§5.1307bμάλιστα δὲ λανθάνουσιν αἱ ἀριστοκρατίαι μεταβάλλουσαι τῷ λύεσθαι κατὰ μικρόν, ὅπερ εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς πρότερον καθόλου κατὰ πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν, ὅτι αἴτιον τῶν μεταβολῶν καὶ τὸ μικρόν ἐστιν·
And aristocracies change most of all without being noticed by being dissolved little by little, just as has been said before in general about all constitutions, that even a small thing is a cause of changes.
ὅταν γάρ τι προῶνται τῶν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν, μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἄλλο μικρῷ μεῖζον εὐχερέστερον κινοῦσιν, ἕως ἂν πάντα κινήσωσι τὸν κόσμον.
For when they give up some part of those things that relate to the constitution, after this they also alter another thing slightly larger more easily, until they have altered the whole order.
συνέβη δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς Θουρίων πολιτείας.
And this happened also in the case of the constitution of Thurii.
νόμου γὰρ ὄντος διὰ πέντε ἐτῶν στρατηγεῖν, γενόμενοί τινες πολεμικοὶ τῶν νεωτέρων καὶ παρὰ τῷ πλήθει τῶν φρουρῶν εὐδοκιμοῦντες, καταφρονήσαντες τῶν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ νομίζοντες ῥᾳδίως κατασχήσειν, τοῦτον τὸν νόμον λύειν ἐπεχείρησαν πρῶτον, ὥστʼ ἐξεῖναι τοὺς αὐτοὺς συνεχῶς στρατηγεῖν, ὁρῶντες τὸν δῆμον αὐτοὺς χειροτονήσοντα προθύμως.
For there being a law to hold the generalship [only] every five years, some of the younger men having become warlike and having a high reputation among the mass of the guards, looking down on those in power and thinking they would easily gain control, attempted first to repeal this law, so that it would be permitted for the same men to hold the generalship continuously, seeing that the people would eagerly elect them.
οἱ δʼ ἐπὶ τούτῳ τεταγμένοι τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἱ καλούμενοι σύμβουλοι, ὁρμήσαντες τὸ πρῶτον ἐναντιοῦσθαι συνεπείσθησαν, ὑπολαμβάνοντες τοῦτον κινήσαντας τὸν νόμον ἐάσειν τὴν ἄλλην πολιτείαν, ὕστερον δὲ βουλόμενοι κωλύειν ἄλλων κινουμένων οὐκέτι πλέον ἐποίουν οὐθέν, ἀλλὰ μετέβαλεν ἡ τάξις πᾶσα τῆς πολιτείας εἰς δυναστείαν τῶν ἐπιχειρησάντων νεωτερίζειν.
And those of the magistrates who had been appointed for this, called counselors (symbouloi), though having rushed at first to oppose, were persuaded [to agree], supposing that if they altered this law they would leave the rest of the constitution alone; but later, when they wished to prevent other things from being altered, they no longer achieved anything, but the whole arrangement of the constitution changed into a dynasty of those who had attempted to make innovations.
πᾶσαι δʼ αἱ πολιτεῖαι λύονται ὁτὲ μὲν ἐξ αὑτῶν ὁτὲ δʼ ἔξωθεν, ὅταν ἐναντία πολιτεία ᾖ ἢ πλησίον ἢ πόρρω μὲν ἔχουσα δὲ δύναμιν.
And all constitutions are dissolved sometimes from within themselves, and sometimes from without, when there is an opposite constitution either nearby or far off but having power.
ὅπερ συνέβαινεν ἐπʼ Ἀθηναίων καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων· οἱ μὲν γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι πανταχοῦ τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας, οἱ δὲ Λάκωνες τοὺς δήμους κατέλυον.
Which happened in the case of the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians; for the Athenians dissolved oligarchies everywhere, and the Laconians dissolved democracies.
ὅθεν μὲν οὖν αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίγνονται τῶν πολιτειῶν καὶ αἱ στάσεις, εἴρηται σχεδόν.
Whence, then, changes of constitutions and factions arise has been pretty much said.
περὶ δὲ σωτηρίας καὶ κοινῇ καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάστης πολιτείας ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν.
