§2.1.1ἐκ τίνων μὲν οὖν δεῖ καὶ προτρέπειν καὶ ἀποτρέπειν, καὶ ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ψέγειν, καὶ κατηγορεῖν καὶ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, καὶ ποῖαι δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις χρήσιμοι πρὸς τὰς τούτων πίστεις, ταῦτʼ ἐστίν· περὶ γὰρ τούτων καὶ ἐκ τούτων τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, ὡς περὶ ἕκαστον εἰπεῖν ἰδίᾳ τὸ γένος τῶν λόγων.
Now, the sources from which one must both exhort and dehort, and praise and blame, and accuse and defend, and what kinds of opinions and propositions are useful for their proofs, are these; for it is concerning these and from these that enthymemes are formed, so to speak, for each species of speech individually.
§2.1.2ἐπεὶ δὲ ἕνεκα κρίσεώς ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορική (καὶ γὰρ τὰς συμβουλὰς κρίνουσι καὶ ἡ δίκη κρίσις ἐστίν), ἀνάγκη μὴ μόνον πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὁρᾶν, ὅπως ἀποδεικτικὸς ἔσται καὶ πιστός, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὑτὸν ποιόν τινα καὶ τὸν κριτὴν κατασκευάζειν·
But since rhetoric is for the sake of judgment (for people judge counsels, and a lawsuit is a judgment), it is necessary not only to look to the speech, so that it will be demonstrative and trustworthy, but also to construct oneself as being of a certain character and to dispose the judge.
§2.1.3πολὺ γὰρ διαφέρει πρὸς πίστιν, μάλιστα μὲν ἐν ταῖς συμβουλαῖς, εἶτα καὶ ἐν ταῖς δίκαις, τό τε ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα καὶ τὸ πρὸς αὑτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν πως διακεῖσθαι αὐτόν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐὰν καὶ αὐτοὶ διακείμενοί πως τυγχάνωσιν.
For it makes a great difference for trust, most of all in counsels, and secondly also in lawsuits, that the speaker appears to be of a certain character and that they suppose him to be disposed in a certain way towards them, and in addition to these, if they themselves also happen to be disposed in a certain way.
§2.1.4τὸ μὲν οὖν ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα χρησιμώτερον εἰς τὰς συμβουλάς ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ διακεῖσθαί πως τὸν ἀκροατὴν εἰς τὰς δίκας· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ φαίνεται φιλοῦσι καὶ μισοῦσιν, οὐδʼ ὀργιζομένοις καὶ πράως ἔχουσιν, ἀλλʼ ἢ τὸ παράπαν ἕτερα ἢ κατὰ μέγεθος ἕτερα·
Now, appearing to be of a certain character is more useful in counsels, while the hearer being disposed in a certain way is more useful in lawsuits; for things do not appear the same to those who love and those who hate, nor to those who are angry and those who are mild, but either entirely different or different in magnitude.
τῷ μὲν γὰρ φιλοῦντι περὶ οὗ ποιεῖται τὴν κρίσιν ἢ οὐκ ἀδικεῖν ἢ μικρὰ δοκεῖ ἀδικεῖν, τῷ δὲ μισοῦντι τοὐναντίον· καὶ τῷ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦντι καὶ εὐέλπιδι ὄντι, ἐὰν ᾖ τὸ ἐσόμενον ἡδύ, καὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἔσεσθαι φαίνεται, τῷ δʼ ἀπαθεῖ ἢ καὶ δυσχεραίνοντι τοὐναντίον.
For to the one who loves, the person concerning whom he makes the judgment seems either not to do wrong or to do wrong only slightly, but to the one who hates, the opposite; and to the one who desires and is hopeful, if the future event is pleasant, it seems both that it will be and that it will be good, but to the indifferent or even displeased person, the opposite.
§2.1.5τοῦ μὲν οὖν αὐτοὺς εἶναι πιστοὺς τοὺς λέγοντας τρία ἐστὶ τὰ αἴτια· τοσαῦτα γάρ ἐστι διʼ ἃ πιστεύομεν ἔξω τῶν ἀποδείξεων.
Now, there are three causes of the speakers themselves being trustworthy; for there are so many things through which we believe, apart from demonstrations.
ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ εὔνοια· διαψεύδονται γὰρ περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν ἢ συμβουλεύουσιν ἢ διʼ ἅπαντα ταῦτα ἢ διὰ τούτων τι· §2.1.6ἢ γὰρ διʼ ἀφροσύνην οὐκ ὀρθῶς δοξάζουσιν, ἢ δοξάζοντες ὀρθῶς διὰ μοχθηρίαν οὐ τὰ δοκοῦντα λέγουσιν, ἢ φρόνιμοι μὲν καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς εἰσιν ἀλλʼ οὐκ εὖνοι, διόπερ ἐνδέχεται μὴ τὰ βέλτιστα συμβουλεύειν γιγνώσκοντας, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδέν.
And these are practical wisdom, virtue, and goodwill; for people make mistakes about what they say or advise either because of all of these or because of one of them; for either through foolishness they do not form opinions rightly, or, forming opinions rightly, through wickedness they do not say what they think, or they are wise and decent but not well-disposed, wherefore it is possible for them not to advise the best things though knowing them, and besides these there is nothing else.
ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸν ἅπαντα δοκοῦντα ταῦτʼ ἔχειν εἶναι τοῖς ἀκροωμένοις πιστόν.
It is necessary, therefore, that the one who seems to have all of these is trustworthy to the hearers.
§2.1.7ὅθεν μὲν οὖν φρόνιμοι καὶ σπουδαῖοι φανεῖεν ἄν, ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς διῃρημένων ληπτέον· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν κἂν ἕτερόν τις κἂν ἑαυτὸν κατασκευάσειε τοιοῦτον· περὶ δʼ εὐνοίας καὶ φιλίας ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη λεκτέον.
The sources from which they would appear wise and good must be taken from what has been divided concerning the virtues; for from the same sources one could construct both another and oneself as such; but concerning goodwill and friendship, we must speak in the section on the emotions.
§2.1.8ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη διʼ ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις οἷς ἕπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή, οἷον ὀργὴ ἔλεος φόβος καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐναντία.
And the emotions are those things through which, by undergoing a change, people differ in their judgments, and which are followed by pain and pleasure, such as anger, pity, fear, and all other such things, and their opposites.
§2.1.9δεῖ δὲ διαιρεῖν περὶ ἕκαστον εἰς τρία, λέγω δʼ οἷον περὶ ὀργῆς πῶς τε διακείμενοι ὀργίλοι εἰσί, καὶ τίσιν εἰώθασιν ὀργίζεσθαι, καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις· εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἓν ἢ τὰ δύο ἔχοιμεν τούτων, ἅπαντα δὲ μή, ἀδύνατον ἂν εἴη τὴν ὀργὴν ἐμποιεῖν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
And we must divide concerning each into three things, I mean, for example, concerning anger, in what state of mind people are angry, and with whom they are accustomed to be angry, and on what grounds; for if we should have one or two of these, but not all, it would be impossible to instill anger; and likewise for the others.
ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν προειρημένων διεγράψαμεν τὰς προτάσεις, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τούτων ποιήσωμεν καὶ διέλωμεν τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον.
Just as, therefore, we sketched the propositions for the previously mentioned topics, so let us do also concerning these and divide them in the manner described.