§1.10.1περὶ δὲ κατηγορίας καὶ ἀπολογίας, ἐκ πόσων καὶ ποίων ποιεῖσθαι δεῖ τοὺς συλλογισμούς, ἐχόμενον ἂν εἴη λέγειν.
On the other hand, about accusation and defense, from how many and what kind of sources one ought to make their deductions, would be the next thing to speak of.
§1.10.2δεῖ δὴ λαβεῖν τρία, ἓν μὲν τίνων καὶ πόσων ἕνεκα ἀδικοῦσι, δεύτερον δὲ πῶς αὐτοὶ διακείμενοι, τρίτον δὲ τοὺς ποίους καὶ πῶς ἔχοντας.
We must then grasp three things: first, for the sake of what and how many things people commit injustice; second, how they themselves are disposed; third, what kind of people they wrong and in what state these people are.
§1.10.3διορισάμενοι οὖν τὸ ἀδικεῖν λέγωμεν ἑξῆς.
Having defined committing injustice, then, let us speak next.
ἔστω δὴ τὸ ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἑκόντα παρὰ τὸν νόμον.
Let committing injustice, then, be defined as harming voluntarily contrary to the law.
νόμος δʼ ἐστὶν ὁ μὲν ἴδιος ὁ δὲ κοινός·
Law is on the one hand particular, on the other hand common.
λέγω δὲ ἴδιον μὲν καθʼ ὃν γεγραμμένον πολιτεύονται, κοινὸν δὲ ὅσα ἄγραφα παρὰ πᾶσιν ὁμολογεῖσθαι δοκεῖ.
By particular I mean that written law according to which people govern themselves in a city, and by common I mean those unwritten rules which seem to be agreed upon among all people.
ἑκόντες δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὅσα εἰδότες καὶ μὴ ἀναγκαζόμενοι.
And they act voluntarily in doing all those things which they do knowingly and not under compulsion.
ὅσα μὲν οὖν εἰδότες, οὐ πάντα προαιρούμενοι, ὅσα δὲ προαιρούμενοι, εἰδότες ἅπαντα· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὃ προαιρεῖται ἀγνοεῖ.
Thus, while they do not choose to do everything that they do knowingly, they know everything that they do by choice; for no one is ignorant of what they choose.
§1.10.4διʼ ἃ δὲ προαιροῦνται βλάπτειν καὶ φαῦλα ποιεῖν παρὰ τὸν νόμον κακία ἐστὶν καὶ ἀκρασία·
The reasons why they choose to harm and do base things contrary to the law are vice and lack of self-control.
ἐὰν γάρ τινες ἔχωσιν μοχθηρίαν ἢ μίαν ἢ πλείους, περὶ τοῦτο ὃ μοχθηροὶ τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες καὶ ἄδικοί εἰσιν·
For if some people possess wickedness either single or multiple, they are unjust with respect to that very thing in which they happen to be wicked.
οἷον ὁ μὲν ἀνελεύθερος περὶ χρήματα, ὁ δʼ ἀκόλαστος περὶ τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἡδονάς, ὁ δὲ μαλακὸς περὶ τὰ ῥάθυμα, ὁ δὲ δειλὸς περὶ τοὺς κινδύνους (τοὺς γὰρ συγκινδυνεύοντας ἐγκαταλιμπάνουσι διὰ τὸν φόβον), ὁ δὲ φιλότιμος διὰ τιμήν, ὁ δʼ ὀξύθυμος διʼ ὀργήν, ὁ δὲ φιλόνικος διὰ νίκην, ὁ δὲ πικρὸς διὰ τιμωρίαν, ὁ δʼ ἄφρων διὰ τὸ ἀπατᾶσθαι περὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἄδικον, ὁ δʼ ἀναίσχυντος διʼ ὀλιγωρίαν δόξης·
For instance, the illiberal person with respect to money, the licentious person with respect to the pleasures of the body, the soft person with respect to things of ease, the cowardly person with respect to dangers (for they desert those sharing the danger because of fear), the ambitious person because of honor, the quick-tempered person because of anger, the lover of victory because of victory, the bitter person because of revenge, the foolish person because of being deceived about what is just and unjust, and the shameless person because of disregard for reputation.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὑποκειμένων.
And similarly, each of the others with respect to each of the underlying subject matters.
§1.10.5ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων δῆλον, τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς εἰρημένων, τὰ δʼ ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰ πάθη ῥηθησομένων·
But about these matters, it is clear, partly from what has been said about the virtues, and partly from what will be said about the emotions.
λοιπὸν δʼ εἰπεῖν τίνος ἕνεκα καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες ἀδικοῦσι καὶ τίνας.
It remains to speak of for the sake of what, and in what state of mind people commit injustice, and against whom.