It is next to speak about preservation both in general and separately for each constitution.
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δῆλον ὅτι, εἴπερ ἔχομεν διʼ ὧν φθείρονται αἱ πολιτεῖαι, ἔχομεν καὶ διʼ ὧν σῴζονται· τῶν γὰρ ἐναντίων τἀναντία ποιητικά, φθορὰ δὲ σωτηρίᾳ ἐναντίον.
First, then, it is clear that, if indeed we know the things through which constitutions are destroyed, we also know the things through which they are preserved; for opposites produce opposites, and destruction is opposite to preservation.
ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς εὖ κεκραμέναις πολιτείαις, εἰπερ ἄλλο τι δεῖ τηρεῖν ὅπως μηθὲν παρανομῶσι, καὶ μάλιστα τὸ μικρὸν φυλάττειν· λανθάνει γὰρ παραδυομένη ἡ παρανομία, ὥσπερ τὰς οὐσίας τὸ μικρὸν δαπάνημα ἀναιρεῖ πολλάκις γινόμενον.
In well-blended constitutions, therefore, if indeed one must guard anything else so that they do not transgress the law in any way, one must especially guard against that which is small; for lawlessness slips in unnoticed, just as a small expense, being incurred often, ruins estates.
λανθάνει γὰρ ἡ δαπάνη διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀθρόα γίγνεσθαι· παραλογίζεται γὰρ ἡ διάνοια ὑπʼ αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος
"εἰ ἕκαστον μικρόν, καὶ πάντα"
· τοῦτο δʼ ἔστι μὲν ὥς, ἔστι δʼ ὡς οὔ· τὸ γὰρ ὅλον καὶ τὰ πάντα οὐ μικρόν, ἀλλὰ σύγκειται ἐκ μικρῶν.
For the expense is unnoticed because of not occurring all at once; for the mind is misled by them, just like the sophistical argument "if each is small, then all are also"; but this is so in one way, and in another way not; for the whole and all [together] is not small, but consists of small parts.
μίαν μὲν οὖν φυλακὴν ταύτην πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι· ἔπειτα μὴ πιστεύειν τοῖς σοφίσματος χάριν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος συγκειμένοις, §5.1308aἐξελέγχεται γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν ἔργων (ποῖα δὲ λέγομεν τῶν πολιτειῶν σοφίσματα, πρότερον εἴρηται).
One safeguard, therefore, must be made against this beginning; secondly, not to trust those devices constructed for the sake of tricking the multitude, for they are refuted by facts (and what kind of devices of constitutions we mean has been said before).
ἔτι δʼ ὁρᾶν ὅτι ἔνιαι μένουσιν οὐ μόνον ἀριστοκρατίαι ἀλλὰ καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαι οὐ διὰ τὸ ἀσφαλεῖς εἶναι τὰς πολιτείας, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ εὖ χρῆσθαι τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς γινομένους καὶ τοῖς ἔξω τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι, τοὺς μὲν μὴ μετέχοντας τῷ μὴ ἀδικεῖν καὶ τῷ τοὺς ἡγεμονικοὺς αὐτῶν εἰσάγειν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ τοὺς μὲν φιλοτίμους μὴ ἀδικεῖν εἰς ἀτιμίαν τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς εἰς κέρδος, πρὸς αὑτοὺς δὲ καὶ τοὺς μετέχοντας τῷ χρῆσθαι ἀλλήλοις δημοτικῶς.
And further to see that some constitutions endure, not only aristocracies but also oligarchies, not because the constitutions are secure, but because those who get into offices treat well both those outside the constitution and those in the governing body, by not wronging those who do not share [in the constitution] and by bringing their leading men into the constitution, and by not wronging the ambitious in regard to dishonor, nor the multitude in regard to financial gain, and by dealing with one another in a democratic spirit among themselves and those who share [in the constitution].
ὃ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ πλήθους ζητοῦσιν οἱ δημοτικοί, τὸ ἴσον, τοῦτʼ ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοίων οὐ μόνον δίκαιον ἀλλὰ καὶ συμφέρον ἐστίν.
For the equality which democratic leaders seek for the multitude, this is not only just but also expedient for those who are peers.
