§1.15.15πρόσφατοι δὲ ὅσοι γνώριμοί τι κεκρίκασιν· χρήσιμοι γὰρ αἱ τούτων κρίσεις τοῖς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, οἷον Εὔβουλος ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἐχρήσατο κατὰ Χάρητος ὃ Πλάτων εἶπε πρὸς Ἀρχίβιον, ὅτι ἐπιδέδωκεν ἐν τῇ πόλει τὸ ὁμολογεῖνπονηροὺς εἶναι.
Recent witnesses are those among the famous who have given some judgment; for their judgments are useful to those disputing about the same matters, as Eubulus in the courts used against Chares what Plato said to Archibius, that it has increased in the city to confess that they are wicked.
§1.15.16καὶ οἱ μετέχοντες τοῦ κινδύνου, ἂν δόξωσι ψεύδεσθαι.
And those who share in the danger, if they are thought to have lied.
οἱ μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτοι τούτων μόνον μάρτυρές εἰσιν, εἰ γέγονεν ἢ μή, εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή, περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποῖον οὐ μάρτυρες, οἷον εἰ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, εἰ συμφέρον ἢ ἀσύμφορον·
Such people, then, are witnesses only of these things, whether it happened or not, whether it is or not, but about the quality they are not witnesses, for instance, whether it is just or unjust, useful or disadvantageous.
§1.15.17οἱ δʼ ἄπωθεν περὶ τούτων πιστότεροι, πιστότατοι δʼ οἱ παλαιοί· ἀδιάφθοροι γάρ.
But those from a distance are more trustworthy about these, and most trustworthy are the ancient ones, for they are incorruptible.
πιστώματα δὲ περὶ μαρτυριῶν μάρτυρας μὲν μὴ ἔχοντι, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων δεῖ κρίνειν καὶ τοῦτʼ ἐστὶ τὸ
γνώμῃ τῇ ἀρίστῃ
, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξαπατῆσαι τὰ εἰκότα ἐπὶ ἀργυρίῳ, καὶ ὅτι οὐχ ἁλίσκεται τὰ εἰκότα ψευδομαρτυριῶν· ἔχοντι δὲ πρὸς μὴ ἔχοντα, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπόδικα τὰ εἰκότα, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει μαρτυριῶν, εἰ ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἱκανὸν ἦν θεωρῆσαι.
Arguments concerning testimonies: for one who does not have witnesses, that one must judge from probabilities and this is the "according to the best judgment", and that it is not possible to deceive probabilities with money, and that probabilities are not convicted of false witness; but for one who has witnesses against one who does not, that probabilities are not subject to trial, and that there would have been no need for testimonies if it were sufficient to contemplate from arguments.
§1.15.18εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μαρτυρίαι αἱ μὲν περὶ αὑτοῦ αἱ δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος, καὶ αἱ μὲν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος αἱ δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἤθους, ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδέποτʼ ἔστιν ἀπορῆσαι μαρτυρίας χρησίμης· εἰ μὴ γὰρ κατὰ τοῦ πράγματος ἢ αὑτῷ ὁμολογουμένης ἢ τῷ ἀμφισβητοῦντι ἐναντίας, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἤθους ἢ αὑτοῦ εἰς ἐπιείκειαν ἢ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος εἰς φαυλότητα.
And testimonies are either about oneself or about the opponent, and either about the matter or about the character, so that it is clear that it is never possible to be at a loss for a useful testimony; for if there is none about the matter, either agreeing with oneself or contrary to the opponent, yet there is about the character, either of oneself for equity or of the opponent for badness.
§1.15.19τὰ δʼ ἄλλα περὶ μάρτυρος, ἢ φίλου ἢ ἐχθροῦ ἢ μεταξύ, ἢ εὐδοκιμοῦντος ἢ ἀδοξοῦντος ἢ μεταξύ, καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τοιαῦται διαφοραί, ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τόπων λεκτέον ἐξ οἵων περ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγομεν.
And other things about a witness, whether friend or enemy or in between, or well-reputed or disreputable or in between, and all other such differences, must be spoken from the same topics from which we also speak enthymemes.
§1.15.20περὶ δὲ τῶν συνθηκῶν τοσαύτη τῶν λόγων χρῆσίς ἐστιν ὅσον αὔξειν ἢ καθαιρεῖν, ἢ πιστὰς ποιεῖν ἢ ἀπίστους— ἐὰν μὲν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχωσι, πιστὰς καὶ κυρίας, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος τοὐναντίον.
Concerning contracts, the use of arguments is as much as to amplify or to minimize, to make them trustworthy or untrustworthy— if they are in our favor, trustworthy and valid, but in the case of the opponent the opposite.
