§4.1298bκατὰ νόμον δʼ ἄρχωσιν ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον, ὀλιγαρχικόν·
And if they rule according to law, just as before, it is oligarchic.
ὅταν δὲ καὶ αἱρῶνται αὐτοὶ αὑτοὺς οἱ κύριοι τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι, καὶ ὅταν παῖς ἀντὶ πατρὸς εἰσίῃ καὶ κύριοι τῶν νόμων ὦσιν, ὀλιγαρχικὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν τάξιν ταύτην.
But when the ones having authority over deliberation themselves elect themselves, and when son enters in place of father and they are masters of the laws, it is necessary that this organization is oligarchic.
ὅταν δὲ τινῶν τινές, οἷον πολέμου μὲν καὶ εἰρήνης καὶ εὐθυνῶν πάντες, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἄρχοντες, καὶ οὗτοι αἱρετοί, μὴ κληρωτοί, ἀριστοκρατία ἡ πολιτεία.
But when some persons deliberate about some matters, for instance all citizens about war and peace and audits, while magistrates deliberate about the other matters, and these are elective, not by lot, the constitution is an aristocracy.
ἐὰν δʼ ἐνίων μὲν αἱρετοὶ ἐνίων δὲ κληρωτοί, καὶ κληρωτοὶ ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ ἐκ προκρίτων, ἢ κοινῇ αἱρετοὶ καὶ κληρωτοί, τὰ μὲν πολιτείας ἀριστοκρατικῆς ἐστι τούτων, τὰ δὲ πολιτείας αὐτῆς.
But if for some matters they are elective and for others by lot, and by lot either simply or from selected persons, or jointly elective and by lot, some of these belong to an aristocratic constitution, and others to the constitution (polity) itself.
διῄρηται μὲν οὖν τὸ βουλευόμενον πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, καὶ διοικεῖ ἑκάστη πολιτεία κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον διορισμόν·
The deliberative part, therefore, is divided in relation to the constitutions in this way, and each constitution administers according to the stated definition.
συμφέρει δὲ δημοκρατίᾳ τῇ μάλιστʼ εἶναι δοκούσῃ δημοκρατίᾳ νῦν (λέγω δὲ τοιαύτην ἐν ᾗ κύριος ὁ δῆμος καὶ τῶν νόμων ἐστίν) πρὸς τὸ βουλεύεσθαι βέλτιον τὸ αὐτὸ ποιεῖν ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις (τάττουσι γὰρ ζημίαν τούτοις οὓς βούλονται δικάζειν, ἵνα δικάζωσιν, οἱ δὲ δημοτικοὶ μισθὸν τοῖς ἀπόροις), τοῦτο δὴ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἐκκλησίας ποιεῖν (βουλεύσονται γὰρ βέλτιον κοινῇ βουλευόμενοι πάντες, ὁ μὲν δῆμος μετὰ τῶν γνωρίμων, οὗτοι δὲ μετὰ τοῦ πλήθους), συμφέρει δὲ καὶ τὸ αἱρετοὺς εἶναι τοὺς βουλευομένους, ἢ κληρωτοὺς ἴσους ἐκ τῶν μορίων, συμφέρει δέ, κἂν ὑπερβάλλωσι πολὺ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος οἱ δημοτικοὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἢ μὴ πᾶσι διδόναι μισθόν, ἀλλʼ ὅσοι σύμμετροι πρὸς τὸ τῶν γνωρίμων πλῆθος, ἢ ἀποκληροῦν τοὺς πλείους·
But it is advantageous to the democracy that seems to be most of all a democracy today (I mean such a one in which the people is master even over the laws) for better deliberation to do the very same thing that is done in oligarchies concerning the law courts (for they impose a fine on those whom they wish to judge, in order that they may judge, while the democratic party provides a wage for the needy), indeed to do this very thing also concerning the assemblies (for they will deliberate better if all deliberate in common, the people with the notables, and these with the multitude). And it is also advantageous that those who deliberate are elective, or by lot in equal numbers from the parts. And it is advantageous, even if the democratic party far exceeds in multitude the political class, either not to give a wage to all, but only to as many as are commensurate with the multitude of the notables, or to exclude the majority by lot.
ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ἢ προσαιρεῖσθαί τινας ἐκ τοῦ πλήθους, ἢ κατασκευάσαντας ἀρχεῖον οἷον ἐν ἐνίαις πολιτείαις ἐστὶν οὓς καλοῦσι προβούλους καὶ νομοφύλακας, περὶ τούτων χρηματίζειν περὶ ὧν ἂν οὗτοι προβουλεύσωσιν (οὕτω γὰρ μεθέξει ὁ δῆμος τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι, καὶ λύειν οὐθὲν δυνήσεται τῶν περὶ τὴν πολιτείαν), ἔτι ἢ ταὐτὰ ψηφίζεσθαι τὸν δῆμον ἢ μηθὲν ἐναντίον τοῖς εἰσφερομένοις, ἢ τῆς συμβουλῆς μὲν μεταδιδόναι πᾶσι, βουλεύεσθαι δὲ τοὺς ἄρχοντας.
But in oligarchies, either to co-opt some from the multitude, or having established an office such as exists in some constitutions which they call preliminary deliberators (probouloi) and law-guardians, to transact business concerning those matters about which these have previously deliberated (for in this way the people will participate in deliberating, and will not be able to dissolve any aspect of the constitution), further, either for the people to vote for the same things or nothing contrary to what is introduced, or to share the advice with all, but for the magistrates to deliberate.
καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον δὲ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις γιγνομένου δεῖ ποιεῖν.
And one must do the opposite of what happens in the polities.
ἀποψηφιζόμενον μὲν γὰρ κύριον δεῖ ποιεῖν τὸ πλῆθος, καταψηφιζόμενον δὲ μὴ κύριον, ἀλλʼ ἐπαναγέσθω πάλιν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας.
For when voting against a proposal, one must make the multitude master, but when voting for it, not master, but let it be referred back to the magistrates.
ἐν γὰρ ταῖς πολιτείαις ἀνεστραμμένως ποιοῦσιν· οἱ γὰρ ὀλίγοι ἀποψηφισάμενοι μὲν κύριοι, καταψηφισάμενοι δὲ οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλʼ ἐπανάγεται εἰς τοὺς πλείους αἰεί.
For in the polities they do the reverse; for the few are masters when voting against, but when voting for, they are not masters, but it is always referred back to the majority.
§4.1299aπερὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ βουλευομένου καὶ τοῦ κυρίου τῆς πολιτείας τοῦτον διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον.
Concerning, then, the deliberative part and that which has authority over the constitution, let it be defined in this way.
ἐχομένη δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς διαίρεσις.
Next to these is the division concerning the offices.
ἔχει γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μόριον τῆς πολιτείας πολλὰς διαφοράς, πόσαι τε ἀρχαί, καὶ κύριαι τίνων, καὶ περὶ χρόνου, πόσος ἑκάστης ἀρχῆς (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἑξαμήνους, οἱ δὲ διʼ ἐλάττονος, οἱ δʼ ἐνιαυσίας, οἱ δὲ πολυχρονιωτέρας ποιοῦσι τὰς ἀρχάς), καὶ πότερον εἶναι δεῖ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀιδίους ἢ πολυχρονίους ἢ μηδέτερον ἀλλὰ πλεονάκις τοὺς αὐτούς, ἢ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν δὶς ἀλλʼ ἅπαξ μόνον, ἔτι δὲ περὶ τὴν κατάστασιν τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἐκ τίνων δεῖ γίνεσθαι καὶ ὑπὸ τίνων καὶ πῶς.
For this part of the constitution also has many differences: how many offices there are, and what they have authority over, and concerning time, how long each office lasts (for some make them for six months, others for a shorter period, others for a year, and others for a longer time), and whether the offices ought to be perpetual or long-lasting or neither but the same persons multiple times, or not the same person twice but only once; and further, concerning the establishment of offices, from whom they must be and by whom and how.
περὶ πάντων γὰρ τούτων δεῖ δύνασθαι διελεῖν κατὰ πόσους ἐνδέχεται γενέσθαι τρόπους, κἄπειτα προσαρμόσαι ποίαις ποῖοι πολιτείαις συμφέρουσιν.
