§1.11.1ὑποκείσθω δὴ ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησίν τινα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ κατάστασιν ἀθρόαν καὶ αἰσθητὴν εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν, λύπην δὲ τοὐναντίον.
Let it be assumed by us, then, that pleasure is a certain movement of the soul and a sudden and perceptible restoration to the pre-existing nature, and pain the opposite.
§1.11.2εἰ δʼ ἐστὶν ἡδονὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡδύ ἐστι τὸ ποιητικὸν τῆς εἰρημένης διαθέσεως, τὸ δὲ φθαρτικὸν ἢ τῆς ἐναντίας καταστάσεως ποιητικὸν λυπηρόν.
But if pleasure is such a thing, it is clear that also pleasant is that which is productive of the aforementioned disposition, and painful that which is destructive of it or productive of the opposite state.
§1.11.3ἀνάγκη οὖν ἡδὺ εἶναι τό τε εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἰέναι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ἀπειληφότα ᾖ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν τὰ κατʼ αὐτὴν γιγνόμενα, καὶ τὰ ἔθη (καὶ γὰρ τὸ εἰθισμένον ὥσπερ πεφυκὸς ἤδη γίγνεται· ὅμοιον γάρ τι τὸ ἔθος τῇ φύσει· ἐγγὺς γὰρ καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τῷ ἀεί, ἔστιν δʼ ἡ μὲν φύσις τοῦ ἀεί, τὸ δὲ ἔθος τοῦ πολλάκις),
Therefore, it is necessary that pleasant is both the going into that which is according to nature for the most part, and especially when those things which happen according to nature have recovered their own nature, and also habits (for that which has been habituated already becomes as if it were natural; for habit is something similar to nature, since "many times" is also close to "always," and nature belongs to "always," while habit to "many times").
§1.11.4καὶ τὸ μὴ βίαιον (παρὰ φύσιν γὰρ ἡ βία, διὸ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον λυπηρόν, καὶ ὀρθῶς εἴρηται
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πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον πρᾶγμʼ ἀνιαρὸν ἔφυ),
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τὰς δʼ ἐπιμελείας καὶ τὰς σπουδὰς καὶ τὰς συντονίας λυπηράς·
And that which is not forced is also pleasant (for force is contrary to nature, wherefore that which is necessary is painful, and it is rightly said, "for every necessary thing is by nature painful").
ἀναγκαῖα γὰρ καὶ βίαια ταῦτα, ἐὰν μὴ ἐθισθῶσιν· οὕτω δὲ τὸ ἔθος ποιεῖ ἡδύ.
On the other hand, cares, serious efforts, and intense exertions are painful; for these are necessary and forced, unless they become habitual; but in this way habit makes them pleasant.
τὰ δʼ ἐναντία ἡδέα· διὸ αἱ ῥαθυμίαι καὶ αἱ ἀπονίαι καὶ αἱ ἀμέλειαι καὶ αἱ παιδιαὶ καὶ αἱ ἀναπαύσεις καὶ ὁ ὕπνος τῶν ἡδέων· οὐδὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἀνάγκην τούτων.
And their opposites are pleasant; wherefore ease, freedom from toil, negligence, play, relaxation, and sleep are among pleasant things; for none of these is under necessity.
§1.11.5καὶ οὗ ἂν ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἐνῇ, ἅπαν ἡδύ· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος ἐστὶν ὄρεξις.
And everything in which appetite is present is pleasant; for appetite is a desire for the pleasant.
τῶν δὲ ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν ἄλογοί εἰσιν αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγου.
Of appetites, some are irrational and others are with reason.
λέγω δὲ ἀλόγους ὅσας μὴ ἐκ τοῦ ὑπολαμβάνειν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν (εἰσὶν δὲ τοιαῦται ὅσαι εἶναι λέγονται φύσει, ὥσπερ αἱ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ὑπάρχουσαι, οἷον ἡ τροφῆς δίψα καὶ πεῖνα, καὶ καθʼ ἕκαστον εἶδος τροφῆς εἶδος ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ αἱ περὶ τὰ γευστὰ καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ ὅλως τὰ ἁπτά, καὶ περὶ ὀσμὴν καὶ ἀκοὴν καὶ ὄψιν), μετὰ λόγου δὲ ὅσας ἐκ τοῦ πεισθῆναι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ θεάσασθαι καὶ κτήσασθαι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἀκούσαντες καὶ πεισθέντες.
I call irrational those which people desire not from supposing anything (and such are those said to exist by nature, like those existing through the body, such as thirst and hunger for food, and a specific kind of appetite for each kind of food, and those concerning taste, sexual pleasures, and touch in general, and concerning smell, hearing, and sight); and with reason are all those which they desire from being persuaded; for they desire to see and acquire many things after having heard and been persuaded.
§1.11.6ἐπεὶ δʼ ἐστὶν τὸ ἥδεσθαι ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαί τινος πάθους, ἡ δὲ φαντασία ἐστὶν αἴσθησίς τις ἀσθενής, ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ μεμνημένῳ καὶ τῷ ἐλπίζοντι ἀκολουθοῖ ἂν φαντασία τις οὗ μέμνηται ἢ ἐλπίζει·
And since enjoying is in the perceiving of some affection, and imagination is a certain weak sensation, there would always follow in the person who remembers and the one who hopes some imagination of what he remembers or hopes.
εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡδοναὶ ἅμα μεμνημένοις καὶ ἐλπίζουσιν, ἐπείπερ καὶ αἴσθησις·
And if this is so, it is clear that pleasures also belong to those who remember and hope, since sensation is also present.
§1.11.7ὥστʼ ἀνάγκη πάντα τὰ ἡδέα ἢ ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι εἶναι παρόντα ἢ ἐν τῷ μεμνῆσθαι γεγενημένα ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐλπίζειν μέλλοντα· αἰσθάνονται μὲν γὰρ τὰ παρόντα, μέμνηνται δὲ τὰ γεγενημένα, ἐλπίζουσι δὲ τὰ μέλλοντα.
So it is necessary that all pleasant things are either present in perceiving, or past in remembering, or future in hoping; for they perceive present things, remember past things, and hope for future things.
§1.11.8τὰ μὲν οὖν μνημονευτὰ ἡδέα ἐστὶν οὐ μόνον ὅσα ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ὅτε παρῆν, ἡδέα ἦν, ἀλλʼ ἔνια καὶ οὐχ ἡδέα, ἂν ᾖ ὕστερον καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο· ὅθεν καὶ τοῦτʼ εἴρηται,
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ἀλλʼ ἡδύ τοι σωθέντα μεμνῆσθαι πόνων,
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καὶ
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μετὰ γάρ τε καὶ ἄλγεσι τέρπεται ἀνὴρ
μνημένος ὅστις πολλὰ πάθῃ καὶ πολλὰ ἐόργῃ· "
Now, things remembered are pleasant not only as many as were pleasant in the present when they were present, but also some that were not pleasant, if their subsequent aftermath is beautiful and good; whence also this has been said: "But sweet it is, when saved, to remember pains," and "For in pains too afterwards a man rejoices, when he remembers as many as he suffered and as many as he did."