§1.11.9τούτου δʼ αἴτιον ὅτι ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν κακόν·
The cause of this is that it is also pleasant not to have evil.
τὰ δʼ ἐν ἐλπίδι ὅσα παρόντα ἢ εὐφραίνειν ἢ ὠφελεῖν φαίνεται μεγάλα, καὶ ἄνευ λύπης ὠφελεῖν.
On the other hand, in the case of things in hope, as many as, when present, appear either to delight or to benefit greatly, and to benefit without pain, are pleasant.
ὅλως δὲ ὅσα παρόντα εὐφραίνει, καὶ ἐλπίζοντας καὶ μεμνημένους ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ· διὸ καὶ τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι ἡδύ, ὥσπερ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐποίησε περὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ
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ὅς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο
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(οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὀργίζεται τῷ ἀδυνάτῳ φαινομένῳ τιμωρίας τυχεῖν, τοῖς δὲ πολὺ ὑπὲρ αὑτοὺς τῇ δυνάμει ἢ οὐκ ὀργίζονται ἢ ἧττον)· §1.11.10καὶ ἐν ταῖς πλείσταις ἐπιθυμίαις ἀκολουθεῖ τις ἡδονή· ἢ γὰρ μεμνημένοι ὡς ἔτυχον ἢ ἐλπίζοντες ὡς τεύξονται χαίρουσίν τινα ἡδονήν, οἷον οἵ τʼ ἐν τοῖς πυρετοῖς ἐχόμενοι ταῖς δίψαις καὶ μεμνημένοι ὡς ἔπιον καὶ ἐλπίζοντες πιεῖσθαι χαίρουσιν, §1.11.11καὶ οἱ ἐρῶντες καὶ διαλεγόμενοι καὶ γράφοντες καὶ ποιοῦντές τι ἀεὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐρωμένου χαίρουσιν· ἐν ἅπασι γὰρ τοῖς τοιούτοις μεμνημένοι οἷον αἰσθάνεσθαι οἴονται τοῦ ἐρωμένου.
And in general, as many things as delight when present, also delight those who hope and remember, for the most part; wherefore also to be angry is pleasant, just as Homer also wrote concerning anger: "which is much sweeter than trickling honey "(for no one grows angry with one who appears incapable of being punished, and with those who are far above them in power they either do not grow angry or less so); and in most appetites a certain pleasure follows; for either remembering how they obtained the object or hoping that they will obtain it, they enjoy a certain pleasure, for instance, those who are held by thirsts in fevers, both remembering how they drank and hoping to drink, rejoice; and those who love also rejoice when conversing and writing and always doing something concerning the beloved; for in all such activities, by remembering, they think they as it were perceive the beloved.
καὶ ἀρχὴ δὲ τοῦ ἔρωτος αὕτη γίγνεται πᾶσιν, ὅταν μὴ μόνον παρόντος χαίρωσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπόντος μεμνημένοις λύπη προσγένηται τῷ μὴ παρεῖναι, καὶ ἐν πένθεσι καὶ θρήνοις ὡσαύτως ἐπιγίγνεταί τις ἡδονή· §1.11.12ἡ μὲν γὰρ λύπη ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ἡδονὴ δʼ ἐν τῷ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ ὁρᾶν πως ἐκεῖνον καὶ ἃ ἔπραττεν καὶ οἷος ἦν· διὸ καὶ τοῦτʼ εἰκότως εἴρηται
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ὧς φάτο, τοῖσι δὲ πᾶσιν ὑφʼ ἵμερον ὦρσε γόοιο.
And this becomes the beginning of love for all, when they not only rejoice when he is present, but also when he is absent, to them remembering, pain is added because of his not being present; and in mournings and lamentations likewise a certain pleasure arises; for the pain is over his not being there, but the pleasure is in remembering and in a way seeing him and what he used to do and what sort of person he was; wherefore also this has been said with good reason: "Thus he spoke, and in them all he aroused the desire for lamentation.
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, §1.11.13καὶ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι ἡδύ.
"And to take revenge is pleasant.
οὗ γὰρ τὸ μὴ τυγχάνειν λυπηρόν, τὸ τυγχάνειν ἡδύ· οἱ δʼ ὀργιζόμενοι λυποῦνται ἀνυπερβλήτως μὴ τιμωρούμενοι, ἐλπίζοντες δὲ χαίρουσιν.
For that of which the failure to obtain is painful, the obtaining is pleasant; and those who are angry are excessively pained when they are not taking revenge, but in hoping for it they rejoice.
§1.11.14καὶ τὸ νικᾶν ἡδύ, οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλονίκοις ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν· φαντασία γὰρ ὑπεροχῆς γίγνεται, οὗ πάντες ἔχουσιν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ ἠρέμα ἢ μάλα.
