§1.9.18καὶ ὅσα τεθνεῶτι ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν μᾶλλον ἢ ζῶντι· τὸ γὰρ αὑτοῦ ἕνεκα μᾶλλον ἔχει τὰ ζῶντι.
And all those things which can belong to a person after death rather than during life; for things belonging to the living have more of the character of being for one's own sake.
§1.9.19καὶ ὅσα ἔργα τῶν ἄλλων ἕνεκα· ἧττον γὰρ αὑτοῦ.
And all works done for the sake of others; for they are less for oneself.
καὶ ὅσαι εὐπραγίαι περὶ ἄλλους ἀλλὰ μὴ περὶ αὑτόν, καὶ αἱ περὶ τοὺς εὖ ποιήσαντας· δίκαιον γάρ.
And all good deeds done toward others but not toward oneself, and those toward ones who have done good to us; for this is just.
καὶ τὰ εὐεργετήματα· οὐ γὰρ εἰς αὑτόν.
And benefits conferred; for they are not directed toward oneself.
§1.9.20καὶ τὰ ἐναντία ἢ ἐφʼ οἷς αἰσχύνονται· τὰ γὰρ αἰσχρὰ αἰσχύνονται καὶ λέγοντες καὶ ποιοῦντες καὶ μέλλοντες, ὥσπερ καὶ Σαπφὼ πεποίηκεν, εἰπόντος τοῦ Ἀλκαίου
"
θέλω τι εἰπῆν, ἀλλά με κωλύει
αἰδώς,
"
"
αἱ δʼ ἦχες ἐσθλῶν ἵμερον ἢ καλῶν
καὶ μή τι εἰπῆν γλῶσσʼ ἐκύκα κακόν
αἰδώς κέν σε οὐκ εἶχεν ὄμματʼ,
ἀλλʼ ἔλεγες περὶ τῶ δικαίω. " §1.9.21καὶ περὶ ὧν ἀγωνιῶσι μὴ φοβούμενοι· περὶ γὰρ τῶν πρὸς δόξαν φερόντων ἀγαθῶν τοῦτο πάσχουσιν.
And the opposites of those things of which people are ashamed; for people are ashamed of shameful things both in speaking, doing, and intending them, just as Sappho has represented, when Alcaeus said "I wish to say something, but shame prevents me," she replied, "If you had a desire for good or noble things, and your tongue were not brewing some evil to say, shame would not have possessed your eyes, but you would have spoken about what is just." And those things about which people strive anxiously without being afraid; for they feel this way about goods that lead to good reputation.
§1.9.22καὶ αἱ τῶν φύσει σπουδαιοτέρων ἀρεταὶ καλλίους καὶ τὰ ἔργα, οἷον ἀνδρὸς ἢ γυναικός.
And the virtues and works of those who are by nature more excellent are more honorable, for instance, those of a man rather than of a woman.
§1.9.23καὶ αἱ ἀπολαυστικαὶ ἄλλοις μᾶλλον ἢ αὐτοῖς· διὸ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καλόν.
And those virtues which are enjoyable to others rather than to themselves; hence what is just and justice are honorable.
§1.9.24καὶ τὸ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ καταλλάττεσθαι· τό τε γὰρ ἀνταποδιδόναι δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον καλόν, καὶ ἀνδρείου τὸ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι.
And punishing enemies and not being reconciled; for to return like for like is just, and what is just is honorable, and not to be defeated is the mark of a courageous person.
§1.9.25καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμὴ τῶν καλῶν· αἱρετά τε γὰρ ἄκαρπα ὄντα, καὶ ὑπεροχὴν ἀρετῆς δηλοῖ.
And victory and honor are among honorable things; for they are desirable even though fruitless, and they manifest an eminence of virtue.
καὶ τὰ μνημονευτά, καὶ τὰ μᾶλλον μᾶλλον.
And those things that are memorable, and the more so, the more they are memorable.
καὶ ἃ μὴ ζῶντι ἕπεται, καὶ οἷς τιμὴ ἀκολουθεῖ, καὶ τὰ περιττά, καὶ τὰ μόνῳ ὑπάρχοντα, καλλίω· εὐμνημονευτότερα γάρ.
And those things that do not accompany a person during life, and those which honor follows, and extraordinary things, and things belonging to one person alone, are more honorable; for they are more easily remembered.
§1.9.26καὶ κτήματα ἄκαρπα· ἐλευθεριώτερα γάρ.
And possessions that yield no profit; for they are more becoming to a free person.
καὶ τὰ παρʼ ἑκάστοις δὲ ἴδια καλά, καὶ ὅσα σημεῖά ἐστιν τῶν παρʼ ἑκάστοις ἐπαινουμένων, οἷον ἐν Λακεδαίμονι κομᾶν καλόν· ἐλευθέρου γὰρ σημεῖον· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν κομῶντα ῥᾴδιον οὐδὲν ποιεῖν ἔργον θητικόν.
And those things that are peculiar to each people are honorable, and whatever are signs of what is praised among each; for instance, in Lacedaemon it is honorable to wear long hair, for it is a sign of a free person, since it is not easy for one with long hair to perform any menial labor.