§1.10.6πρῶτον μὲν οὖν διελώμεθα τίνων ὀρεγόμενοι καὶ ποῖα φεύγοντες ἐγχειροῦσιν ἀδικεῖν· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς τῷ μὲν κατηγοροῦντι πόσα καὶ ποῖα τούτων ὑπάρχει τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ σκεπτέον, ὧν ἐφιέμενοι πάντες τοὺς πλησίον ἀδικοῦσι, τῷ δὲ ἀπολογουμένῳ ποῖα καὶ πόσα τούτων οὐχ ὑπάρχει.
First, then, let us distinguish what things people desire and what things they avoid when they undertake to commit injustice; for it is clear that the accuser must examine how many and what kind of these motives—which all people desire when they wrong their neighbors—belong to the opponent, and the defender must examine what kind and how many of these do not belong to him.
§1.10.7πάντες δὴ πάντα πράττουσι τὰ μὲν οὐ διʼ αὑτοὺς τὰ δὲ διʼ αὑτούς.
Indeed, all people do all things either not because of themselves or because of themselves.
τῶν μὲν οὖν μὴ διʼ αὑτοὺς τὰ μὲν διὰ τύχην πράττουσι τὰ δʼ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τῶν δʼ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ μὲν βίᾳ τὰ δὲ φύσει, ὥστε πάντα ὅσα μὴ διʼ αὑτοὺς πράττουσι, τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τύχης τὰ δὲ φύσει τὰ δὲ βίᾳ.
Of those things done not because of themselves, they do some by chance and others of necessity; and of those done of necessity, some they do by force and others by nature; so that all things which they do not because of themselves are either from chance, or by nature, or by force.
ὅσα δὲ διʼ αὑτούς, καὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι, τὰ μὲν διʼ ἔθος τὰ δὲ διʼ ὄρεξιν, τὰ μὲν διὰ λογιστικὴν ὄρεξιν τὰ δὲ διʼ ἄλογον·
But of those things done because of themselves, and of which they are themselves the causes, some are due to habit and others to desire, and of those due to desire, some are due to rational desire and others to irrational desire.
§1.10.8ἔστιν δʼ ἡ μὲν βούλησις ἀγαθοῦ ὄρεξις (οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται ἀλλʼ ἢ ὅταν οἰηθῇ εἶναι ἀγαθόν), ἄλογοι δʼ ὀρέξεις ὀργὴ καὶ ἐπιθυμία·
Wish is a desire for the good (for no one wishes for anything except when they think it is good), while irrational desires are anger and appetite.
ὥστε πάντα ὅσα πράττουσιν ἀνάγκη πράττειν διʼ αἰτίας ἑπτά, διὰ τύχην, διὰ φύσιν, διὰ βίαν, διʼ ἔθος, διὰ λογισμόν, διὰ θυμόν, διʼ ἐπιθυμίαν.
Consequently, all things that people do must of necessity be done due to seven causes: chance, nature, force, habit, reason, anger, appetite.
§1.10.9τὸ δὲ προσδιαιρεῖσθαι καθʼ ἡλικίαν ἢ ἕξεις ἢ ἀλλʼ ἄττα τὰ πραττόμενα περίεργον·
To make further classifications of actions according to age or habits or other such things is superfluous.
εἰ γὰρ συμβέβηκεν τοῖς νέοις ὀργίλοις εἶναι ἢ ἐπιθυμητικοῖς, οὐ διὰ τὴν νεότητα πράττουσι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀλλὰ διʼ ὀργὴν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν.
For if it happens to young people to be quick-tempered or subject to appetite, they do not do such things because of their youth, but because of anger and appetite.
οὐδὲ διὰ πλοῦτον καὶ πενίαν, ἀλλὰ συμβέβηκε τοῖς μὲν πένησι διὰ τὴν ἔνδειαν ἐπιθυμεῖν χρημάτων, τοῖς δὲ πλουσίοις διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἐπιθυμεῖν τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων ἡδονῶν· ἀλλὰ πράξουσι καὶ οὗτοι οὐ διὰ πλοῦτον καὶ πενίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν.
Nor is it because of wealth and poverty, but it happens that the poor desire money because of their need, and the rich desire non-essential pleasures because of their resources; but these too will act, not because of wealth and poverty, but because of appetite.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ οἱ ἄδικοι, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ λεγόμενοι κατὰ τὰς ἕξεις πράττειν, διὰ ταῦτα πράξουσιν· ἢ γὰρ διὰ λογισμὸν ἢ διὰ πάθος· ἀλλʼ οἱ μὲν διὰ ἤθη καὶ πάθη χρηστά, οἱ δὲ διὰ τἀναντία.
Similarly, both the just and the unjust, and the others who are said to act according to their habits, will act because of these same causes, namely, either because of reason or because of emotion; though the former do so because of good characters and emotions, and the latter because of the opposites.