And to win is pleasant, not only to those who love victory, but to all; for there arises an imagination of superiority, of which all have an appetite, either slightly or greatly.
§1.11.15ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ νικᾶν ἡδύ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς παιδιὰς ἡδείας εἶναι τὰς μαχητικὰς καὶ τὰς ἐριστικάς (πολλάκις γὰρ ἐν ταύταισγίγνεται τὸ νικᾶν), καὶ ἀστραγαλίσεις καὶ σφαιρίσεις καὶ κυβείας καὶ πεττείας.
And since to win is pleasant, it is necessary that also those games which are competitive and disputatious are pleasant, (for in these winning often occurs), and knuckle-bones, ball-games, dice, and board games.
καὶ περὶ τὰς ἐσπουδασμένας δὲ παιδιὰς ὁμοίως· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἡδεῖαι γίγνονται ἄν τις ᾖ συνήθης, αἱ δʼ εὐθὺς ἡδεῖαι, οἷον κυνηγία καὶ πᾶσα θηρευτική· ὅπου γὰρ ἅμιλλα, ἐνταῦθα καὶ νίκη ἔστιν· διὸ καὶ ἡ δικανικὴ καὶ ἡ ἐριστικὴ ἡδέα τοῖς εἰθισμένοις καὶ δυναμένοις.
And concerning serious sports likewise; for some become pleasant if one is accustomed to them, while others are pleasant immediately, such as hunting and every kind of chase; for where there is contest, there also is victory; wherefore also forensic and disputatious skills are pleasant to those who are accustomed to them and capable.
§1.11.16καὶ τιμὴ καὶ εὐδοξία τῶν ἡδίστων διὰ τὸ γίγνεσθαι φαντασίαν ἑκάστῳ ὅτι τοιοῦτος οἷος ὁ σπουδαῖος, καὶ μᾶλλον ὅταν φῶσιν οὓς οἴεται ἀληθεύειν.
And honor and good reputation are among the most pleasant things, because there arises an imagination in each person that he is such a one as the worthy man, and all the more when they say so whom he thinks to speak the truth.
τοιοῦτοι δʼ οἱ ἐγγὺς μᾶλλον τῶν πόρρω, καὶ οἱ συνήθεις καὶ οἱ πολῖται τῶν ἄπωθεν, καὶ οἱ ὄντες τῶν μελλόντων, καὶ οἱ φρόνιμοι ἀφρόνων, καὶ πολλοὶ ὀλίγων· μᾶλλον γὰρ εἰκὸς ἀληθεύειν τοὺς εἰρημένους τῶν ἐναντίων· ἐπεὶ ὧν τις πολὺ καταφρονεῖ, ὥσπερ παιδίων ἢ θηρίων, οὐδὲν μέλει τῆς τούτων τιμῆς ἢ τῆς δόξης αὐτῆς γε τῆς δόξης χάριν, ἀλλʼ εἴπερ, διʼ ἄλλο τι.
And such are those who are near rather than far, and intimates and fellow citizens rather than those at a distance, and those existing now rather than those to come, and the wise rather than the foolish, and the many rather than the few; for it is more likely that those mentioned speak the truth than their opposites; since of those whom one greatly despises, such as children or beasts, one cares nothing for their honor or their opinion for the sake of the opinion itself, but if at all, for some other reason.
§1.11.17καὶ ὁ φίλος τῶν ἡδέων· τό τε γὰρ φιλεῖν ἡδύ (οὐδεὶς γὰρ φίλοινος μὴ χαίρων οἴνῳ) καὶ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ἡδύ· φαντασία γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῦ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, οὗ πάντες ἐπιθυμοῦσιν οἱ αἰσθανόμενοι· τὸ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι ἀγαπᾶσθαί ἐστιν αὐτὸν διʼ αὑτόν.
And a friend is among pleasant things; for both to love is pleasant (for no one is a lover of wine who does not rejoice in wine) and to be loved is pleasant; for here too there is an imagination of his possessing the being good, which all who perceive desire; and to be loved is to be cherished himself for his own sake.
§1.11.18καὶ τὸ θαυμάζεσθαι ἡδὺ διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ τιμᾶσθαι.
And to be admired is pleasant for the same reason as to be honored.
καὶ τὸ κολακεύεσθαι καὶ ὁ κόλαξ ἡδέα· φαινόμενος γὰρ θαυμαστὴς καὶ φαινόμενος φίλος ὁ κόλαξ ἐστίν.
And to be flattered and the flatterer are pleasant; for the flatterer is an apparent admirer and an apparent friend.