§5.1308bἐν δὲ ταῖς μείζοσι διὰ τριετηρίδος ἢ πενταετηρίδος, κἂν ᾖ πολλαπλάσιον ἢ πολλοστημόριον τοῦ πρότερον, ἐν ᾧ αἱ τιμήσεις κατέστησαν τῆς πολιτείας, νόμον εἶναι καὶ τὰ τιμήματα ἐπιτείνειν ἢ ἀνιέναι, ἐὰν μὲν ὑπερβάλλῃ, ἐπιτείνοντας κατὰ τὴν πολλαπλασίωσιν, ἐὰν δʼ ἐλλείπῃ, ἀνιέντας καὶ ἐλάττω ποιοῦντας τὴν τίμησιν.
but in larger [cities], this should be done every three or five years; and if the property qualification is many times larger or many times smaller than that of the earlier time when the qualifications of the constitution were established, there should be a law both to tighten or to relax the qualifications: if it exceeds, tightening them according to the multiplication, and if it falls short, relaxing them and making the assessment smaller.
ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις καὶ ταῖς πολιτείαις, μὴ ποιούντων οὕτως μὲν ἔνθα μὲν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἔνθα δὲ δυναστείαν γίνεσθαι συμβαίνει, ἐκείνως δὲ ἐκ μὲν πολιτείας δημοκρατίαν, ἐκ δʼ ὀλιγαρχίας πολιτείαν ἢ δῆμον.
For in oligarchies and polities, when they do not act in this way, in the one case an oligarchy and in the other a dynasty comes about; but in the other way, a democracy arises out of a polity, and a polity or a democracy out of an oligarchy.
κοινὸν δὲ καὶ ἐν δήμῳ καὶ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ καὶ πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ μήτʼ αὐξάνειν λίαν μηθένα παρὰ τὴν συμμετρίαν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πειρᾶσθαι μικρὰς καὶ πολυχρονίους διδόναι τιμὰς ἢ ταχὺ μεγάλας (διαφθείρονται γάρ, καὶ φέρειν οὐ παντὸς ἀνδρὸς εὐτυχίαν), εἰ δὲ μή, μή τοί γʼ ἀθρόας δόντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι πάλιν ἀθρόας, ἀλλʼ ἐκ προσαγωγῆς·
And it is a common principle both in a democracy and an oligarchy and in every constitution, neither to increase anyone excessively beyond proportion, but rather to try to give small and long-lasting honors rather than quick and large ones (for men are corrupted, and it is not the fortune of every man to bear success); or if not, at least not to take them away all at once after having given them all at once, but gradually.
καὶ μάλιστα μὲν πειρᾶσθαι τοῖς νόμοις οὕτω ῥυθμίζειν ὥστε μηδένα ἐγγίγνεσθαι πολὺ ὑπερέχοντα δυνάμει μήτε φίλων μήτε χρημάτων, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀποδημητικὰς ποιεῖσθαι τὰς παραστάσεις αὐτῶν.
And especially one should try to regulate by laws in such a way that no one arises who is greatly superior in power, whether of friends or of money; and if not, to make their departures abroad.
ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ διὰ τοὺς ἰδίους βίους νεωτερίζουσιν, δεῖ ἐμποιεῖν ἀρχήν τινα τὴν ἐποψομένην τοὺς ζῶντας ἀσυμφόρως πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, ἐν μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ πρὸς τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ἐν δὲ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν ἑκάστῃ·
And since they also make innovations because of their private lives, one must establish some office that will oversee those who live in a manner disadvantageous to the constitution—in a democracy toward the democracy, in an oligarchy toward the oligarchy, and likewise for each of the other constitutions.
καὶ τὸ εὐημεροῦν δὲ τῆς πόλεως ἀνὰ μέρος φυλάττεσθαι διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αἰτίας· τούτου δʼ ἄκος τὸ αἰεὶ τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις μορίοις ἐγχειρίζειν τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἀρχάς (λέγω δʼ ἀντικεῖσθαι τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς τῷ πλήθει, καὶ τοὺς ἀπόρους τοῖς εὐπόροις), καὶ τὸ πειρᾶσθαι ἢ συμμιγνύναι τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων πλῆθος καὶ τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων ἢ τὸ μέσον αὔξειν (τοῦτο γὰρ διαλύει τὰς διὰ τὴν ἀνισότητα στάσεις).
