§5.1309bοἷον εἰ στρατηγικὸς μέν τις εἴη, πονηρὸς δὲ καὶ μὴ τῇ πολιτείᾳ φίλος, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος καὶ φίλος, πῶς δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν;
For example, if someone is skilled in military leadership but is wicked and not a friend to the constitution, while another is just and a friend, how ought one to make the choice?
ἔοικε δὲ δεῖν βλέπειν εἰς δύο, τίνος πλεῖον μετέχουσι πάντες καὶ τίνος ἔλαττον·
It seems that one must look to two things: which of the two qualities all people share in to a greater degree, and which to a lesser degree.
διὸ ἐν στρατηγίᾳ μὲν εἰς τὴν ἐμπειρίαν μᾶλλον τῆς ἀρετῆς (ἔλαττον γὰρ στρατηγίας μετέχουσι, τῆς δʼ ἐπιεικείας πλεῖον), ἐν δὲ φυλακῇ καὶ ταμιείᾳ τἀναντία (πλείονος γὰρ ἀρετῆς δεῖται ἢ ὅσην οἱ πολλοὶ ἔχουσιν, ἡ δὲ ἐπιστήμη κοινὴ πᾶσιν).
Therefore, in the case of a generalship, one should look to experience rather than virtue (for people share less in military skill, but more in decency), while in the case of a guardship or a treasunyship, the opposite (for these require more virtue than the multitude possess, while the knowledge is common to all).
ἀπορήσειε δʼ ἄν τις, ἂν δύναμις ὑπάρχῃ καὶ τῆς πολιτείας φιλία, τί δεῖ τῆς ἀρετῆς;
And one might ask, if capacity and friendship toward the constitution are present, why is there need of virtue?
ποιήσει γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα καὶ τὰ δύο.
For the two qualities will do what is beneficial.
ἢ ὅτι ἐνδέχεται τοὺς τὰ δύο ταῦτα ἔχοντας ἀκρατεῖς εἶναι, ὥστε καθάπερ καὶ αὑτοῖς οὐχ ὑπηρετοῦσιν εἰδότες καὶ φιλοῦντες αὑτούς, οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν οὐθὲν κωλύει ἔχειν ἐνίους;
Or is it because it is possible for those who possess these two qualities to be lack of self-control, so that just as they do not serve themselves although they know and love themselves, in the same way nothing prevents some from behaving so toward the common good?
ἁπλῶς δέ, ὅσα ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ὡς συμφέροντα λέγομεν ταῖς πολιτείαις, ἅπαντα ταῦτα σῴζει τὰς πολιτείας, καὶ τὸ πολλάκις εἰρημένον μέγιστον στοιχεῖον, τὸ τηρεῖν ὅπως κρεῖττον ἔσται τὸ βουλόμενον τὴν πολιτείαν πλῆθος τοῦ μὴ βουλομένου.
Simply, whatever we say in the laws is beneficial to constitutions, all these preserve constitutions, and especially the often-mentioned greatest element, which is to watch that the multitude wishing for the constitution be stronger than those not wishing for it.
παρὰ πάντα δὲ ταῦτα δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν, ὃ νῦν λανθάνει τὰς παρεκβεβηκυίας πολιτείας, τὸ μέσον· πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν δοκούντων δημοτικῶν λύει τὰς δημοκρατίας καὶ τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας.
And besides all these, one must not overlook what is now overlooked by the deviated constitutions, namely the middle; for many of the things seeming democratic ruin democracies, and oligarchic things ruin oligarchies.
οἱ δʼ οἰόμενοι ταύτην εἶναι μίαν ἀρετὴν ἕλκουσιν εἰς τὴν ὑπερβολήν, ἀγνοοῦντες ὅτι, καθάπερ ῥὶς ἔστι παρεκβεβηκυῖα μὲν τὴν εὐθύτητα τὴν καλλίστην πρὸς τὸ γρυπὸν ἢ τὸ σιμόν, ἀλλʼ ὅμως ἔτι καλὴ καὶ χάριν ἔχουσα πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν, οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ἐὰν ἐπιτείνῃ τις ἔτι μᾶλλον εἰς τὴν ὑπερβολήν, πρῶτον μὲν ἀποβαλεῖ τὴν μετριότητα τοῦ μορίου, τέλος δʼ οὕτως ὥστε μηδὲ ῥῖνα ποιήσει φαίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν τῶν ἐναντίων, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μορίων, συμβαίνει δὴ τοῦτο καὶ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας.
Those who think this is the single virtue drag it to excess, not knowing that, just as a nose may deviate from the most beautiful straightness toward being hooked or snub, but nevertheless is still beautiful and pleasing to the eye, yet if someone tightens it still more toward excess, first it will lose the due proportion of the part, and finally so much so that it will not even appear to be a nose because of the excess of one and the lack of the opposite qualities, and the same holds for the other parts as well, so this also happens to constitutions.
καὶ γὰρ ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ δημοκρατίαν ἔστιν ὥστʼ ἔχειν ἱκανῶς, καίπερ ἐξεστηκυίας τῆς βελτίστης τάξεως· ἐὰν δέ τις ἐπιτείνῃ μᾶλλον ἑκατέραν αὐτῶν, πρῶτον μὲν χείρω ποιήσει τὴν πολιτείαν, τέλος δʼ οὐδὲ πολιτείαν.
For it is possible for both an oligarchy and a democracy to be in a tolerable state, even though they have departed from the best order; but if one tightens either of them further, first one will make the constitution worse, and finally not even a constitution.
διὸ δεῖ τοῦτο μὴ ἀγνοεῖν τὸν νομοθέτην καὶ τὸν πολιτικόν, ποῖα σῴζει τῶν δημοτικῶν καὶ ποῖα φθείρει τὴν δημοκρατίαν, καὶ ποῖα τῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶν τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν.
Therefore, the legislator and the statesman must not be ignorant of this, which of the democratic measures preserve and which destroy democracy, and which of the oligarchic measures destroy oligarchy.
οὐδετέραν μὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν ἄνευ τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τοῦ πλήθους, ἀλλʼ ὅταν ὁμαλότης γένηται τῆς οὐσίας ἄλλην ἀνάγκη εἶναι ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν,
For it is not possible for either of them to exist and continue without the wealthy and the multitude, but when equality of property comes about, this constitution must of necessity be another one,