§1.15.26αἱ δὲ βάσανοι μαρτυρίαι τινές εἰσιν, ἔχειν δὲ δοκοῦσι τὸ πιστόν, ὅτι ἀνάγκη τις πρόσεστιν.
Tortures are also a kind of testimony, and they are thought to have trustworthiness because a certain necessity is attached to them.
οὔκουν χαλεπὸν οὐδὲ περὶ τούτων εἰπεῖν τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα, ἐξ ὧν ἐάν τε ὑπάρχωσιν οἰκεῖαι αὔξειν ἔστιν, ὅτι ἀληθεῖς μόναι τῶν μαρτυριῶν εἰσιν αὗται, ἐάν τε ὑπεναντίαι ὦσι καὶ μετὰ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος, διαλύοι ἄν τις τἀληθῆ λέγων καθʼ ὅλου τοῦ γένους τῶν βασάνων·
Therefore, it is not difficult to speak of the available arguments concerning them, by which, if they are in our favor, we can amplify them, on the ground that these are the only true testimonies; but if they are contrary and on the side of the opponent, one can dismiss them by speaking the truth against the whole class of tortures.
οὐδὲν γὰρ ἧττον ἀναγκαζόμενοι τὰ ψευδῆ λέγουσιν ἢ τἀληθῆ, καὶ διακαρτεροῦντες μὴ λέγειν τἀληθῆ, καὶ ῥᾳδίως καταψευδόμενοι ὡς παυσόμενοι θᾶττον.
For those who are forced speak falsehoods no less than the truth, both enduring to the end so as not to speak the truth, and easily lying in order to cease more quickly.
δεῖ δὲ ἔχειν ἐπαναφέρειν ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα γεγενημένα παραδείγματα ἃ ἴσασιν οἱ κρίνοντες.
And one must be able to refer to such examples that have actually happened, which the judges know.
δεῖ δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀληθεῖς αἱ βάσανοι· πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ παχύφρονες καὶ λιθόδερμοι καὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὄντες δυνατοὶ γενναίως ἐγκαρτεροῦσι ταῖς ἀνάγκαις, οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ εὐλαβεῖς πρὸ τοῦ τὰς ἀνάγκας ἰδεῖν αὐτῶν καταθαρροῦσιν, ὥστε οὐδὲν ἔστι πιστὸν ἐν βασάνοις.
And one must say that tortures are not true; for many thick-witted and thick-skinned men, being strong in their souls, nobly endure necessities, while the cowardly and cautious, before they even see the necessities, lose their courage, so that there is nothing trustworthy in tortures.
§1.15.27περὶ δʼ ὅρκων τετραχῶς ἔστι διελεῖν· ἢ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ λαμβάνει, ἢ οὐδέτερον, ἢ τὸ μὲν τὸ δʼ οὔ, καὶ τούτων ἢ δίδωσιν μὲν οὐ λαμβάνει δέ, ἢ λαμβάνει μὲν δίδωσιν δὲ οὔ.
Concerning oaths, one can divide them in four ways; for one either offers and accepts, or neither, or one but not the other, and of these, either one offers but does not accept, or accepts but does not offer.
ἔτι ἄλλως παρὰ ταῦτα, εἰ ὀμώμοσται οὗτος ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ ἢ ὑπʼ ἐκείνου.
Besides these, in another way, if an oath has already been sworn by oneself or by the opponent.
§1.15.28οὐ δίδωσιν μὲν οὖν, ὅτι ῥᾳδίως ἐπιορκοῦσιν, καὶ ὅτι ὁ μὲν ὀμόσας οὐκ ἀποδίδωσιν, τοὺς δὲ μὴ ὀμόσαντος οἴεται καταδικάσειν, καὶ οὗτος ὁ κίνδυνος κρείττων, ὁ ἐν τοῖς δικασταῖς· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πιστεύει τῷ δʼ οὔ.
Now, one does not offer, because people easily perjure themselves, and because the opponent, having sworn, does not return (the money), whereas one thinks the judges will condemn the opponent if one does not swear; and this danger, the one in the hands of the judges, is better, for one trusts them but not the opponent.
§1.15.29οὐ λαμβάνει δʼ, ὅτι ἀντὶ χρημάτων ὅρκος, καὶ ὅτι εἰ ἦν φαῦλος, κατωμόσατο ἄν· κρεῖττον γὰρ ἂν ἦν ἕνεκά του φαῦλον εἶναι ἢ μηδενός· ὀμόσας μὲν οὖν ἕξει, μὴ ὀμόσας δʼ οὔ· οὕτως δὲ διʼ ἀρετὴν ἂν εἴη, ἀλλʼ οὐ διʼ ἐπιορκίαν, τὸ μή.
And one does not accept, because the oath is in place of money, and because if one were wicked, one would have sworn; for it would be better to be wicked for something rather than for nothing; for by swearing one will have it, but by not swearing one will not; and thus the refusal would be due to virtue, and not due to perjury.
καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ξενοφάνους ἁρμόττει, ὅτι
οὐκ ἴση πρόκλησις αὕτη τἀσεβεῖ πρὸς εὐσεβῆ
, ἀλλʼ ὁμοία καὶ εἰ ἰσχυρὸς ἀσθενῆ πατάξαι ἢ πληγῆναι προκαλέσαιτο.
And the saying of Xenophanes is fitting, that this is not an equal challenge from an impious man to a pious one, but similar to if a strong man should challenge a weak one to strike or to be struck.
§1.15.30εἰ δὲ λαμβάνει, ὅτι πιστεύει αὑτῷ, ἐκείνῳ δʼ οὔ.
But if one accepts, it is because one trusts oneself, but not the opponent.
καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ξενοφάνους μεταστρέψαντα φατέον οὕτως ἴσον εἶναι ἂν ὁ μὲν ἀσεβὴς διδῷ, ὁ δʼ εὐσεβὴς ὀμνύῃ· δεινόν τε τὸ μὴ θέλειν αὐτόν, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐκείνους ἀξιοῖ ὀμόσαντας δικάζειν.
And reversing the saying of Xenophanes, one must say that it is equal if the impious man offers and the pious man swears; and that it is a terrible thing for the opponent not to be willing himself to swear concerning those things which he demands that the judges decide under oath.
§1.15.31εἰ δὲ δίδωσιν, ὅτι εὐσεβὲς τὸ θέλειν τοῖς θεοῖς ἐπιτρέπειν, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν δεῖ αὐτὸν ἄλλων δικαστῶν δεῖσθαι (αὐτοῖς γὰρ δίδωσι κρίσιν), §1.15.32καὶ ὅτι ἄτοπον τὸ μὴ θέλειν ὀμνύναι περὶ ὧν ἄλλους ἀξιοῦσιν ὀμνύναι.
And if one offers, it is because it is a pious thing to be willing to entrust matters to the gods, and because there is no need for him to require other judges, since he gives the decision to the opponents themselves, and because it is absurd not to be willing to swear concerning those things about which they demand others to swear.
ἐπεὶ δὲ καθʼ ἕκαστον δῆλον ὅπως λεκτέον, καὶ συνδυαζομένων πῶς λεκτέον δῆλον, οἷον εἰ αὐτὸς μὲν θέλει λαμβάνειν διδόναι δὲ μή, καὶ εἰ δίδωσι μὲν λαμβάνειν δὲ μὴ θέλει, καὶ εἰ λαμβάνειν καὶ διδόναι θέλει εἴτε μηδέτερον·
And since it is clear how one must speak in each case, it is also clear how one must speak when they are combined, for instance, if one wants to accept but not to offer, and if one offers but does not want to accept, and if one wants both to accept and to offer, or neither.
ἐκ γὰρ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀνάγκη συγκεῖσθαι, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς λόγους συγκεῖσθαι ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.
For these must be composed of the things already mentioned, so that the arguments are also composed of them.
ἐὰν δὲ ᾖ γεγενημένος ὑφʼ αὑτοῦ καὶ ἐναντίος, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιορκία· ἑκούσιον γὰρ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ δʼ ἐπιορκεῖν ἀδικεῖν ἐστι, τὰ δὲ βίᾳ καὶ ἀπάτῃ ἀκούσια.
And if an oath has been made by oneself and is contrary, one must say that it is not perjury; for to do injustice is voluntary, and to commit perjury is to do injustice, but things done by force and deceit are involuntary.
§1.15.33ἐνταῦθα οὖν συνακτέον καὶ τὸ ἐπιορκεῖν, ὅτι ἔστι τὸ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἀλλʼ οὐ τῷ στόματι.
Therefore, in this case, one must conclude that to commit perjury is in the mind, but not in the mouth.
ἐὰν δὲ τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ ᾖ ὑπεναντίος καὶ ὀμωμοσμένος, ὅτι πάντα ἀναιρεῖ μὴ ἐμμένων οἷς ὤμοσεν· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς νόμοις χρῶνται ὀμόσαντες.
But if the oath is contrary to the opponent and has been sworn, one must say that he destroys everything by not abiding by what he swore; for it is for this reason also that they use the laws under oath.
καὶ
ὑμᾶς μὲν ἀξιοῦσιν ἐμμένειν οἷς ὀμόσαντες δικάζετε, αὐτοὶ δὲ οὐκ ἐμμένουσιν
. καὶ ὅσα ἂν ἄλλα αὔξων τις εἴπειεν.
And "they demand that you abide by what you swore when you judge, but they themselves do not abide." And whatever other things one might say to amplify.
περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀτέχνων πίστεων εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα.
Concerning the inartificial proofs, let so much have been said.