§1.10.10συμβαίνει μέντοι ταῖς μὲν τοιαύταις ἕξεσι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκολουθεῖν, ταῖς δὲ τοιαῖσδε τὰ τοιάδε·
Yet it happens that to such habits such things follow, and to those of a different kind different things.
εὐθὺς γὰρ ἴσως τῷ μὲν σώφρονι διὰ τὸ σώφρονα εἶναι δόξαι τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι χρησταὶ ἐπακολουθοῦσι περὶ τῶν ἡδέων, τῷ δʼ ἀκολάστῳ αἱ ἐναντίαι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων·
For instance, immediately perhaps, to the temperate person, because of being temperate, good opinions and desires follow concerning pleasant things, and to the licentious person the opposite concerning these same things.
§1.10.11διὸ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας διαιρέσεις ἐατέον, σκεπτέον δὲ ποῖα ποίοις εἴωθεν ἕπεσθαι·
Therefore, such classifications must be left aside, but one must examine what kinds of things are accustomed to follow what.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ λευκὸς ἢ μέλας, ἢ μέγας ἢ μικρός, οὐδὲν τέτακται τῶν τοιούτων ἀκολουθεῖν, εἰ δὲ νέος ἢ πρεσβύτης, ἢ δίκαιος ἢ ἄδικος, ἤδη διαφέρει· καὶ ὅλως ὅσα τῶν συμβαινόντων ποιεῖ διαφέρειν τὰ ἤθη τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οἷον πλουτεῖν δοκῶν ἑαυτῷ ἢ πένεσθαι διοίσει τι, καὶ εὐτυχεῖν ἢ ἀτυχεῖν.
For if someone is white or black, or tall or short, no such thing is ordained to follow, but if one is young or old, or just or unjust, it already makes a difference; and in general, all those accompanying circumstances which make the characters of people differ, for instance, whether one thinks oneself rich or poor will make some difference, as will being fortunate or unfortunate.
ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν, νῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν εἴπωμεν πρῶτον.
These matters we shall discuss later, but now let us speak first of the remaining things.
§1.10.12ἔστι δʼ ἀπὸ τύχης μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα γιγνόμενα, ὅσων ἥ τε αἰτία ἀόριστος καὶ μὴ ἕνεκά του γίγνεται καὶ μήτε ἀεὶ μήτε ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ μήτε τεταγμένως (δῆλον δʼ ἐκ τοῦ ὁρισμοῦ τῆς τύχης περὶ τούτων), §1.10.13φύσει δὲ ὅσων ἥ τʼ αἰτία ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ τεταγμένη· ἢ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ὡσαύτως ἀποβαίνει.
Now, those things happen by chance whose cause is indefinite, and which do not happen for the sake of something, and which happen neither always, nor for the most part, nor in an ordained manner (this is clear from the definition of chance concerning these things); and those by nature whose cause is in themselves and ordained; for they turn out in the same way either always or for the most part.
τὰ γὰρ παρὰ φύσιν οὐδὲν δεῖ ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι πότερα κατὰ φύσιν ἤ τινα ἄλλην αἰτίαν γίγνεται· §1.10.14δόξειε δʼ ἂν καὶ ἡ τύχη αἰτία εἶναι τῶν τοιούτων.
As for things contrary to nature, there is no need to examine minutely whether they happen according to nature or through some other cause; and chance might also seem to be the cause of such things.
βίᾳ δὲ ὅσα παρʼ ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ τοὺς λογισμοὺς γίγνεται αὐτῶν τῶν πραττόντων.
And by force are all those things that happen contrary to the appetite or the reasonings of the agents themselves.
§1.10.15ἔθει δὲ ὅσα διὰ τὸ πολλάκις πεποιηκέναι ποιοῦσιν.
And by habit are all those things which they do because of having done them many times.
§1.10.16διὰ λογισμὸν δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα συμφέρειν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀγαθῶν ἢ ὡς τέλος ἢ ὡς πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ὅταν διὰ τὸ συμφέρειν πράττηται· ἔνια γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἀκόλαστοι συμφέροντα πράττουσιν, ἀλλʼ οὐ διὰ τὸ συμφέρειν ἀλλὰ διʼ ἡδονήν.