And for the same reasons, one must guard against the prosperity of one part of the city in turn; and the remedy for this is always to entrust affairs and offices to the opposite parts (I mean by opposite, the notable men against the multitude, and the poor against the wealthy), and to try either to mix the multitude of the poor and that of the wealthy, or to increase the middle class (for this dissolves factions caused by inequality).
μέγιστον δὲ ἐν πάσῃ πολιτείᾳ τὸ καὶ τοῖς νόμοις καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ οἰκονομίᾳ οὕτω τετάχθαι ὥστε μὴ εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς κερδαίνειν.
And the greatest thing in every constitution is to be so ordered both by laws and by other administration that it is not possible to gain profit from offices.
τοῦτο δὲ μάλιστα ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχικαῖς δεῖ τηρεῖν.
This must be guarded against especially in oligarchical constitutions.
οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ἀγανακτοῦσιν εἰργόμενοι τοῦ ἄρχειν οἱ πολλοί, ἀλλὰ καὶ χαίρουσιν ἐάν τις ἐᾷ πρὸς τοῖς ἰδίοις σχολάζειν, ὥστʼ ἐὰν οἴωνται τὰ κοινὰ κλέπτειν τοὺς ἄρχοντας, τότε γʼ ἀμφότερα λυπεῖ, τό τε τῶν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχειν καὶ τὸ τῶν κερδῶν·
For the many do not vex themselves so much at being excluded from ruling, but they even rejoice if someone allows them to leisure for their private affairs, so that if they think that the rulers are stealing public funds, then indeed both things grieve them, both not sharing in honors and not sharing in profits.
μοναχῶς δὲ καὶ ἐνδέχεται ἅμα εἶναι δημοκρατίαν καὶ ἀριστοκρατίαν, εἰ τοῦτο κατασκευάσειέ τις.
And it is only in this way that it is possible to have both democracy and aristocracy at the same time, if someone should arrange this.
§5.1309aἐνδέχοιτο γὰρ ἂν καὶ τοὺς γνωρίμους καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἔχειν ἃ βούλονται ἀμφοτέρους.
For it would be possible both for the notables and the multitude to have what they both want.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐξεῖναι πᾶσιν ἄρχειν δημοκρατικόν, τὸ δὲ τοὺς γνωρίμους εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἀριστοκρατικόν, τοῦτο δʼ ἔσται ὅταν μὴ ᾖ κερδαίνειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν·
For that it is permitted for all to rule is democratic, but that the notables are in offices is aristocratic; and this will be so when there is no profiting from offices.
οἱ γὰρ ἄποροι οὐ βουλήσονται ἄρχειν τῷ μηδὲν κερδαίνειν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῖς ἰδίοις εἶναι μᾶλλον, οἱ δὲ εὔποροι δυνήσονται διὰ τὸ μηδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι τῶν κοινῶν· ὥστε συμβήσεται τοῖς μὲν ἀπόροις γίγνεσθαι εὐπόροις διὰ τὸ διατρίβειν πρὸς τοῖς ἔργοις, τοῖς δὲ γνωρίμοις μὴ ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων.
For the poor will not wish to rule because of gaining nothing, but rather to be at their private affairs, while the wealthy will be able because of needing nothing of the public funds; so that it will happen that the poor become wealthy through spending time on their work, and the notables are not ruled by ordinary men.
τοῦ μὲν οὖν μὴ κλέπτεσθαι τὰ κοινὰ ἡ παράδοσις γιγνέσθω τῶν χρημάτων παρόντων πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ ἀντίγραφα κατὰ φατρίας καὶ λόχους καὶ φυλὰς τιθέσθωσαν· τοῦ δὲ ἀκερδῶς ἄρχειν τιμὰς εἶναι δεῖ νενομοθετημένας τοῖς εὐδοκιμοῦσιν.
