἡ τιμιωτάτη πασῶν τελετή· τὰ γὰρ μυστήρια πασῶν τιμιωτάτη τελετή.
Another part is based on homonymy, as in saying that a mouse (μῦς) is noble, since from it comes the most honored of all initiations; for the mysteries (μυστήρια) are the most honored initiation of all.
ἢ εἴ τις κύνα ἐγκωμιάζων τὸν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ συμπαραλαμβάνοι, ἢ τὸν Πᾶνα, ὅτι Πίνδαρος ἔφησεν
"
ὦ μάκαρ, ὅν τε μεγάλας θεοῦ κύνα παντοδαπὸν
καλέουσιν Ὀλύμπιοι,
"
ἢ ὅτι τὸ μηδένα εἶναι κύνʼ ἀτιμότατόν ἐστιν, ὥστε τὸ κύνα δῆλον ὅτι τίμιον.
Or if someone, in praising a dog, should include the one in the heavens (Sirius), or Pan, because Pindar said: "O blessed one, whom the Olympians call the all-shaped dog of the great goddess, "or because the non-existence of any dog is most dishonorable, so that a dog is clearly honorable.
καὶ τὸ κοινωνικὸν φάναι τὸν Ἑρμῆν εἶναι μάλιστα τῶν θεῶν· μόνος γὰρ καλεῖται κοινὸς Ἑρμῆς. καὶ τὸ τὸν λόγον εἶναι σπουδαιότατον, ὅτι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες οὐ χρημάτων ἀλλὰ λόγου εἰσὶν ἄξιοι· τὸ γὰρ λόγου ἄξιον οὐχ ἁπλῶς λέγεται.
And to say that Hermes is the most sharing of the gods; for he alone is called "common Hermes." And to say that speech/reason (λόγος) is most noble, because good men are worthy not of wealth but of λόγος (esteem); for "worthy of λόγος" is not said in a single sense.
§2.24.3ἄλλος τὸ τὸ διῃρημένον συντιθέντα λέγειν ἢ τὸ συγκείμενον διαιροῦντα·
Another topic is to speak by combining what is divided, or dividing what is combined.
ἐπεὶ γὰρ ταὐτὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐκ ὂν ταὐτὸ πολλάκις, ὁπότερον χρησιμώτερον, τοῦτο δεῖ ποιεῖν.
Since what is not the same often seems to be the same, one must do whichever is more useful.
ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο Εὐθυδήμου λόγος, οἷον τὸ εἰδέναι ὅτι τριήρης ἐμ Πειραεῖ ἐστίν· ἕκαστον γὰρ οἶδεν.
This is like the argument of Euthydemus, such as knowing that a trireme is in Piraeus; for one knows each (of the elements).
καὶ τὸν τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐπιστάμενον ὅτι τὸ ἔπος οἶδεν· τὸ γὰρ ἔπος τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν.
And that he who knows the letters knows the verse (ἔπος); for the verse is the same thing.
καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ δὶς τοσοῦτον νοσῶδες, μηδὲ τὸ ἓν φάναι ὑγιεινὸν εἶναι· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ τὰ δύο ἀγαθὰ ἓν κακόν ἐστιν.
And since twice as much is diseased, to say that even the single amount is not healthy; for it is absurd if two good things make one bad thing.
οὕτω μὲν οὖν ἐλεγκτικόν, ὧδε δὲ δεικτικόν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἓν ἀγαθὸν δύο κακά· ὅλος δὲ ὁ τόπος παραλογιστικός.
Used in this way, it is refutative, but in the following way it is demonstrative: "for one good thing does not make two bad things"; but the whole topic is fallacious.
πάλιν τὸ Πολυκράτους εἰς Θρασύβουλον, ὅτι τριάκοντα τυράννους κατέλυσε· συντίθησι γάρ.
Again, the saying of Polycrates against Thrasybulus, that he put down thirty tyrants; for he combines them.
ἢ τὸ ἐν τῷ Ὀρέστῃ τῷ Θεοδέκτου· ἐκ διαιρέσεως γάρ ἐστιν· "
δίκαιόν ἐστιν, ἥτις ἂν κτείνῃ πόσιν,
"
ἀποθνῄσκειν ταύτην, καὶ τῷ πατρί γε τιμωρεῖν τὸν υἱόν, οὐκοῦν καὶ ταῦτα ἃ πέπρακται·
Or the passage in the *Orestes* of Theodectes; for it is from division: "It is just, whoever kills her husband, "that she should die, and that the son should avenge his father; therefore, these things too which have been done are just.
συντεθέντα γὰρ ἴσως οὐκέτι δίκαιον.
For when combined, they are perhaps no longer just.
εἴη δʼ ἂν καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἔλλειψιν· ἀφαιρεῖ γὰρ τὸ ὑπὸ τίνος.
It might also be due to omission; for it leaves out "by whom" she is killed.
§2.24.4ἄλλος δὲ τόπος τὸ δεινώσει κατασκευάζειν ἢ ἀνασκευάζειν·
Another topic is to establish or refute by exaggeration (arousing indignation).
τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ὅταν, μὴ δείξας ὅτι ἐποίησεν μηδʼ ὅτι οὐκ ἐποίησεν, αὐξήσῃ τὸ πρᾶγμα· ποιεῖ γὰρ φαίνεσθαι ἢ ὡς οὐ πεποίηκεν, ὅταν ὁ τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχων αὔξῃ, ἢ ὡς πεποίηκεν, ὅταν ὁ κατηγορῶν αὐξῇ.
This is when, without having shown that the person did or did not do the deed, one amplifies the matter; for it makes it appear either as though he did not do it, when the accused amplifies, or as though he did it, when the accuser amplifies.
οὔκουν ἐστὶν ἐνθύμημα· παραλογίζεται γὰρ ὁ ἀκροατὴς ὅτι ἐποίησεν ἢ οὐκ ἐποίησεν, οὐ δεδειγμένου.
Thus it is not an enthymeme; for the listener fallaciously concludes that the person did or did not do it, when it has not been proved.
§2.24.5ἄλλος τὸ ἐκ σημείου· ἀσυλλόγιστον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο·
Another is from a sign; for this also is non-syllogistic.
οἷον εἴ τις λέγοι
ταῖς πόλεσι συμφέρουσιν οἱ ἐρῶντες· ὁ γὰρ Ἁρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος ἔρως κατέλυσε τὸν τύραννον Ἵππαρχον
, ἢ εἴ τις λέγοι ὅτι κλέπτης Διονύσιος· πονηρὸς γάρ· ἀσυλλόγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ πᾶς πονηρὸς κλέπτης, ἀλλὰ κλέπτης πᾶς πονηρός.
For instance, if someone should say: "Lovers are advantageous to cities; for the love of Harmodius and Aristogeiton overthrew the tyrant Hipparchus," or if someone should say that Dionysius is a thief, for he is a wicked man; for this indeed is non-syllogistic, since not every wicked man is a thief, although every thief is a wicked man.