διὸ ἐὰν πλείους ὦσιν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι, πολλὰ συμφέρει τῶν δημοτικῶν νομοθετημάτων, οἷον τὸ ἑξαμήνους τὰς ἀρχὰς εἶναι, ἵνα πάντες οἱ ὅμοιοι μετέχωσιν· ἔστι γὰρ ὥσπερ δῆμος ἤδη οἱ ὅμοιοι (διὸ καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἐγγίγνονται δημαγωγοὶ πολλάκις, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον), ἔπειθʼ ἧττον εἰς δυναστείας ἐμπίπτουσιν αἱ ὀλιγαρχίαι καὶ ἀριστοκρατίαι (οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ῥᾴδιον κακουργῆσαι ὀλίγον χρόνον ἄρχοντας καὶ πολύν, ἐπεὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις καὶ δημοκρατίαις γίγνονται τυραννίδες· ἢ γὰρ οἱ μέγιστοι ἐν ἑκατέρᾳ ἐπιτίθενται τυραννίδι, ἔνθα μὲν οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ἔνθα δʼ οἱ δυνάσται, ἢ οἱ τὰς μεγίστας ἔχοντες ἀρχάς, ὅταν πολὺν χρόνον ἄρχωσιν).
Wherefore if those in the governing body are more numerous, many of the democratic enactments are beneficial, such as that the offices should be for six months, so that all the peers may share; for the peers are already like a democracy (wherefore also among them demagogues often arise, as was said before), and furthermore oligarchies and aristocracies fall less into dynasties (for it is not equally easy for those ruling for a short time to do mischief as for those ruling for a long time, since it is because of this that tyrannies arise in oligarchies and democracies; for either the greatest men in each constitution aim at tyranny, in the one case the demagogues, in the other the dynasts, or those who hold the greatest offices, when they rule for a long time).
σῴζονται δʼ αἱ πολιτεῖαι οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ πόρρω εἶναι τῶν διαφθειρόντων, ἀλλʼ ἐνίοτε καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐγγύς· φοβούμενοι γὰρ διὰ χειρῶν ἔχουσι μᾶλλον τὴν πολιτείαν.
And constitutions are preserved not only because of being far from destroying factors, but sometimes also because of being near them; for being afraid, they hold the constitution more in their hands.
ὥστε δεῖ τοὺς τῆς πολιτείας φροντίζοντας φόβους παρασκευάζειν, ἵνα φυλάττωσι καὶ μὴ καταλύωσιν ὥσπερ νυκτερινὴν φυλακὴν τὴν τῆς πολιτείας τήρησιν, καὶ τὸ πόρρω ἐγγὺς ποιεῖν.
So those who care for the constitution must generate fears, so that they may guard and not dissolve like a night watch the preservation of the constitution, and make that which is far off seem near.
ἔτι τὰς τῶν γνωρίμων φιλονεικίας καὶ στάσεις καὶ διὰ τῶν νόμων πειρᾶσθαι δεῖ φυλάττειν, καὶ τοὺς ἔξω τῆς φιλονεικίας ὄντας πρὶν παρειληφέναι καὶ αὐτούς, ὡς τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ γινόμενον κακὸν γνῶναι οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος ἀλλὰ πολιτικοῦ ἀνδρός.
Furthermore, one must attempt to guard against the rivalries and factions of the notables even through laws, and [to guard] those who are outside the rivalry before they themselves have been drawn into it, since to recognize an evil in its beginning is not the task of an ordinary man but of a statesman.
πρὸς δὲ τὴν διὰ τὰ τιμήματα γιγνομένην μεταβολὴν ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ πολιτείας, ὅταν συμβαίνῃ τοῦτο μενόντων μὲν τῶν αὐτῶν τιμημάτων εὐπορίας δὲ νομίσματος γιγνομένης, συμφέρει τοῦ τιμήματος ἐπισκοπεῖν τοῦ κοινοῦ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ παρελθόν, ἐν ὅσαις μὲν πόλεσι τιμῶνται κατʼ ἐνιαυτόν, κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον,
And with view to the change from oligarchy and polity that occurs because of property qualifications, when this happens while the same qualifications remain but an abundance of money arises, it is expedient to inspect the total amount of the common qualification in comparison with the past, in those cities where they are assessed annually, at that time,