§3.1287bἀλλὰ μὴν εἰσάγονταί γʼ ἐφʼ ἑαυτοὺς οἱ ἰατροὶ κάμνοντες ἄλλους ἰατροὺς καὶ οἱ παιδοτρίβαι γυμναζόμενοι παιδοτρίβας, ὡς οὐ δυνάμενοι κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθὲς διὰ τὸ κρίνειν περί τε οἰκείων καὶ ἐν πάθει ὄντες.
Yet indeed, doctors when they are sick call in other doctors to treat themselves, and trainers when they are exercising call in other trainers, on the ground that they are unable to judge the truth because they are judging about their own affairs and are in a state of suffering.
ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον ζητοῦντες τὸ μέσον ζητοῦσιν· ὁ γὰρ νόμος τὸ μέσον.
Consequently, it is clear that in seeking what is just they are seeking the mean; for the law is the mean.
ἔτι κυριώτεροι καὶ περὶ κυριωτέρων τῶν κατὰ γράμματα νόμων οἱ κατὰ τὰ ἔθη εἰσίν, ὥστʼ εἰ τῶν κατὰ γράμματα ἄνθρωπος ἄρχων ἀσφαλέστερος, ἀλλʼ οὐ τῶν κατὰ τὸ ἔθος. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον ἐφορᾶν πολλὰ τὸν ἕνα· δεήσει ἄρα πλείονας εἶναι τοὺς ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ καθισταμένους ἄρχοντας, ὥστε τί διαφέρει τοῦτο ἐξ ἀρχῆς εὐθὺς ὑπάρχειν ἢ τὸν ἕνα καταστῆσαι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον;
Moreover, laws according to custom are more sovereign and concern more sovereign matters than written laws, so that even if a human ruler is safer than written laws, he is not safer than those according to custom.\nBut indeed, it is not easy either for one person to oversee many things; there will therefore be a need for more rulers appointed by him, so what difference does it make whether this is the case immediately from the beginning or one person appoints them in this manner?
ἔτι, ὃ καὶ πρότερον εἰρημένον ἐστίν, εἴπερ ὁ ἀνὴρ ὁ σπουδαῖος, διότι βελτίων, ἄρχειν δίκαιος, τοῦ γε ἑνὸς οἱ δύο ἀγαθοὶ βελτίους· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ
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σύν τε δύʼ ἐρχομένω
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καὶ ἡ εὐχὴ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος
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τοιοῦτοι δέκα μοι συμφράδμονες. "
εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν περὶ ἐνίων αἱ ἀρχαὶ κύριαι κρίνειν, ὥσπερ ὁ δικαστής, περὶ ὧν ὁ νόμος ἀδυνατεῖ διορίζειν, ἐπεὶ περὶ ὧν γε δυνατός, οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητεῖ περὶ τούτων ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἄριστα ὁ νόμος ἄρξειε καὶ κρίνειεν.
Furthermore, what has also been said before, if indeed the excellent man is just to rule because he is better, two good men are better than one; for this is the saying,\n"When two go together,"\nand the prayer of Agamemnon: \n"Would that I had ten such counselors."\nAnd even now there are some offices sovereign to judge, like the judge, concerning things which the law is unable to define, since concerning those which it is able, no one disputes about these that the law would rule and judge in the best way.
ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὴ τὰ μὲν ἐνδέχεται περιληφθῆναι τοῖς νόμοις τὰ δὲ ἀδύνατα, ταῦτʼ ἐστὶν ἃ ποιεῖ διαπορεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν πότερον τὸν ἄριστον νόμον ἄρχειν αἱρετώτερον ἢ τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἄριστον· περὶ ὧν γὰρ βουλεύονται νομοθετῆσαι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν.
But since some things can be embraced by the laws, while others are impossible, it is these very things that cause people to perplex and inquire whether it is more desirable for the best law to rule or the best man; for the things about which they deliberate to legislate are among those that are impossible.
οὐ τοίνυν τοῦτό γʼ ἀντιλέγουσιν, ὡς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι τὸν κρινοῦντα περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλʼ ὅτι οὐχ ἕνα μόνον ἀλλὰ πολλούς. κρίνει γὰρ ἕκαστος ἄρχων πεπαιδευμένος ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου καλῶς, ἄτοπον τʼ ἴσως ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν εἰ βέλτιον ἴδοι τις δυοῖν ὄμμασι καὶ δυσὶν ἀκοαῖς κρίνων καὶ πράττων δυσὶ ποσὶ καὶ χερσίν, ἢ πολλοὶ πολλοῖς· ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ὀφθαλμοὺς πολλοὺς οἱ μόναρχοι ποιοῦσιν αὑτῶν καὶ ὦτα καὶ χεῖρας καὶ πόδας· τοὺς γὰρ τῇ ἀρχῇ καὶ αὑτοῖς φίλους ποιοῦνται συνάρχους.
Therefore, they do not dispute this at least, that it is necessary for a human being to be the one who judges about such things, but they argue that it should not be one person alone but many.\nFor each ruler judges well having been trained by the law, and it would perhaps seem absurd if someone judging and acting with two eyes and two ears and two feet and hands could see better than many people with many; since even now monarchs make many eyes and ears and hands and feet of their own; for they make those who are friends to their office and to themselves co-rulers.
μὴ φίλοι μὲν οὖν ὄντες οὐ ποιήσουσι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ μονάρχου προαίρεσιν· εἰ δὲ φίλοι κἀκείνου καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς, ὅ γε φίλος ἴσος καὶ ὅμοιος, ὥστʼ εἰ τούτους οἴεται δεῖν ἄρχειν, τοὺς ἴσους καὶ ὁμοίους ἄρχειν οἴεται δεῖν ὁμοίως.
If, on the one hand, they are not friends, they will not act according to the monarch's choice; but if they are friends both of him and of the office, a friend is equal and like, so that if he thinks these ought to rule, he thinks those who are equal and like ought to rule likewise.
ἃ μὲν οὖν οἱ διαμφισβητοῦντες πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν λέγουσι, σχεδὸν ταῦτʼ ἐστίν. ἀλλʼ ἴσως ταῦτʼ ἐπὶ μὲν τινῶν ἔχει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, ἐπὶ δὲ τινῶν οὐχ οὕτως.
These, then, are pretty much the things that those who dispute against kingship say.\n But perhaps these things are so in the case of some, but in the case of others not so.
ἔστι γάρ τι φύσει δεσποτικὸν καὶ ἄλλο βασιλευτικὸν καὶ ἄλλο πολιτικὸν καὶ δίκαιον καὶ συμφέρον ἄλλο ἄλλοις· τυραννικὸν δʼ οὐκ ἔστι κατὰ φύσιν, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτειῶν ὅσαι παρεκβάσεις εἰσί· ταῦτα γὰρ γίνεται παρὰ φύσιν.
For there is something by nature fit for mastership, and another for kingship, and another for constitutional rule, and different things are just and expedient for different people; but tyrannical rule is not according to nature, nor are any of the other constitutions that are deviations; for these come into being contrary to nature.