§1.9.27καὶ τὸ μηδεμίαν ἐργάζεσθαι βάναυσον τέχνην· ἐλευθέρου γὰρ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλον ζῆν.
And not practicing any vulgar craft; for it is the mark of a free person not to live for the sake of another.
§1.9.28ληπτέον δὲ καὶ τὰ σύνεγγυς τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν ὡς ταὐτὰ ὄντα καὶ πρὸς ἔπαινον καὶ πρὸς ψόγον, οἷον τὸν εὐλαβῆ ψυχρὸν καὶ ἐπίβουλον καὶ τὸν ἠλίθιον χρηστὸν ἢ τὸν ἀνάλγητον πρᾶον,
And we must grasp those qualities which are close to the existing ones as being identical, both for the purpose of praise and of blame; for instance, taking the cautious person to be cold and designing, and the simpleton to be good-natured, or the insensitive person to be gentle.
§1.9.29καὶ ἕκαστον δʼ ἐκ τῶν παρακολουθούντων ἀεὶ κατὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, οἷον τὸν ὀργίλον καὶ τὸν μανικὸν ἁπλοῦν καὶ τὸν αὐθάδη μεγαλοπρεπῆ καὶ σεμνόν, καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς ὡς ἐν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ὄντας, οἷον τὸν θρασὺν ἀνδρεῖον καὶ τὸν ἄσωτον ἐλευθέριον· δόξει τε γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς, καὶ ἅμα παραλογιστικὸν τῆς αἰτίας. εἰ γὰρ οὗ μὴ ἀνάγκη κινδυνευτικός, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἂν δόξειεν ὅπου καλόν, καὶ εἰ προετικὸς τοῖς τυχοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς φίλοις· ὑπερβολὴ γὰρ ἀρετῆς τὸ πάντας εὖ ποιεῖν.
And we must always interpret each quality from its accompanying characteristics in the best light; for instance, the quick-tempered and passionate person as "simple," and the self-willed person as "magnificent and dignified," and those in extremes as being in the virtues; for instance, the rash person as "courageous," and the prodigal as "liberal." For it will seem so to the many, and at the same time a fallacious inference can be drawn from the cause; for if someone is ready to run risks where there is no need, he would seem much more ready to do so where it is honorable, and if he is spendthrift to any chance comers, he would seem to be even more so to his friends; for it is an excess of virtue to do good to everyone.
§1.9.30σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ παρʼ οἷς ὁ ἔπαινος· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν, οὐ χαλεπὸν Ἀθηναίους ἐν Ἀθηναίοις ἐπαινεῖν.
And we must also consider before whom the praise is spoken; for as Socrates used to say, it is not difficult to praise Athenians among Athenians.
δεῖ δὲ τὸ παρʼ ἑκάστοις τίμιον ὂν λέγειν ὡς ὑπάρχει, οἷον ἐν Σκύθαις ἢ Λάκωσιν ἢ φιλοσόφοις.
We must speak of what is valued among each people as if it actually belongs to them, for instance, among Scythians or Lacedaemonians or philosophers.
καὶ ὅλως δὲ τὸ τίμιον ἄγειν εἰς τὸ καλόν, ἐπείπερ γε δοκεῖ γειτνιᾶν.
And in general, we must refer what is valued to the honorable, since they seem to be closely related.
§1.9.31καὶ ὅσα κατὰ τὸ προσῆκον, οἷον εἰ ἄξια τῶν προγόνων καὶ τῶν προϋπηργμένων· εὐδαιμονικὸν γὰρ καὶ καλὸν καὶ τὸ προσεπικτᾶσθαι τιμήν.
And all those things that are in accordance with what is fitting, for instance, if they are worthy of one's ancestors and of what has already been achieved; for to acquire additional honor is conducive to happiness and is honorable.
καὶ εἰ παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ κάλλιον, οἷον εἰ εὐτυχῶν μὲν μέτριος, ἀτυχῶν δὲ μεγαλόψυχος, ἢ μείζων γιγνόμενος βελτίων καὶ καταλλακτικώτερος.
And also if, contrary to what is fitting, it is in the direction of what is better and more honorable; for instance, if one is moderate in good fortune, but magnanimous in bad fortune, or if one becomes better and more ready to be reconciled as he grows greater.
τοιοῦτον δὲ τὸ τοῦ Ἰφικράτους,
"ἐξ οἵων εἰς οἷα"
, καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ὀλυμπιονίκου
"
πρόσθε μὲν ἀμφʼ ὤμοισιν ἔχων τραχεῖαν,
"
καὶ τὸ τοῦ Σιμωνίδου
"
ἣ πατρός τε καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀδελφῶν τʼ οὖσα τυράννων. "
Such is the saying of Iphicrates, "from what origins to what heights," and that of the Olympic victor, "formerly carrying on my shoulders a rough [basket]," and that of Simonides, "she who was the daughter, wife, and sister of tyrants."