§3.1286bἢ δῆλον ὡς οἱ πλείους;
Or is it manifest that the more are better?
"ἀλλʼ οἱ μὲν στασιάσουσιν ὁ δὲ εἷς ἀστασίαστος. "
ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦτʼ ἀντιθετέον ἴσως ὅτι σπουδαῖοι τὴν ψυχήν, ὥσπερ κἀκεῖνος ὁ εἷς.
"But they will factionalize, whereas the one is free from faction." But to this it should perhaps be countered that they are excellent in soul, just as that one person.
εἰ δὴ τὴν μὲν τῶν πλειόνων ἀρχὴν ἀγαθῶν δʼ ἀνδρῶν πάντων ἀριστοκρατίαν θετέον, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς βασιλείαν, αἱρετώτερον ἂν εἴη ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀριστοκρατία βασιλείας, καὶ μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ χωρὶς δυνάμεως οὔσης τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἂν ᾖ λαβεῖν πλείους ὁμοίους.
If indeed the rule of the more, but all of them good men, must be set down as aristocracy, and that of the one as kingship, aristocracy would be more desirable for cities than kingship, whether the rule is with power or without power, if it is possible to find several who are similar.
καὶ διὰ τοῦτʼ ἴσως ἐβασιλεύοντο πρότερον, ὅτι σπάνιον ἦν εὑρεῖν ἄνδρας πολὺ διαφέροντας κατʼ ἀρετήν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τότε μικρὰς οἰκοῦντας πόλεις.
And for this reason perhaps they were ruled by kings formerly, because it was rare to find men greatly outstanding in virtue, especially since they then inhabited small cities.
ἔτι δʼ ἀπʼ εὐεργεσίας καθίστασαν τοὺς βασιλεῖς, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἔργον τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν.
Moreover, they established their kings on the basis of benefit, which is the work of good men.
ἐπεὶ δὲ συνέβαινε γίγνεσθαι πολλοὺς ὁμοίους πρὸς ἀρετήν, οὐκέτι ὑπέμενον ἀλλʼ ἐζήτουν κοινόν τι καὶ πολιτείαν καθίστασαν.
But when it happened that many became similar in virtue, they no longer submitted but sought something common and established a constitution.
ἐπεὶ δὲ χείρους γιγνόμενοι ἐχρηματίζοντο ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν, ἐντεῦθέν ποθεν εὔλογον γενέσθαι τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας· ἔντιμον γὰρ ἐποίησαν τὸν πλοῦτον.
But when, becoming worse, they made money from the public funds, from some such source it is reasonable that oligarchies arose; for they made wealth honorable.
ἐκ δὲ τούτων πρῶτον εἰς τυραννίδας μετέβαλλον, ἐκ δὲ τῶν τυραννίδων εἰς δημοκρατίαν· αἰεὶ γὰρ εἰς ἐλάττους ἄγοντες διʼ αἰσχροκέρδειαν ἰσχυρότερον τὸ πλῆθος κατέστησαν, ὥστʼ ἐπιθέσθαι καὶ γενέσθαι δημοκρατίας.
And from these they first changed into tyrannies, and from tyrannies into democracy; for by always bringing the power into fewer hands because of shameful greed, they made the multitude stronger, so that they attacked and democracies arose.
ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ μείζους εἶναι συμβέβηκε τὰς πόλεις, ἴσως οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον ἔτι γίγνεσθαι πολιτείαν ἑτέραν παρὰ δημοκρατίαν.
And since it has also happened that cities are larger, perhaps it is no longer even easy for any other constitution to arise besides democracy.
εἰ δὲ δή τις ἄριστον θείη τὸ βασιλεύεσθαι ταῖς πόλεσιν, πῶς ἕξει τὰ περὶ τῶν τέκνων;
But if indeed someone should set down that to be ruled by a king is best for cities, how will the matter of children stand?
πότερον καὶ τὸ γένος δεῖ βασιλεύειν;
Should the family also rule?
ἀλλὰ γιγνομένων ὁποῖοί τινες ἔτυχον, βλαβερόν.
But if they turn out to be whatever kind they happen to be, it is harmful.
"ἀλλʼ οὐ παραδώσει κύριος ὢν τοῖς τέκνοις. "
ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἔτι τοῦτο ῥᾴδιον πιστεῦσαι· χαλεπὸν γάρ, καὶ μείζονος ἀρετῆς ἢ κατʼ ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν.
"But being sovereign, he will not hand it over to his children." But this is no longer easy to believe; for it is difficult, and requires a greater virtue than belongs to human nature.
ἔχει δʼ ἀπορίαν καὶ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, πότερον ἔχειν δεῖ τὸν μέλλοντα βασιλεύειν ἰσχύν τινα περὶ αὑτόν, ᾗ δυνήσεται βιάζεσθαι τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους πειθαρχεῖν, ἢ πῶς ἐνδέχεται τὴν ἀρχὴν διοικεῖν;
And there is also a difficulty about power, whether the one who is going to rule as king should have some force about him, by which he will be able to compel those who are unwilling to obey, or how is it possible to administer the rule?
εἰ γὰρ καὶ κατὰ νόμον εἴη κύριος, μηδὲν πράττων κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ βούλησιν παρὰ τὸν νόμον, ὅμως ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ δύναμιν ᾗ φυλάξει τοὺς νόμους.
For even if he were sovereign according to law, doing nothing according to his own will contrary to the law, nevertheless it is necessary that a power belong to him by which he will guard the laws.
τάχα μὲν οὖν τὰ περὶ τὸν βασιλέα τὸν τοιοῦτον οὐ χαλεπὸν διορίσαι· δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν μὲν ἔχειν ἰσχύν, εἶναι δὲ τοσαύτην τὴν ἰσχὺν ὥστε ἑκάστου μὲν καὶ ἑνὸς καὶ συμπλειόνων κρείττω τοῦ δὲ πλήθους ἥττω, καθάπερ οἵ τʼ ἀρχαῖοι τὰς φυλακὰς ἐδίδοσαν, ὅτε καθισταῖέν τινα τῆς πόλεως ὃν ἐκάλουν αἰσυμνήτην ἢ τύραννον, καὶ Διονυσίῳ τις, ὅτʼ ᾔτει τοὺς φύλακας, συνεβούλευε τοῖς Συρακουσίοις διδόναι τοσούτους τοὺς φύλακας.
Perhaps, therefore, the matters concerning such a king are not difficult to define; for he must have force, but the force must be of such a size as to be stronger than each individual, both one and several together, but weaker than the multitude, just as the ancients used to give guards when they established someone as what they called an aisymnetes or tyrant of the city, and someone, when Dionysius asked for guards, advised the Syracusans to give guards of such a size.