§2.19.1πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτου λέγωμεν.
First, then, let us speak about the possible and the impossible.
ἂν δὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ᾖ δυνατὸν ἢ εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι δυνατόν, οἷον εἰ δυνατὸν ἄνθρωπον ὑγιασθῆναι, καὶ νοσῆσαι· ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων ᾗ ἐναντία.
If indeed the contrary is possible either to be or to come to be, the [other] contrary also would seem to be possible; for instance, if it is possible for a human being to be cured, it is also possible to fall ill; for the same capacity belongs to contraries, insofar as they are contraries.
καὶ εἰ τὸ ὅμοιον δυνατόν, καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον·
And if the like is possible, the like [is also possible].
§2.19.2καὶ εἰ τὸ χαλεπώτερον δυνατόν, καὶ τὸ ῥᾷον·
And if the harder is possible, the easier [is also possible].
§2.19.3καὶ εἰ τὸ σπουδαῖον καὶ καλὸν γενέσθαι δυνατόν, §2.19.4καὶ ὅλως δυνατὸν γενέσθαι· χαλεπώτερον γὰρ καλὴν οἰκίαν ἢ οἰκίαν εἶναι.
And if it is possible for the excellent and beautiful to come to be, and in general, it is possible [for it] to come to be; for [to be] a beautiful house is harder than [to be] a house.
§2.19.5καὶ οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ δύναται γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ τέλος· οὐδὲν γὰρ γίγνεται οὐδʼ ἄρχεται γίγνεσθαι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον τὸ σύμμετρον τὴν διάμετρον εἶναι οὔτʼ ἂν ἄρξαιτο γίγνεσθαι οὔτε γίγνεται.
And that of which the beginning can come to be, the end can also; for nothing of impossible things comes to be or begins to come to be, for instance, that the diagonal is commensurable [with the side] would neither begin to come to be nor does it come to be.
καὶ οὗ τὸ τέλος, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ δυνατή· ἅπαντα γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς γίγνεται.
And that of which the end [can come to be], the beginning is also possible; for all things come to be from a beginning.
§2.19.6καὶ εἰ τὸ ὕστερον τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἢ τῇ γενέσει δυνατὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ πρότερον, οἷον εἰ ἄνδρα γενέσθαι δυνατόν, καὶ παῖδα (πρότερον γὰρ ἐκεῖνο γίγνεται), καὶ εἰ παῖδα, καὶ ἄνδρα (καὶ ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἐκείνη).
And if that which is posterior in substance or in generation can come to be, the prior can also; for instance, if it is possible for a man to come to be, it is also possible for a child (for the latter comes to be prior); and if a child, a man also (for that is the beginning).
§2.19.7καὶ ὧν ἢ ἔρως ἢ ἐπιθυμία φύσει ἐστίν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀδυνάτων ἐρᾷ οὐδὲ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ.
And those things of which there is naturally either love or desire; for no one loves or desires impossible things, for the most part.
§2.19.8καὶ ὧν ἐπιστῆμαί εἰσι καὶ τέχναι, δυνατὸν ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι καὶ γίγνεσθαι.
And those things of which there are sciences and arts, these are possible both to be and to come to be.
§2.19.9καὶ ὅσων ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶν ἃ ἡμεῖς ἀναγκάσαιμεν ἂν ἢ πείσαιμεν· ταῦτα δʼ ἐστὶν ὧν κρείττους ἢ κύριοι ἢ φίλοι.
And all those things of which the beginning of generation is in those whom we could compel or persuade; and these are those over whom we are superior, or masters, or friends.
§2.19.10καὶ ὧν τὰ μέρη δυνατά, καὶ τὸ ὅλον, καὶ ὧν τὸ ὅλον δυνατόν, καὶ τὰ μέρη ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ· εἰ γὰρ πρόσχισμα καὶ κεφαλὶς καὶ χιτὼν δύναται γενέσθαι, καὶ ὑποδήματα δυνατὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ εἰ ὑποδήματα, καὶ πρόσχισμα καὶ κεφαλίς καὶ χιτών.
And those things of which the parts are possible, the whole also [is possible]; and those of which the whole is possible, the parts also are possible, for the most part; for if the front-split, the toe-piece, and the lining can come to be, shoes can also come to be; and if shoes, the front-split, the toe-piece, and the lining also.
§2.19.11καὶ εἰ τὸ γένος ὅλον τῶν δυνατῶν γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ εἶδος, καὶ εἰ τὸ εἶδος, καὶ τὸ γένος, οἷον εἰ πλοῖον γενέσθαι δυνατόν, καὶ τριήρη, καὶ εἰ τριήρη, καὶ πλοῖον.
And if the whole genus belongs to those things that are possible to come to be, the species also [is possible]; and if the species, the genus also; for instance, if a vessel can come to be, a trireme also [can]; and if a trireme, a vessel also.
§2.19.12καὶ εἰ θάτερον τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα πεφυκότων, καὶ θάτερον, οἷον εἰ διπλάσιον, καὶ ἥμισυ, καὶ εἰ ἥμισυ, διπλάσιον.
And if one of two things naturally related to each other [is possible], the other is also; for instance, if the double, the half also; and if the half, the double.
§2.19.13καὶ εἰ ἄνευ τέχνης καὶ παρασκευῆς δυνατὸν γίγνεσθαι, μᾶλλον διὰ τέχνης καὶ ἐπιμελείας δυνατόν, ὅθεν καὶ Ἀγάθωνι εἴρηται
"
καὶ μὴν τὰ μέν γε τῆς τέχνης πράσσειν, τὰ δὲ
ἡμῖν ἀνάγκῃ καὶ τύχῃ προσγίγνεται. " §2.19.14καὶ εἰ τοῖς χείροσι καὶ ἥττοσι καὶ ἀφρονεστέροις δυνατόν, καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἰσοκράτης ἔφη δεινὸν εἴναι εἰ ὁ μὲν Εὔθυνος ἔμαθεν, αὐτὸς δὲ μὴ δυνήσεται εὑρεῖν.
And if it is possible to come to be without art and preparation, it is even more possible through art and care; whence it was also said by Agathon: "And indeed, some things we must do by art, while others fall to our lot by necessity and chance." And if it is possible for the worse, inferior, and more foolish, it is even more so for their contraries; just as Isocrates also said that it would be a terrible thing if Euthynus learned it, but he himself should not be able to find it out.
§2.19.15περὶ δὲ ἀδυνάτου δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖς εἰρημένοις ὑπάρχει.
Concerning the impossible, it is clear that its arguments are derived from the contraries of those mentioned.
§2.19.16εἰ δὲ γέγονεν, ἐκ τῶνδε σκεπτέον.
And whether a thing has happened, must be examined from the following.