§1.9.32ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐκ τῶν πράξεων ὁ ἔπαινος, ἴδιον δὲ τοῦ σπουδαίου τὸ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, πειρατέον δεικνύναι πράττοντα κατὰ προαίρεσιν, χρήσιμον δὲ τὸ πολλάκις φαίνεσθαι πεπραχότα· διὸ καὶ τὰ συμπτώματα καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης ὡς ἐν προαιρέσει ληπτέον· ἂν γὰρ πολλὰ καὶ ὅμοια προφέρηται, σημεῖον ἀρετῆς εἶναι δόξει καὶ προαιρέσεως.
Since praise is from actions, and the characteristic of a virtuous person is to act according to deliberate choice, we must try to show that the subject is acting according to deliberate choice, and it is useful that they appear to have done so many times; therefore even accidental occurrences and those from chance must be taken as if done according to deliberate choice; for if many similar occurrences are brought forward, it will seem to be a sign of virtue and deliberate choice.
§1.9.33ἔστιν δʼ ἔπαινος λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος ἀρετῆς.
Praise is a statement displaying the greatness of virtue.
δεῖ οὖν τὰς πράξεις ἐπιδεικνύναι ὡς τοιαῦται.
We must therefore display actions as being of this kind.
τὸ δʼ ἐγκώμιον τῶν ἔργων ἐστίν (τὰ δὲ κύκλῳ εἰς πίστιν, οἷον εὐγένεια καὶ παιδεία· εἰκὸς γὰρ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ τὸν οὕτω τραφέντα τοιοῦτον εἶναι), διὸ καὶ ἐγκωμιάζομεν πράξαντας.
On the other hand, encomium is of achievements (and surrounding circumstances, such as noble birth and education, are for the sake of confirmation; for it is natural that good individuals come from good parents, and that one brought up in such a way should be of such a kind), which is why we praise in encomia those who have acted.
τὰ δʼ ἔργα σημεῖα τῆς ἕξεώς ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ ἐπαινοῖμεν ἂν καὶ μὴ πεπραγότα, εἰ πιστεύοιμεν εἶναι τοιοῦτον.
But achievements are signs of the disposition, since we would praise even one who has not acted, if we believed him to be of such a kind.
§1.9.34μακαρισμὸς δὲ καὶ εὐδαιμονισμὸς αὑτοῖς μὲν ταὐτά, τούτοις δʼ οὐ ταὐτά, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ἡ εὐδαιμονία τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ ὁ εὐδαιμονισμὸς περιέχει ταῦτα.
And felicitation and congratulation on fortune are identical to each other, but not identical to these, but just as happiness contains virtue, so felicitation contains these.
§1.9.35ἔχει δὲ κοινὸν εἶδος ὁ ἔπαινος καὶ αἱ συμβουλαί.
And praise and counsels have a common form.
ἃ γὰρ ἐν τῷ συμβουλεύειν ὑπόθοιο ἄν, ταῦτα μετατεθέντα τῇ λέξει ἐγκώμια γίγνεται.
For those things which you would suggest in counseling, these when changed in their expression become encomia.
§1.9.36ἐπεὶ οὖν ἔχομεν ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ποῖόν τινα εἶναι δεῖ, ταῦτα ὡς ὑποθήκας λέγοντας τῇ λέξει μετατιθέναι δεῖ καὶ στρέφειν, οἷον ὅτι οὐ δεῖ μέγα φρονεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς διὰ τύχην ἀλλὰ τοῖς διʼ αὑτόν. οὕτω μὲν οὖν λεχθὲν ὑποθήκην δύναται, ὡδὶ δʼ ἔπαινον
μέγα φρονῶν οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς διὰ τύχην ὑπάρχουσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς διʼ αὑτόν
. ὥστε ὅταν ἐπαινεῖν βούλῃ, ὅρα τί ἂν ὑπόθοιο· καὶ ὅταν ὑποθέσθαι, ὅρα τί ἂν ἐπαινέσειας.
Since, then, we have what we ought to do and what kind of person we ought to be, we must, while speaking of these things as suggestions, change and turn them in expression; for instance, that "one ought not to be proud of things due to chance, but of those due to oneself." Expressed in this way it has the force of a suggestion, but in this way that of praise: "being proud not of things belonging to him due to chance, but of those due to himself." So whenever you wish to praise, look at what suggestion you would make; and when you wish to suggest, look at what you would praise.
§1.9.37ἡ δὲ λέξις ἔσται ἀντικειμένη ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὅταν τὸ μὲν κωλῦον τὸ δὲ μὴ κωλῦον μετατεθῇ.
And the expression will of necessity be opposite, whenever the one forbidding and the other not forbidding are transposed.