§1.15.21πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πιστὰς ἢ ἀπίστους κατασκευάζειν οὐδὲν διαφέρει τῆς περὶ τοὺς μάρτυρας πραγματείας· ὁποῖοι γὰρ ἄν τινες ὦσιν οἱ ἐπιγεγραμμένοι ἢ φυλάττοντες, τοιούτως αἱ συνθῆκαι πισταί εἰσιν.
For constructing them as trustworthy or untrustworthy, it makes no difference from the treatment concerning witnesses; for of whatever kind the signatories or the guardians are, of such kind the contracts are trustworthy.
ὁμολογουμένης δʼ εἶναι τῆς συνθήκης, οἰκείας μὲν οὔσης αὐξητέον· ἡ γὰρ συνθήκη νόμος ἐστὶν ἴδιος καὶ κατὰ μέρος, καὶ αἱ μὲν συνθῆκαι οὐ ποιοῦσι τὸν νόμον κύριον, οἱ δὲ νόμοι τὰς κατὰ νόμους συνθήκας, καὶ ὅλως αὐτὸς ὁ νόμος συνθήκη τίς ἐστιν, ὥστε ὅστις ἀπιστεῖ ἢ ἀναιρεῖ συνθήκην τοὺς νόμους ἀναιρεῖ.
But when the contract is agreed to exist, if it is our own, it must be amplified; for a contract is a private and particular law, and contracts do not make the law valid, but the laws make the contracts according to law valid, and in general the law itself is a certain contract, so that whoever distrusts or abolishes a contract abolishes the laws.
§1.15.22ἔτι δὲ πράττεται τὰ πολλὰ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων καὶ τὰ ἑκούσια κατὰ συνθήκας, ὥστε ἀκύρων γιγνομένων ἀναιρεῖται ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρεία τῶν ἀνθρώπων.
Moreover, most of the transactions and voluntary exchanges are carried out according to contracts, so that if they become invalid, the mutual use of men is abolished.
καὶ τἆλλα δὲ ὅσα ἁρμόττει ἐπιπολῆς ἰδεῖν ἔστιν.
And other things that are fitting can be seen on the surface.
§1.15.23ἂν δʼ ἐναντία ᾖ, καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων, πρῶτον μέν, ἅπερ ἄν τις πρὸς νόμον ἐναντίον μαχέσαιτο, ταῦτα ἁρμόττει· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ τοῖς μὲν νόμοις, ἂν μὴ ὀρθῶς κείμενοι ὦσιν ἀλλʼ ἐξαμάρτωσιν οἱ τιθέμενοι, οὐκ οἰόμεθα δεῖν πείθεσθαι, ταῖς δὲ συνθήκαις ἀναγκαῖον.
But if the contract is contrary and with the opponents, first, whatever one would fight against a contrary law, these are fitting; for it is absurd if we do not think we must obey the laws, if they are not rightly enacted but those who made them erred, but it is necessary to obey contracts.
§1.15.24εἶτα ὅτι τοῦ δικαίου ἐστὶ βραβευτὴς ὁ δικαστής· οὔκουν τοῦτο σκεπτέον, ἀλλʼ ὡς δικαιότερον·
Next, that the judge is the arbitrator of justice; therefore he must not consider this, but what is more just.
§1.15.25καὶ τὸ μὲν δίκαιον οὐκ ἔστιν μεταστρέψαι οὔτʼ ἀπάτῃ οὔτʼ ἀνάγκῃ (πεφυκὸς γάρ ἐστιν), συνθῆκαι δὲ γίγνονται καὶ ἐξαπατηθέντων καὶ ἀναγκασθέντων.
And what is just cannot be changed either by deceit or by necessity (for it is by nature), but contracts are made both by those deceived and those forced.
πρὸς δὲ τούτοις σκοπεῖν εἰ ἐναντία ἐστί τινι τῶν γεγραμμένων νόμων ἢ τῶν κοινῶν, καὶ τῶν γεγραμμένων ἢ τοῖς οἰκείοις ἢ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις, ἔπειτα εἰ ἢ ἄλλαις συνθήκαις ὑστέραις ἢ προτέραις· ἢ γὰρ αἱ ὕστεραι κύριαι, ἄκυροι δʼ αἱ πρότεραι, ἢ αἱ πρότεραι ὀρθαί, αἱ δʼ ὕστεραι ἠπατήκασιν, ὁποτέρως ἂν ᾖ χρήσιμον.
Besides these, we must look if it is contrary to any of the written laws or the common ones, and of the written ones either to our own or to foreign ones, and then if to other contracts, either subsequent or prior; for either the subsequent ones are valid and the prior ones invalid, or the prior ones are right and the subsequent ones have deceived, whichever way is useful.
ἔτι δὲ τὸ συμφέρον ὁρᾶν, εἴ που ἐναντιοῦται τοῖς κριταῖς, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα εὐθεώρητα ὁμοίως.
Moreover, we must see the utility, whether it is contrary to the judges, and all other such things; for these also are easily observed in the same way.