In order, then, that public funds may not be stolen, let the transfer of money be made in the presence of all the citizens, and let copies be deposited by phratries, companies, and tribes; and for ruling without profit, there must be honors established by law for those who distinguish themselves.
δεῖ δʼ ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις τῶν εὐπόρων φείδεσθαι, μὴ μόνον τῷ τὰς κτήσεις μὴ ποιεῖν ἀναδάστους, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ τοὺς καρπούς, ὃ ἐν ἐνίαις τῶν πολιτειῶν λανθάνει γιγνόμενον, βέλτιον δὲ καὶ βουλομένους κωλύειν λειτουργεῖν τὰς δαπανηρὰς μὲν μὴ χρησίμους δὲ λειτουργίας, οἷον χορηγίας καὶ λαμπαδαρχίας καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τοιαῦται·
And in democracies one must spare the wealthy, not only by not making their properties subject to redistribution, but not even their crops—which in some constitutions happens without being noticed—and it is better also to prevent them, even if they wish, from undertaking expensive but useless public services (leitourgiai), such as choregiai, torch-races (lampadarchiai), and any other such services.
ἐν δʼ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ τῶν ἀπόρων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι πολλήν, καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀφʼ ὧν λήμματα ἔστι τούτοις ἀπονέμειν, κἄν τις ὑβρίσῃ τῶν εὐπόρων εἰς τούτους, μείζω τὰ ἐπιτίμια εἶναι ἢ ἂν σφῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ τὰς κληρονομίας μὴ κατὰ δόσιν εἶναι ἀλλὰ κατὰ γένος, μηδὲ πλειόνων ἢ μιᾶς τὸν αὐτὸν κληρονομεῖν.
In an oligarchy, on the other hand, one must take great care of the poor, and assign to them those offices from which there are gains; and if any of the wealthy acts with insolence toward them, the penalties should be greater than if toward their own class; and inheritances should not be by gift but by family descent, and not more than one inheritance should be inherited by the same person.
οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ὁμαλώτεραι αἱ οὐσίαι εἶεν καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων εἰς εὐπορίαν ἂν καθίσταιντο πλείους.
For in this way properties would be more equalized, and more of the poor would be established in comfort.
συμφέρει δὲ καὶ ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ τῶν ἄλλων ἢ ἰσότητα ἢ προεδρίαν νέμειν τοῖς ἧττον κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας, ἐν μὲν δήμῳ τοῖς εὐπόροις, ἐν δʼ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ τοῖς ἀπόροις, πλὴν ὅσαι ἀρχαὶ κύριαι τῆς πολιτείας, ταύτας δὲ τοῖς ἐκ τῆς πολιτείας ἐγχειρίζειν μόνοις ἢ πλείοσιν.
And it is expedient both in a democracy and in an oligarchy to assign either equality or precedence in other matters to those who share less in the constitution—in a democracy to the wealthy, in an oligarchy to the poor, except for those offices which are sovereign over the constitution; these, however, should be entrusted to those from the constitution alone, or to more of them.
τρία δέ τινα χρὴ ἔχειν τοὺς μέλλοντας ἄρξειν τὰς κυρίας ἀρχάς, πρῶτον μὲν φιλίαν πρὸς τὴν καθεστῶσαν πολιτείαν, ἔπειτα δύναμιν μεγίστην τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἀρχῆς, τρίτον δʼ ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἐν ἑκάστῃ πολιτείᾳ τὴν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν (εἰ γὰρ μὴ ταὐτὸν τὸ δίκαιον κατὰ πάσας τὰς πολιτείας, ἀνάγκη καὶ τῆς δικαιοσύνης εἶναι διαφοράς).
There are three things which those who are going to rule in the sovereign offices must have: first, friendship toward the established constitution; second, the greatest capacity for the duties of the office; third, virtue and justice in each constitution, such as is relative to the constitution (for if justice is not the same in all constitutions, there must also be differences in justice).
ἔχει δʼ ἀπορίαν, ὅταν μὴ συμβαίνῃ ταῦτα πάντα περὶ τὸν αὐτόν, πῶς χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν·
But there is a difficulty, when all these things do not happen to belong to the same person, how one ought to make the choice.