§1.9.38χρηστέον δὲ καὶ τῶν αὐξητικῶν πολλοῖς, οἷον εἰ μόνος ἢ πρῶτος ἢ μετʼ ὀλίγων ἢ καὶ μάλιστα πεποίηκεν· ἅπαντα γὰρ ταῦτα καλά.
And we must use many of the means of amplification, for instance, if he has done something alone, or first, or with few, or most of all; for all these things are honorable.
καὶ τῷ ἐκ τῶν χρόνων καὶ τῶν καιρῶν· τούτῳ δʼ εἰ παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον.
And also those from times and opportunities; and in this case, if it is contrary to what is expected.
καὶ εἰ πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸ κατώρθωκεν· μέγα γὰρ καὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης ἀλλὰ διʼ αὑτοῦ ἂν δόξειεν.
And if he has succeeded in the same thing many times; for it would seem to be great and not from chance, but due to himself.
καὶ εἰ τὰ προτρέποντα καὶ τιμῶντα διὰ τοῦτον εὕρηται καὶ κατεσκευάσθη, καὶ εἰς τοῦτον πρῶτον ἐγκώμιον ἐποιήθη, οἷον εἰς Ἱππόλοχον, καὶ εἰς Ἁρμόδιον καὶ Ἀριστογείτονα τὸ ἐν ἀγορᾷ σταθῆναι· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων.
And if incentives and honors have been devised and established because of him, and if the first encomium was made for him, as for Hippolochus, and the setting up of a statue in the agora for Harmodius and Aristogeiton; and similarly also in the case of the opposites.
κἂν μὴ καθʼ αὑτὸν εὐπορῇς, πρὸς ἄλλους ἀντιπαραβάλλειν, ὅπερ Ἰσοκράτης ἐποίει διὰ τὴν ἀσυνήθειαν τοῦ δικολογεῖν.
And if you are not well provided on his own account, you must compare him with others, which Isocrates used to do because of his unfamiliarity with speaking in court.
δεῖ δὲ πρὸς ἐνδόξους συγκρίνειν· αὐξητικὸν γὰρ καὶ καλόν, εἰ σπουδαίων βελτίων.
And we must compare him with famous people; for it is amplifying and honorable if he is better than virtuous people.
§1.9.39πίπτει δʼ εὐλόγως ἡ αὔξησις εἰς τοὺς ἐπαίνους· ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γάρ ἐστιν, ἡ δʼ ὑπεροχὴ τῶν καλῶν· διὸ κἂν μὴ πρὸς τοὺς ἐνδόξους, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους δεῖ παραβάλλειν, ἐπείπερ ἡ ὑπεροχὴ δοκεῖ μηνύειν ἀρετήν.
And amplification falls naturally into praises; for praise is concerned with superiority, and superiority is among honorable things; therefore, even if not against famous people, we must compare him with others, since superiority seems to indicate virtue.
§1.9.40ὅλως δὲ τῶν κοινῶν εἰδῶν ἅπασι τοῖς λόγοις ἡ μὲν αὔξησις ἐπιτηδειοτάτη τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς (τὰς γὰρ πράξεις ὁμολογουμένας λαμβάνουσιν, ὥστε λοιπὸν μέγεθος περιθεῖναι καὶ κάλλος)· τὰ δὲ παραδείγματα τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς (ἐκ γὰρ τῶν προγεγονότων τὰ μέλλοντα καταμαντευόμενοι κρίνομεν)· τὰ δʼ ἐνθυμήματα τοῖς δικανικοῖς (αἰτίαν γὰρ καὶ ἀπόδειξιν μάλιστα δέχεται τὸ γεγονὸς διὰ τὸ ἀσαφές).
And in general, of the forms common to all speeches, amplification is most suitable for epideictic speeches (for they take the actions as agreed upon, so that it remains to invest them with greatness and beauty); and examples are for deliberative speeches (for we judge by predicting the future from past events); and enthymemes are for judicial speeches (for what has happened, because of its obscurity, especially admits of cause and proof).
§1.9.41ἐκ τίνων μὲν οὖν οἱ ἔπαινοι καὶ οἱ ψόγοι λέγονται σχεδὸν πάντες, καὶ πρὸς ποῖα δεῖ βλέποντας ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ψέγειν, καὶ ἐκ τίνων τὰ ἐγκώμια γίγνεται καὶ τὰ ὀνείδη, ταῦτʼ ἐστίν· ἐχομένων γὰρ τούτων τὰ ἐναντία τούτοις φανερά· ὁ γὰρ ψόγος ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν.
From what sources, then, praises and blames are spoken, almost all of them, and looking toward what things we ought to praise and blame, and from what sources encomia and reproaches arise, these are they; for if these are grasped, their opposites are obvious; for blame is from the opposites.