And through reason are those things which seem to be advantageous from among the aforementioned goods, either as an end or as contributing to the end, when they are done because they are advantageous; for even the licentious do some advantageous things, but not because they are advantageous, but for the sake of pleasure.
διὰ θυμὸν δὲ καὶ ὀργὴν τὰ τιμωρητικά.
And through anger and passion are acts of revenge.
§1.10.17διαφέρει δὲ τιμωρία καὶ κόλασις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κόλασις τοῦ πάσχοντος ἕνεκά ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ τιμωρία τοῦ ποιοῦντος, ἵνα πληρωθῇ.
But revenge and punishment differ; for punishment is for the sake of the one who suffers it, but revenge is for the sake of the one who inflicts it, so that he may be satisfied.
§1.10.18τί μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ὀργή, δῆλον ἔσται ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν παθῶν.
Now, what anger is will be clear in the section on the emotions.
διʼ ἐπιθυμίαν δὲ πράττεται ὅσα φαίνεται ἡδέα.
And due to appetite are all those things done which appear pleasant.
ἔστιν δὲ καὶ τὸ σύνηθες καὶ τὸ ἐθιστὸν ἐν τοῖς ἡδέσιν· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει μὴ ἡδέων, ὅταν συνεθισθῶσιν, ἡδέως ποιοῦσιν·
Also, what is familiar and what has been habitual is among pleasant things; for many things that are not pleasant by nature, once people have been habituated to them, they do with pleasure.
ὥστε συλλαβόντι εἰπεῖν, ὅσα διʼ αὑτοὺς πράττουσιν ἅπαντʼ ἐστὶν ἢ ἀγαθὰ ἢ φαινόμενα ἀγαθά, ἢ ἡδέα ἢ φαινόμενα ἡδέα.
So, to speak summarily, all things that they do because of themselves are either good or apparently good, or pleasant or apparently pleasant.
ἐπεὶ δʼ ὅσα διʼ αὑτοὺς ἑκόντες πράττουσιν, οὐχ ἑκόντες δὲ ὅσα μὴ διʼ αὑτούς, πάντʼ ἂν εἴη ὅσα ἑκόντες πράττουσιν ἢ ἀγαθὰ ἢ φαινόμενα ἀγαθά, ἢ ἡδέα ἢ φαινόμενα ἡδέα·
And since they do voluntarily all those things which they do because of themselves, and involuntarily those things which they do not because of themselves, all things which they do voluntarily would be either good or apparently good, or pleasant or apparently pleasant.
τίθημι γὰρ καὶ τὴν τῶν κακῶν ἢ φαινομένων κακῶν ἢ ἀπαλλαγὴν ἢ ἀντὶ μείζονος ἐλάττονος μετάληψιν ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς (αἱρετὰ γάρ πως), καὶ τὴν τῶν λυπηρῶν ἢ φαινομένων λυπηρῶν ἢ ἀπαλλαγὴν ἢ μετάληψιν ἀντὶ μειζόνων ἐλαττόνων ἐν τοῖς ἡδέσιν ὡσαύτως.
For I also place the escape from evils or apparent evils, or the exchange of a greater evil for a lesser one, among goods (for they are in a way desirable), and the escape from painful things or apparent painful things, or the exchange of greater pains for lesser ones, among pleasant things in the same way.
ληπτέον ἄρα τὰ συμφέροντα καὶ τὰ ἡδέα, πόσα καὶ ποῖα.
Therefore, we must grasp how many and what kind of advantageous and pleasant things there are.
§1.10.19περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐν τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον, περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἡδέος εἴπωμεν νῦν.
Now, about the advantageous, it has been spoken of before in the section on deliberative rhetoric, but about the pleasant, let us speak now.
δεῖ δὲ νομίζειν ἱκανοὺς εἶναι τοὺς ὅρους ἐὰν ὦσι περὶ ἑκάστου μήτε ἀσαφεῖς μήτε ἀκριβεῖς.
And we must consider the definitions to be sufficient if they are neither obscure nor too precise concerning each.