Humanitext Reader

Aristotle · Politics §3.1287a

Critique of Absolute Kingship and Rule of Law

Passage 65 of 155 · Greek

Summary

Aristotle examines "absolute kingship," where the king rules according to his own will, and argues that in a city of equals, the rule of law is more natural and desirable than the rule of a single absolute sovereign. He emphasizes that the rule of law represents the rule of God and intellect alone, whereas human rule introduces the beast of desire, and refutes the analogy of the arts used to defend absolute monarchy.

§3.1287aπερὶ δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως τοῦ κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ βούλησιν πάντα πράττοντος ὅ τε λόγος ἐφέστηκε νῦν καὶ ποιητέον τὴν σκέψιν.
But concerning the king who does all things according to his own will, our inquiry has now arrived, and we must make our investigation.
ὁ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ νόμον λεγόμενος βασιλεὺς οὐκ ἔστιν εἶδος, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, πολιτείας (ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ὑπάρχειν ἐνδέχεται στρατηγίαν ἀίδιον, οἷον ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ καὶ ἀριστοκρατίᾳ, καὶ πολλοὶ ποιοῦσιν ἕνα κύριον τῆς διοικήσεως· τοιαύτη γὰρ ἀρχή τις ἔστι καὶ περὶ Ἐπίδαμνον, καὶ περὶ Ὀποῦντα δὲ κατά τι μέρος ἔλαττον)·
For the so-called king according to law is not a form of constitution, as we said (for in all constitutions it is possible for there to be an eternal generalship, as in democracy and aristocracy, and many make one person sovereign of the administration; for there is some such office also concerning Epidamnus, and concerning Opus too in some smaller part).
περὶ δὲ τῆς παμβασιλείας καλουμένης (αὕτη δʼ ἐστὶ καθʼ ἣν ἄρχει πάντων κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βούλησιν ὁ βασιλεύς) δοκεῖ τισιν οὐδὲ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι τὸ κύριον ἕνα πάντων εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ὅπου συνέστηκεν ἐξ ὁμοίων ἡ πόλις·
But concerning the so-called absolute kingship (this is that according to which the king rules all things according to his own will), it seems to some not even to be according to nature for one person to be sovereign over all the citizens where the city is composed of equals.
τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίοις φύσει τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀξίαν κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι, ὥστʼ εἴπερ καὶ τὸ ἴσην ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνίσους τροφὴν ἢ ἐσθῆτα βλαβερὸν τοῖς σώμασιν, οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς τιμάς· ὁμοίως τοίνυν καὶ τὸ ἄνισον τοὺς ἴσους·
For to those who are equal by nature, the same justice and the same worth according to nature is necessary, so that, if indeed for unequal persons to have equal food or clothing is harmful to their bodies, so it is also concerning honors; similarly therefore also for equal persons to have unequal things.
διόπερ οὐδένα μᾶλλον ἄρχειν ἢ ἄρχεσθαι δίκαιον, καὶ τὸ ἀνὰ μέρος τοίνυν ὡσαύτως.
Wherefore it is just that no one should rule any more than be ruled, and therefore that they do so in turn likewise.
τοῦτο δʼ ἤδη νόμος· ἡ γὰρ τάξις νόμος.
But this is already law; for order is law.
τὸν ἄρα νόμον ἄρχειν αἱρετώτερον μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολιτῶν ἕνα τινά, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λόγον τοῦτον, κἂν εἴ τινας ἄρχειν βέλτιον, τούτους καταστατέον νομοφύλακας καὶ ὑπηρέτας τοῖς νόμοις· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ εἶναί τινας ἀρχάς, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἕνα τοῦτον εἶναί φασι δίκαιον, ὁμοίων γε ὄντων πάντων.
Therefore it is more desirable that the law should rule rather than some one of the citizens, and according to this same reasoning, even if it is better for some persons to rule, these must be established as guardians of the laws and servants to the laws; for it is necessary that there be some offices, but they say it is not just for this one person to be so, when all are at least equal.
ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα γε μὴ δοκεῖ δύνασθαι διορίζειν ὁ νόμος, οὐδʼ ἄνθρωπος ἂν δύναιτο γνωρίζειν.
But indeed, whatever things the law does not seem to be able to define, not even a human being would be able to know.
ἀλλʼ ἐπίτηδες παιδεύσας ὁ νόμος ἐφίστησι τὰ λοιπὰ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ γνώμῃ κρίνειν καὶ διοικεῖν τοὺς ἄρχοντας.
But having trained them on purpose, the law appoints the rulers to judge and administer the remaining things with the most just mind.
ἔτι δʼ ἐπανορθοῦσθαι δίδωσιν ὅ τι ἂν δόξῃ πειρωμένοις ἄμεινον εἶναι τῶν κειμένων.
Moreover, it allows them to correct whatever might seem, to those who try, to be better than the established laws.
ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νοῦν μόνους, ὁ δʼ ἄνθρωπον κελεύων προστίθησι καὶ θηρίον· ἥ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχοντας διαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας.
Therefore, he who bids the law to rule seems to bid God and intellect alone to rule, but he who bids a human being to rule adds also a beast; for desire is such a thing, and anger warps rulers and even the best men.
διόπερ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἐστίν.
Wherefore the law is intellect without desire.
τὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ παράδειγμα ψεῦδος, ὅτι τὸ κατὰ γράμματα ἰατρεύεσθαι φαῦλον, ἀλλὰ αἱρετώτερον χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἔχουσι τὰς τέχνας.
But the argument from the arts seems to be false, namely, that to be treated medically according to written rules is bad, but it is more desirable to employ those who possess the arts.
οἱ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν διὰ φιλίαν παρὰ τὸν λόγον ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλʼ ἄρνυνται τὸν μισθὸν τοὺς κάμνοντας ὑγιάσαντες· οἱ δʼ ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς πολλὰ πρὸς ἐπήρειαν καὶ χάριν εἰώθασι πράττειν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τοὺς ἰατροὺς ὅταν ὑποπτεύωσι πιστευθέντας τοῖς ἐχθροῖς διαφθείρειν διὰ κέρδος, τότε τὴν ἐκ τῶν γραμμάτων θεραπείαν ζητήσαιεν ἂν μᾶλλον.
For the former do nothing contrary to reason because of friendship, but earn their pay after healing the sick; whereas those in political offices are accustomed to do many things out of spite and favor, since even in the case of doctors, when people suspect that they have been persuaded by enemies to destroy them for gain, they would then rather seek treatment from written rules.

Notes

  1. 1287aὁμοίως τοίνυν καὶ τὸ ἄνισον τοὺς ἴσους — This phrase contrasts with the preceding `τὸ ἴσην ἔχειν τοὺς ἀνίσους... βλαβερὸν [εἶναι]`, with `βλαβερὸν εἶναι` ("is harmful") being omitted. The subject is the accusative and infinitive construction `τὸ ἄνισον [ἔχειν] τοὺς ἴσους`, meaning "for equals to have unequal things."
  2. 1287aτὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ παράδειγμα ψεῦδος — The infinitive `εἶναι` is associated with the main verb `δοκεῖ` and the predicate `ψεῦδος`. The structure is a hyperbaton of `τὸ τῶν τεχνῶν παράδειγμα δοκεῖ ψεῦδος εἶναι` ("the argument from the arts seems to be false"). The subsequent `ὅτι` clause explains the specific content of this "argument from the arts" (namely, the claim that it is better to rely on experts than written rules).

Cite this passage

Aristotle, Politics §3.1287a. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg035.humanitext-grc2:3.1287a

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