For concerning all these things one must be able to distinguish in how many ways they can occur, and then to fit which kinds are advantageous to which constitutions.
ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο διορίσαι ῥᾴδιον, ποίας δεῖ καλεῖν ἀρχάς·
But it is not easy either to define what kinds one ought to call offices.
πολλῶν γὰρ ἐπιστατῶν ἡ πολιτικὴ κοινωνία δεῖται, διόπερ οὐ πάντας οὔτε τοὺς αἱρετοὺς οὔτε τοὺς κληρωτοὺς ἄρχοντας θετέον, οἷον τοὺς ἱερεῖς πρῶτον (τοῦτο γὰρ ἕτερόν τι παρὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχὰς θετέον)· ἔτι δὲ καὶ χορηγοὶ καὶ κήρυκες αἱροῦνται καὶ πρεσβευταί.
For the political community needs many supervisors, wherefore one must not class all either elective or lot-selected ones as magistrates; for instance, priests first (for this must be established as something other than political offices); and further, choragi, heralds, and ambassadors are also elected.
εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μὲν πολιτικαὶ τῶν ἐπιμελειῶν, ἢ πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν πρός τινα πρᾶξιν, οἷον στρατηγὸς στρατευομένων, ἢ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ὁ γυναικονόμος ἢ παιδονόμος· αἱ δʼ οἰκονομικαί (πολλάκις γὰρ αἱροῦνται σιτομέτρας)· αἱ δʼ ὑπηρετικαὶ καὶ πρὸς ἅς, ἂν εὐπορῶσι, τάττουσι δούλους.
And of supervisions, some are political, either of all citizens toward some action, like a general of those on campaign, or partial, like a controller of women or a controller of children; others are financial (for often they elect grain-measurers); and others are subservient, and to which, if they are wealthy, they appoint slaves.
μάλιστα δʼ ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἀρχὰς λεκτέον ταύτας ὅσαις ἀποδέδοται βουλεύσασθαί τε περὶ τινῶν καὶ κρῖναι καὶ ἐπιτάξαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο· τὸ γὰρ ἐπιτάττειν ἀρχικώτερόν ἐστιν.
But most of all, to speak simply, those must be called offices to which has been assigned to deliberate about some matters, to judge, and to command, and most of all this last; for commanding is more characteristic of ruling.
ἀλλὰ ταῦτα διαφέρει πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσεις οὐδὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν (οὐ γάρ πω κρίσις γέγονεν ἀμφισβητούντων περὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος), ἔχει δέ τινʼ ἄλλην διανοητικὴν πραγματείαν.
But these things differ for use virtually nothing (for no judgment has yet arisen of people disputing about the name), but they have some other intellectual study.
ποῖαι δʼ ἀρχαὶ καὶ πόσαι ἀναγκαῖαι εἰ ἔσται πόλις, καὶ ποῖαι ἀναγκαῖαι μὲν οὔ, χρήσιμοι δὲ πρὸς σπουδαίαν πολιτείαν, μᾶλλον ἄν τις ἀπορήσειε πρὸς ἅπασάν τε δὴ πολιτείαν καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰς μικρὰς πόλεις.
But what kinds of offices and how many are necessary for a city to exist, and what kinds, though not necessary, are useful for a good constitution, one might rather puzzle over in relation to all constitutions and especially small cities.
ἐν μὲν γὰρ δὴ ταῖς μεγάλαις ἐνδέχεταί τε καὶ δεῖ μίαν τετάχθαι πρὸς ἓν ἔργον (πολλούς τε γὰρ εἰς τὰ ἀρχεῖα ἐνδέχεται βαδίζειν διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς εἶναι τοὺς πολίτας, ὥστε τὰς μὲν διαλείπειν πολὺν χρόνον τὰς δʼ ἅπαξ ἄρχειν, καὶ βέλτιον ἕκαστον ἔργον τυγχάνει τῆς ἐπιμελείας μονοπραγματούσης ἢ πολυπραγματούσης)·
For in the large ones it is both possible and necessary for one office to be assigned to one task (for it is possible for many to enter into the public offices because the citizens are many, so that some offices are vacant for a long time and others are held only once, and each task obtains better care when it is a single business than when it is multiple business);