§2.19.17πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, εἰ τὸ ἧττον γίγνεσθαι πεφυκὸς γέγονεν, γεγονὸς ἂν εἴη καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον.
For first, if that which is naturally less likely to happen has happened, that which is more [likely to happen] would also have happened.
καὶ εἰ τὸ ὕστερον εἰωθὸς γίγνεσθαι γέγονεν, καὶ τὸ πρότερον γέγονεν, οἷον εἰ ἐπιλέλησται, καὶ ἔμαθέ ποτε τοῦτο.
And if that which is accustomed to happen later has happened, the prior also has happened; for instance, if he has forgotten, he also once learned this.
§2.19.18καὶ εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ ἐβούλετο, πέπραχε· πάντες γάρ, ὅταν δυνάμενοι βουληθῶσι, πράττουσιν· ἐμποδὼν γὰρ οὐδέν.
And if he was able and wished [to do it], he has done it; for all, when they are able and wish, do [it]; for nothing is in their way.
§2.19.19ἔτι εἰ ἐβούλετο καὶ μηδὲν τῶν ἔξω ἐκώλυεν, καὶ εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ ὠργίζετο, καὶ εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ ἐπεθύμει· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ὧν ὀρέγονται, ἂν δύνωνται, ποιοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι διʼ ἀκρασίαν, οἱ δʼ ἐπιεικεῖς ὅτι τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν.
Furthermore, if he wished and nothing of external things prevented [him], and if he was able and was angry, and if he was able and desired [it]; for, for the most part, they do what they desire, if they are able, the base through lack of self-control, and the decent because they desire decent things.
§2.19.20καὶ εἰ ἔμελλε, καὶ ποιεῖν· εἰκὸς γὰρ τὸν μέλλοντα καὶ ποιῆσαι.
And if he was about [to do it], [it is likely] also that he did [it]; for it is likely that one who is about [to do it] also does [it].
§2.19.21καὶ εἰ γέγονεν ὅσα ἢ πέφυκε πρὸ ἐκείνου ἢ ἕνεκα ἐκείνου, οἷον εἰ ἤστραψε, καὶ ἐβρόντησεν, καὶ εἰ ἐπείρασε, καὶ ἔπραξεν.
And if all those things have happened which are naturally prior to that or for the sake of that, for instance, if it lightened, it also thundered, and if he attempted, he also did [it].
καὶ εἰ ὅσα ὕστερον πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι ἢ οὗ ἕνεκα γίγνεται γέγονε, καὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ τούτου ἕνεκα γέγονεν, οἷον εἰ ἐβρόντησε, καὶ ἤστραψεν, καὶ εἰ ἔπραξεν, ἐπείρασεν.
And if all those things have happened which naturally occur later or for the sake of which a thing occurs, the prior also and that which is for the sake of this has happened; for instance, if it thundered, it also lightened, and if he did [it], he attempted [it].
§2.19.22ἔστι δὲ τούτων ἁπάντων τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ δʼ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὕτως ἔχοντα.
And of all these things, some are of necessity so, and others for the most part.
περὶ δὲ τοῦ μὴ γεγονέναι φανερὸν ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖς εἰρημένοις.
And concerning a thing not having happened, it is clear that [the arguments] are from the contraries of those mentioned.
§2.19.23καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν δῆλον· τό τε γὰρ ἐν δυνάμει καὶ ἐν βουλήσει ὂν ἔσται, καὶ τὰ ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ ὀργῇ καὶ λογισμῷ μετὰ δυνάμεως ὄντα, ταῦτα καὶ ἐν ὁρμῇ τοῦ ποιεῖν ἢ μελλήσει ἔσται·
And concerning what will be, it is clear from the same arguments; for that which is in capacity and in wish will be, and those things which are in desire, anger, and calculation, when accompanied by capacity, will be; these are in the impulse to do [something] or in intention.
ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γίγνεται μᾶλλον τὰ μέλλοντα ἢ τὰ μὴ μέλλοντα.
For, for the most part, those things which are about to be happen rather than those which are not about to be.
§2.19.24καὶ εἰ προγέγονε ὅσα πρότερον πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι, οἷον εἰ συννεφεῖ, εἰκὸς ὗσαι.
And if all those things have happened prior which naturally occur first, for instance, if it is cloudy, it is likely to rain.
§2.19.25καὶ εἰ τὸ ἕνεκα τούτου γέγονε, καὶ τοῦτο εἰκὸς γενέσθαι, οἷον εἰ θεμέλιος, καὶ οἰκία.
And if that for the sake of which this occurs has happened, this also is likely to happen; for instance, if there is a foundation, there is also a house.
§2.19.26περὶ δὲ μεγέθους καὶ μικρότητος τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ μείζονός τε καὶ ἐλάττονος καὶ ὅλως μεγάλων καὶ μικρῶν ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ἡμῖν ἐστιν φανερόν.
And concerning the greatness and smallness of things, and the greater and the smaller, and in general great and small things, it is clear to us from what has been said before.
εἴρηται γὰρ ἐν τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς περί τε μεγέθους ἀγαθῶν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μείζονος ἁπλῶς καὶ ἐλάττονος, ὥστε ἐπεὶ καθʼ ἕκαστον τῶν λόγων τὸ προκείμενον τέλος ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, οἷον τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, φανερὸν ὅτι διʼ ἐκείνων ληπτέον τὰς αὐξήσεις πᾶσιν.
For in the deliberative speeches, it has been discussed about the greatness of goods and about the greater and smaller absolutely; so that, since in each of the speeches the proposed end is a good (for instance, the expedient, the beautiful, and the just), it is clear that all must obtain their exaggerations through those.
§2.19.27τὸ δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα ἔτι ζητεῖν περὶ μεγέθους ἁπλῶς καὶ ὑπεροχῆς κενολογεῖν ἐστιν· κυριώτερα γάρ ἐστιν πρὸς τὴν χρείαν τῶν καθόλου τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα τῶν πραγμάτων.
To seek further besides these concerning greatness absolutely and superiority is to speak in vain; for particular things are more sovereign for practical use than the universal.
περὶ μὲν οὖν δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτου, καὶ πότερον γέγονεν ἢ οὐ γέγονεν καὶ ἔσται ἢ οὐκ ἔσται, ἔτι δὲ περὶ μεγέθους καὶ μικρότητος τῶν πραγμάτων, εἰρήσθω ταῦτα.
Concerning then the possible and impossible, and whether it has happened or has not happened, and whether it will be or will not be, and further concerning the greatness and smallness of things, let this much be said.